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Executive Summary 
How do insurgents give up arms and return to the same political processes that 
they had once sought to overthrow? A lot has been written on why men and women 
rebel, but we know very little about how rebels quit. This dissertation lays out the pro-
tracted process of retirement of Maoist rebels through informal exit networks that 
grow in the grey zones of insurgency-democracy interface in India.  
Based on fine-grained fieldwork in conflict zones in North and South India, I 
argue that the biggest fear of retiring rebels is that they could be killed as soon as they 
disarmed, potentially by their former enemies, by former comrades, or by various state 
agencies. The state policies for surrender and rehabilitation, however, focus on post 
retirement livelihood provisions without addressing this apprehension of rebels that 
hinders retirement. During intimate conversations with the author former rebels com-
plained that while they could possibly lose their lives after disarming, the state would 
not lose much if retired rebels were killed. This creates a problem of credible com-
mitment, which, I show, is resolved locally by the informal exit networks that flourish 
in the shadow of grassroots associations of civic participation.  
These exit networks are locally embedded. I argue that rebel retirement is ex-
ceptionally high in the South due to emergence of a harmonic exit network that 
weaves together multiple stakeholders in conflict zones in an amalgam of roles and 
alliances in a way that ensures returning rebels survive and reintegrate. In contrast, 
rebel retirement is low in the North due to emergence of a discordant exit network that 
exacerbates the fear and anxiety of retiring rebels and stifles their reintegration. I also 
show that emergence of a specific exit network is contingent on the social bases of in-
surgency, the strength of vertical and horizontal ties forged by the insurgent organiza-
tion, and the everyday dynamics of democracy-insurgency interaction.  
 iv 
To my parents
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I’m indebted to many people for their encouragement and criticism. To those who I mention 
here, words may not adequately convey my appreciation. To those I fail to mention here, my 
apologies. To many rebels and activists in India, some of whom took up arms for a just, equi-
table society, and hence cannot be cited here, I offer my gratitude.  
I owe a special debt to Professor Ronald J Herring for his support, guidance, intellec-
tual engagement and criticism. Ron encouraged me to write the dissertation that I wanted to 
without trying to tailor it to the vagaries of the job market. He constantly pushed me to think 
broadly, and link my narrow empirical interests to broader theoretical issues. Many conversa-
tions with him helped me refine my field research story into an argument. I am especially 
grateful to him for going beyond the call of duty in promptly responding to my endless ques-
tions, over numerous meetings, emails, phone calls, from the field and elsewhere.  
Professor Andrew Mertha has been very generous with his time, offering me constant 
advice, inspiration and criticism through the years. Andy patiently read various drafts of the 
dissertation and offered me incisive comments from the perspective of a comparativist who 
did not work on India. In addition to the intellectual engagement, I owe him a deep gratitude 
for providing the right mix of encouragement, plain speaking and genuine excitement through 
various stages of this project.  
I am especially grateful to Professor Thomas B Pepinsky for steering the dissertation 
towards a more theoretically engaged exercise. At a time I was drowning in fieldwork details 
and my narrow interests in left agrarian radicalism in India, Tom pushed me to think how my 
research would be of interest to someone who does not study left politics in India. I remain in 
awe of his ability to provide prompt, detailed, insightful and sometimes devastating feedback 
that demanded important refinements of the arguments.   
 
 vi 
Professor Emmanuel Teiltelbaum, George Washington University, has been a 
friend, philosopher and guide from my earliest days in graduate school. A guru bhai, I have 
always looked up to him for advice and inspiration through the years. He oversaw the first 
tentative steps of the project and gave me valuable feedback as it neared completion. He re-
minds me, in ways he perhaps does not know, that it is possible to be a great human being as 
well as a good scholar at the same time. I am forever grateful to him.  
The field research was sponsored by the American Institute of Indian Studies (AI-
IS). My fieldwork depended on the generous hospitality of many people in India. I had the 
privilege of speaking to many former Maoists, activists, politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, 
and ordinary villagers in conflict zones, who were incredibly generous opening their homes 
and hearts to me, sharing painful memories and patiently answering my questions.  
I’m grateful to Dr Shibashis Chatterjee for arranging my institutional affiliation with 
the department of International Relations, Jadavpur University. In the South, I worked out of 
the Center for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad. I am especially grateful to Professor 
N Chandrasekhar Rao, who has been a dear friend from Ithaca, NY to Hyderabad and New 
Delhi, India, offering valuable advice as well as logistical assistance in organizing field re-
search in rural South India. I’m also grateful to V. Srinivas for his efficient research assistance 
in the South. In the North, I received valuable assistance from Anumeha Yadav (journalist, 
The Hindu) and from researchers affiliated to Indian Institute of Management, Ranchi.  
I have relied heavily on my family to keep me (sort of) sane during the process. It is 
difficult to express my gratitude to Niloy Sengupta in words. Our children, Rajnaya and Ne-
van, inspire me everyday, in every way. I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, who chose 
to make many sacrifices over several years, just so I could aspire to “have it all” in ways that 
they never did.  
 
 
 vii 
	  
Contents	  
	  
Chapter	  1:	  Maoists	  and	  the	  Lure	  of	  Democracy	  in	  India	  ...........................................................	  0	  
1.	  1	  Introduction	  ........................................................................................................................	  0	  
1.2	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  India:	  The	  Empirical	  Puzzle	  .................................................................	  4	  
1.2.1	  What	  Sets	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  Apart?	  ...........................................................................	  5	  
1.2.2	  What	  sets	  the	  1990s	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  apart?	  .......................................................	  8	  
1.2.3	  What	  sets	  certain	  districts	  apart?	  .............................................................................	  9	  
1.3	  Insights	  from	  literature:	  Explaining	  the	  puzzle	  of	  rebel	  retirement	  in	  India	  ......................	  12	  
1.4	  Mechanisms	  of	  Rebel	  Retirement:	  	  Introducing	  Informal	  Exit	  Networks	  ..........................	  27	  
1.5	  Chapter	  Outline	  .................................................................................................................	  33	  
Chapter	  2:	  	  Setting	  the	  Stage:	  Local	  Embeddedness	  of	  Informal	  Exit	  Networks	  .....................	  37	  
2.1	  Introduction	  ......................................................................................................................	  37	  
2.2	  Agrarian	  Uprisings	  in	  India:	  Emergence	  of	  the	  Maoists	  .....................................................	  39	  
2.2.1	  The	  Forties:	  Violent	  Agrarian	  Uprisings	  across	  India	  ..................................................	  40	  
2.2.2	  The	  Sixties:	  Fragmentation	  of	  the	  Indian	  Left	  .............................................................	  46	  
2.2.3	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century:	  Agrarian	  Discontent	  and	  New	  Mobilization	  ............................	  50	  
2.3	  Maoists	  in	  North	  and	  South	  India:	  Similarities	  and	  Differences	  ........................................	  53	  
2.3.	  1	  Unifying	  Elements	  of	  Maoist	  Ideology:	  State,	  Struggle,	  and	  Strategy	  ...........................	  53	  
2.3.1.1	  Nature	  of	  the	  Indian	  State:	  Semi-­‐Feudal,	  Semi-­‐Colonial	  .....................................	  53	  
2.3.1.2	  Nature	  of	  the	  Struggle:	  Protracted	  People’s	  War	  ................................................	  55	  
2.3.1.3	  Maoist	  Strategy:	  Militant	  Mass	  Mobilization	  .......................................................	  57	  
2.3.2	  Regional	  Specificities	  of	  Maoists:	  Legacy	  and	  Local	  Conditions	  .....................................	  60	  
2.3.2.1	  Fragmentation	  of	  the	  Radical	  Left	  in	  India:	  Maoist	  Factions	  in	  the	  North	  and	  
South	  ................................................................................................................................	  61	  
2.3.2.2	  Pre-­‐War	  Social	  Conditions:	  Democracy-­‐Insurgency	  Interface	  in	  North	  and	  South	  
India	  .................................................................................................................................	  66	  
2.4	  Conclusion	  .........................................................................................................................	  80	  
Chapter	  3:	  Origin	  of	  Rebel	  Retirement	  Network:	  Probing	  the	  Explanatory	  Factors	  ................	  81	  
 viii 
3.1 Introduction	  ...................................................................................................................	  81	  
3.2 Dependent Variable	  .......................................................................................................	  85	  
3.3	  Lure	  of	  Democracy:	  Operationalization	  and	  Measurement	  ..........................................	  86	  
3.4	  Development	  and	  Repression:	  Alternative	  Explanations	  of	  Rebel	  Retirement	  .............	  94	  
	  	  	  	  3.4.1	  Impact	  of	  Development	  on	  Rebel	  Retirement:	  Conceptualization	  and	  Measurement94	  
3.4.2	  Impact	  of	  Brutal	  Repression	  on	  Rebel	  Retirement:	  Conceptualization	  and	  
Measurement	  ....................................................................................................................	  100	  
3.4.3	  Control	  Variables	  ......................................................................................................	  100	  
3.5	  Hypotheses	  and	  Methods	  ............................................................................................	  102	  
3.6	  Results	  .........................................................................................................................	  104	  
3.7	  Conclusion	  ...................................................................................................................	  106	  
Chapter	  4:	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  the	  South:	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Harmonic	  Exit	  Network	  ...........	  108	  
4.1	  Introduction	  .................................................................................................................	  108	  
4.2.	  Telangana	  Region	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh:	  Setting	  the	  Stage	  ...........................................	  109	  
4.2.1	  Telangana:	  History	  and	  Location	  ..........................................................................	  110	  
4.2.2	  Fieldwork:	  Locations,	  Strategy,	  Experience	  ..........................................................	  113	  
4.2.2.1	  Fieldwork	  Locations	  ...........................................................................................	  113	  
4.2.2.2	  Fieldwork	  Strategies	  and	  Limitations	  .................................................................	  116	  
4.3	  From	  a	  Rebel’s	  Perspective:	  Retirement	  through	  Informal	  Exit	  Networks	  ..................	  120	  
4.4	  Macro	  (Environmental)	  Factors:	  Social	  Conditions	  of	  Maoist	  Insurgency	  ...................	  126	  
4.4.1 Battle Lines in Rural Telangana: Underlying Caste Divisions	  .............................	  126	  
4.4.2 Class Polarization of Castes: Insurgent Grassroots Organization in Telangana	  ...	  129	  
4.4.3 Low Militancy of Reddy Landlords: Grassroots Mobilization of Maoists	  ...........	  132	  
4.5	  Meso	  (Organizational)	  Factors:	  Horizontal	  and	  Vertical	  Ties	  .......................................	  136	  
4.5.1 Strong Vertical Ties: Energizing Grassroots Democratic Politics	  ........................	  137	  
4.5.2	  Strong	  Horizontal	  Ties:	  Supporting	  Networks	  Across	  the	  Rural-­‐Urban	  Divide	  .....	  138	  
4.6	  Gray	  Areas	  in	  the	  Insurgency-­‐Democracy	  Interface:	  Civic	  Associations	  and	  Informal	  Exit	  
Networks	  ...........................................................................................................................	  145	  
	  	  	  	  	  4.6.1	  Dalit	  Movement	  in	  the	  South:	  Carving	  out	  a	  Gray	  Zone	  in	  the	  Insurgency-­‐Democracy	  
Interface	  ................................................................................................................................	  146	  
    4.6.2 Civil Liberties Movement in the South: Fortifying the Gray Zone	  ...........................	  153	  
4.7	  Harmonic	  Exit	  Network	  in	  Telangana:	  Actors	  and	  Processes	  ......................................	  159	  
 ix 
4.8 Conclusion	  ...................................................................................................................	  161	  
Chapter	  5:	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  the	  South:	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Discordant	  Exit	  Network	  ..........	  163	  
5.1	  Introduction	  .....................................................................................................................	  163	  
5.2	  Maoist	  Pockets	  in	  the	  North:	  Setting	  the	  Context	  ...........................................................	  165	  
5.2.1	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Jharkhand:	  Poverty	  and	  Mineral	  Resources	  ............................	  167	  
5.2.2	  Demography	  of	  Jharkhand:	  Anti-­‐Migrant	  Tribal	  Agitation	  .......................................	  168	  
5.2.3	  Maoist	  Pockets	  in	  Jharkhand:	  Conflict	  and	  Co-­‐operation	  with	  Democratic	  Tribal	  
Agitation	  ............................................................................................................................	  170	  
5.2.4	  Fieldwork:	  Locations	  and	  Strategy	  ............................................................................	  173	  
5.3	  From	  the	  Rebel’s	  Perspective:	  Retirement	  through	  Discordant	  Exit	  Network	  ................	  175	  
5.4	  Macro	  (Environmental)	  Factors:	  Social	  Bases	  of	  Maoist	  Insurgency	  ...............................	  180	  
5.4.1	  Battle	  lines	  in	  Rural	  Jharkhand:	  Resilience	  of	  Caste	  Divisions	  ..................................	  182	  
5.4.1.1	  Caste	  is	  Class:	  Why	  Hierarchy	  Matters	  in	  the	  Rural	  North	  .................................	  183	  
5.4.	  1.	  2	  Crystallization	  of	  Caste	  as	  a	  Master	  Cleavage:	  The	  Role	  of	  Democratic	  Politics
	  .......................................................................................................................................	  186	  
5.4.1.	  3	  Fractured	  Class	  Coalitions:	  	  Internal	  Cohesiveness	  of	  Insurgent	  Organization	  .	  189	  
5.4.2	  Upper	  Caste	  Counter-­‐Mobilization:	  Collusion	  of	  the	  Democratic	  State	  ...................	  192	  
5.5	  Meso	  (Organizational)	  Factors:	  Strong	  Vertical	  and	  Weak	  Horizontal	  Ties	  .....................	  196	  
5.5.1 Strong Vertical Ties: Maoist Organization Entrenched in Local Conflicts	  ...........	  197	  
5.5.2 Weak Horizontal Ties: Violence, Corruption and Competition	  ............................	  201	  
5.6	  Grey	  Areas	  in	  Insurgency-­‐Democracy	  Interface:	  Rise	  of	  Discordant	  Exit	  Network	  ..........	  204	  
5.7 Conclusion	  ......................................................................................................................	  209	  
Chapter	  6:	  Understanding	  the	  Process	  of	  Rebel	  Retirement	  .................................................	  211	  
6.1	  Introduction:	  Revisiting	  the	  Argument	  ........................................................................	  211	  
6.2	  Theoretical	  Implications	  ..............................................................................................	  217	  
    6.2.1 Pre-­‐War	  Social	  Bases	  of	  Rebel	  Group	  .......................................................................	  218	  
	  	  	  	  	  6.2.2	  Horizontal	  and	  Vertical	  Ties	  of	  Insurgent	  Organization	  ...........................................	  223	  
	  	  	  	  	  6.2.3	  Insurgency-­‐Democracy	  Interaction	  ..........................................................................	  224	  
6.3 Conclusion	  ...................................................................................................................	  229	  
Bibliography	  ...........................................................................................................................	  231	  
Appendix	  ................................................................................................................................	  244	  
 x 
	  
LIST OF FIGURES 
	  
Figure	  1:	  Maps	  Showing	  Decline	  of	  Maoist	  Influence	  in	  the	  South	  	   1	  
Figure	  2:	  Maoist	  Retirement	  Across	  States	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   6	  
Figure	  3:	  Aggregate	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  India	  (2006-­‐2014)	   7	  
Figure	  4:	  Aggregate	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	   9	  
Figure	  5:	  District-­‐Level	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	   10	  
Figure	  6:	  District-­‐	  Level	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  all	  Maoist	  Affected	  States	   11	  
Figure	  7:	  Rebel	  Retirement	  and	  Casualty	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	   24	  
Figure	  8:	  Splits	  in	  the	  Indian	  Left:	  Wave	  1	   48	  
Figure	  9:	  Maoist	  Conceptualization	  of	  Class	  Divisions	  in	  Rural	  India	   59	  
Figure	  10:	  Splits	  in	  the	  Radical	  Left	  Camp	  of	  India:	  Wave	  2	   64	  
Figure	  11:	  Conceptualization	  of	  Social	  Capital	  	   88	  
Figure	  12;	  Construction	  of	  the	  Orgdens	  Variable	   91	  
Figure	  13:	  Correlation	  between	  Orgdens	  and	  Confidence	  in	  Institutions	  (IHDSI)	   92	  
Figure	  14:	  Correlation	  between	  Orgdens	  and	  Confidence	  in	  Institutions	  (IHDSII)	  	   93	  
Figure	  15:	  Correlation	  between	  Rebel	  Retirement	  and	  Orgdens	   94	  
Figure	  16:	  Correlation	  between	  Household	  Assets	  and	  Rebel	  Retirement	  	   97	  
Figure	  17:	  Correlation	  between	  Healthcare	  and	  Rebel	  Retirement	   97	  
Figure	  18:	  Correlation	  between	  Education	  and	  Rebel	  Retirement	   98	  
Figure	  19:	  Boxplot	  Showing	  Impact	  of	  Orgdens	  on	  Rebel	  Retirement	   104	  
Figure	  20:	  Map	  Showing	  Three	  Regions	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  	   111	  
Figure	  21:	  Map	  Showing	  Uneven	  Economic	  Development	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  	   112	  
Figure	  22:	  Map	  Showing	  District	  Level	  Retirement	  in	  the	  South	  	   114	  
Figure	  23:	  FIeldwork	  Areas	  in	  Rural	  South	  	   116	  
Figure	  24:	  Conceptualizing	  the	  Grey	  Area	   145	  
Figure	  25:	  Map	  Showing	  Jharkhand	  in	  South	  Bihar	  	   167	  
Figure	  26:	  Map	  Showing	  District	  Level	  Retirement	  in	  the	  North	  	   173	  
Figure	  27:	  Fieldwork	  Areas	  in	  the	  North	  	   175	  
Figure	  28:	  Process	  of	  Rebel	  Retirement	  Through	  Harmonic	  Exit	  Network	  in	  the	  South	  	   214	  
Figure	  29:	  Process	  of	  Rebel	  Retirement	  Through	  Discordantc	  Exit	  Network	  in	  the	  North	   216	  
Figure	  30:	  Rebel	  Retirement	  and	  the	  Pre-­‐War	  Social	  Bases	  of	  Insurgecny	  	   222	  
Figure	  31:	  Rebel	  Retirement	  and	  Insurgent	  Organizational	  Ties	  	   223	  
Figure	  32:	  Informal	  Exit	  Networks	  Emerging	  in	  the	  Grey	  Zone	   227	  
  	  
Chapter	  1:	  Maoists	  and	  the	  Lure	  of	  Democracy	  in	  India	  
	  
Inquilab (Revolution) was in the air. We planted red flags in the cities and the villages. Everybody knew 
us. My parents were proud of me. We were neighborhood heroes. Then we went underground. No one 
knows us anymore. The Revolution never came.   
-Retired Maoist, Hanamkonda, Warangal District, 20131.   
 
1.	  1	  Introduction	  
	  
In 2006, the government of India identified the Communist Party of India (Maoist) as the biggest 
internal security threat the country has ever faced.2 Telangana, comprising ten districts in the 
southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, has been one of the strongest pockets of Maoist influ-
ence in India. The dominant Maoist faction in the South is Communist Party of India (Marxist-
Leninist) Peoples’ War [CPI(ML)PW], commonly referred to as PW. (S. Banerjee 1980). 3 In 
2004, PW merged with two other dominant Maoist factions in the North, the Maoist Communist 
Center (MCC) and CPI(Party Unity) (PU), to form an all-India united front CPI(Maoist). Post-
unification, the Maoist party leaped into national prominence proclaiming control over continu-
ous territory across six states now dubbed as “Red Corridor.” The Union Ministry of Home Af-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Unless	  otherwise	  indicated,	  all	  quotations	  are	  from	  interviews	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  author	  in	  2013	  and	  2014.	  
2	  Man	  Mohan	   Singh,	   “Focus	   on	  Good	  Governance,	   Reducing	  Deprivation	   and	  Alienation”	   during	   the	   Concluding	  
Remarks	  at	  the	  Second	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Standing	  Committee	  of	  Chief	  Ministers	  on	  Naxalism,	  April	  13,	  2006,	  availa-­‐
ble	  at	  http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=17128	  (accessed	  on	  November	  21,	  2009)	  
3	  Telangana	  became	  a	  separate	  state	  in	  2014,	  splitting	  from	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  The	  Maoists	  have	  always	  considered	  
political	  economy	  of	  Telangana	  very	  distinct	  from	  Coastal	  Andhra	  and	  Rayalseema,	  but	  more	  akin	  to	  the	  bordering	  
districts	  of	  Odisha.	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fairs in 2008 indicated that the Maoist movement variously affected a total of 223 Districts 
across 20 States in North and South India.4   
The Maoists have grabbed national and international headlines by leading a series of bra-
zen assaults, including beheading an inspector, hijacking a crowded passenger train, kidnapping 
highest ranking bureaucrats, attacking a convoy of politicians, attempting assassinations of vari-
ous ruling chief ministers, slaughtering 76 officers of paramilitary counterinsurgency forces and 
so on. Between 2005-2015, the conflict has claimed a total approximately seven thousand lives.5 
As the media fixated on the spectacular exploits of the Maoists, the popular insurgency started 
losing grounds in its strongest foothold in the South (as shown in the map below), where it had 
deep roots since the 1970s. 
	  
Figure	  1	  
Maps	  showing	  decline	  of	  Maoist	  influence	  in	  the	  South	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Confirming	  these	  broad	  trends,	  partial	  data	  compiled	  from	  media	  reports	  by	  the	  South	  Asia	  Terrorism	  Portal	  
(SATP)	  shows	  that,	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  total	  number	  of	  incidents,	  total	  affected	  Districts	  dropped	  from	  194	  in	  
2008	  to	  just	  141	  in	  2011.	  Further,	  58	  highly	  affected	  districts	  in	  2008	  were	  reduced	  to	  just	  48	  in	  the	  Highly	  Affected	  
category	  in	  2011;	  another	  47	  and	  46	  Districts,	  respectively,	  were	  listed	  in	  the	  moderately	  and	  marginally	  affected	  
categories	  in	  2011,	  as	  against	  54	  and	  83	  Districts	  in	  these	  categories	  in	  2008.	  
5	  The	  casualty	  is	  distributed	  as	  follows:	  of	  which	  715	  are	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  2262	  are	  in	  Chhattisgarh,	  1364	  are	  in	  
Jharkhand	  and	  699	  are	  in	  West	  Bengal	  Data	  from	  South	  Asia	  Terrorism	  Portal	  available	  at	  
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/fatalitiesnaxal05-­‐11.htm	  (accessed	  on	  June	  
18,	  2015)	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By the time of my fieldwork in the South in 2013-14, ordinary people in most districts in 
Telangana region  have not seen or heard of armed guerrillas visiting their villages and neighbor-
ing areas in the last five years or more. It is as if the Indian state, like a giant sponge, absorbed all 
upheavals in the region and fell right back in shape. The only tangible reminders of the violent 
uprisings are the numerous tombs that the local Maoist faction (Peoples’ War, PW henceforth) 
had erected across the rural South to honor their dead comrades. Even these modest structures 
are shrouded in thorny shrubs and animal excreta, lying dilapidated by the pitch-black roads built 
by state governments to connect villages that were once remote. Standing by one such tomb, a 
tribal woman in Adilabad district said wistfully that annalu (the comrades, referred to as older 
brother in local dialect) abandoned her, just like rain and good fortune always had. I knew she 
had deserted her comrades too. The dream of revolution was no more.  
Body bags still come to villages of the South when a local boy gets killed in neighboring 
states of Chhattisgarh and Odisha. But Maoists there have mostly disarmed, demobilized and re-
integrated back into the mainstream. These retired rebels are known as “majhi”. This is a unique 
local honorific used to refer to former Maoists, with no comparable equivalent in any other 
Maoist-affected states. I found the dominant popular sentiment in the South respectful towards 
majhis. Ministers, activists, lawyers, poets, journalists, academics, bureaucrats, and policemen 
eagerly proclaimed their earlier association with Maoist politics and acknowledged how the up-
rising in the 70s and 80s left an indelible mark on their personal lives, political views, and public 
careers. Even in villages, despite initial hesitation, there were hushed admissions of how the rev-
olutionaries gave them hope and self-confidence before they were gone. I have met retired rebels 
in remote villages, small towns and cities working as life insurance agent, farmer, homemaker, 
musician, moonshiner, tailor, doctor, auto-rickshaw (ubiquitous public transport) driver, journal-
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ist, professor, politician, real estate agent, goonda (hired thug), shopkeeper, tailor, village head-
man (or woman) and so on. Some former Maoists have also reportedly formed killer criminal 
gangs.(Kumar and Balagopal 2006)  
In the North, however, people were much more critical of the Maoists, and more hesitant 
to even talk about them. Retired rebels are scarce and them becoming a criminal, politician or 
both is the norm rather than the exception.6 In fact, I have not met any former Maoist in Jhar-
khand who is not plugged into a political-criminal network, one way or the other. For example, a 
former rebel I met in a shady roadside dance bar in the North raised my curiosity when he men-
tioned that his wife was, in fact, elected head (Sarpanch) of village self-government in Chhatra 
district. However, it turns out that the timid-looking rebel was, in fact, member of a vigilante 
group of former Maoists that allegedly works with police to ‘wipe out’ Maoist militancy.7  
Every mention of Maoists invoked much fear, suspicion, patriotic indignation, and dis-
comfort among ordinary people in the North. In villages, doors were shut on my face and some 
threatened to call the police. In the neighboring state of West Bengal, intellectuals, politicians, 
and activists offered customary lip service to the Naxal uprising in the 1960s. But revolutionaries 
were quickly dismissed as misguided militants indulging in youthful fantasies; retired rebels 
were disillusioned political turncoats seeking refuge in dominant political parties or in cushy jobs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  While	  I	  met	  and	  spoke	  to	  retired	  rebels	  without	  any	  hassle	  in	  the	  South,	  it	  was	  very	  difficult	  to	  find	  them	  in	  the	  
North.	  Jharkhand	  police	  gave	  me	  the	  names,	  addresses	  and	  phone	  numbers	  of	  rebels	  that	  they	  ‘encouraged’	  me	  to	  
talk	  to.	  But	  as	  I	  tried	  to	  visit	  villages	  in	  the	  North	  and	  met	  former	  Maoists	  who	  joined	  other	  armed	  factions	  (alleg-­‐
edly	  set	  up	  by	  police),	  I	  was	  ‘interviewed’	  by	  Intelligence	  Bureau	  (IB)	  officers	  from	  New	  Delhi	  for	  several	  hours,	  
requesting	  to	  discuss	  my	  notes,	  my	  research	  and	  identification	  papers.	  They	  knocked	  on	  my	  hotel	  door	  at	  6	  AM,	  
and	  advised	  me	  to	  reconsider	  my	  meetings	  of	  the	  day.	  My	  local	  research	  assistants	  and	  drivers	  were	  also	  ques-­‐
tioned.	  
7	  The	  TPC	  (Tritiya	  Prastuti	  Committee)	  was	  founded	  in	  2001	  in	  Chatra	  by	  Brajesh	  Ganju,	  a	  Dalit,	  who	  had	  left	  the	  
Maoists	  Communist	  Centre	  (MCC),	  citing	  the	  dominance	  of	  Yadavs	  in	  the	  party	  leadership	  and	  discrimination	  
against	  Dalits.	  The	  TPC,	  which	  has	  cadres	  from	  Dalit	  communities	  including	  Ganju,	  Turi	  and	  Bokta,	  is	  active	  in	  parts	  
of	  Chatra,	  Palamu,	  Latehar,	  Ranchi	  and	  Hazaribagh	  districts	  in	  Jharkhand	  and	  parts	  of	  West	  Bengal	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in academia and nongovernment organizations. I also found that, quite counter intuitively, Mao-
ists in the North were first arrested by the police and then convinced to ‘surrender’. In other 
words, rebels, already in police custody, were offered money and other incentives to enroll in the 
surrender and rehabilitation program. Yet there were few successful surrender cases in Jharkhand 
over the last ten years for them to show for all that. In Telangana, on the other hand, rebels 
reached out to the police through various channels from their hideouts in jungles to disarm and 
reintegrate into mainstream.  
Summing up, rebel retirement is much higher in in the South compared to that in the 
North. In addition, life and livelihood of retired rebels in South is very different from their coun-
terparts in the North. The process and pathway out of the movement in the two pockets of Maoist 
movement are also distinct. While retired rebels in the South experienced broad reintegration in-
to a variety of professions in both urban and rural areas, those in the North remain entrenched in 
the same political-criminal network that also plagued their insurgent career. It is no coincidence 
that Maoist retirement is exceptionally high in the South and very low in the North.   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 fleshes out the empirical puzzle 
that lie at the center of this thesis. Section 3 analyzes existing literature that addresses various 
dimensions of this puzzle and highlights the primary contribution of this thesis to this literature. 
Section 4 presents a brief summary of arguments presented in this thesis. Section 5 lays out the 
research design and provides a road map, explaining the structure and contribution of each chap-
ter.  
1.2	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  India:	  The	  Empirical	  Puzzle	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The empirical puzzle of Maoist retirement in India has three dimensions: (a) Rebel re-
tirement is very high in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh compared to the northern states of 
Jharkhand and West Bengal, despite comparable movement intensity in the two regions. (b) 
Within Andhra Pradesh, rebel retirement is highest in the nineties, before targeted welfare 
measures, lucrative surrender package and efficient policing by Greyhound commando forces 
were introduced. (c) Within states, both in the North and the South, rebel retirement tends to 
concentrate in a few districts and not others. This project is centrally concerned with what this 
subnational variation in rebel retirement and its concentration in certain times and places tell us 
about the mechanisms of lure of democracy that brings extremists back into the mainstream in 
India. The rest of this section will lay out the data that further illustrates various dimensions of 
the empirical puzzle of retirement of Maoist rebels as laid out above.  
1.2.1	  What	  Sets	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  Apart?	  
	  
The retirement of Maoist rebels is exceptionally high in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. 
Between 2006 and 2014, over 60 percent of the total Maoist surrenders in India are concentrated 
in the state of Andhra Pradesh. There were 781 surrenders in Andhra Pradesh between 2006 and 
2012, compared to 142 in Bihar, 142 in Odisha, 115 in Chhattisgarh, 54 in Jharkhand and 39 in 
West Bengal (graph below).  
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Figure	  2	  
Maoist Retirement Across States (2006-2012)  
Andhra Pradesh stands out as exceptionally successful in securing Maoist surrender not 
only in terms of surrender data but also in the national narrative of counterinsurgency. Data on 
surrender of Maoists in India are available from two sources: (a) the Naxal Management Divi-
sion of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) of the Government of India (b) South Asia Terror-
ism Portal (an independent think tank based in New Delhi). The MHA has official data based on 
reports submitted by respective Maoist-affected states. SATP bases its estimate on media reports 
of surrender. The following diagram compares MHA and SATP surrender data (2006-2014).  
781	  
142	   115	  
54	  
142	  
39	  
0	  
100	  
200	  
300	  
400	  
500	  
600	  
700	  
800	  
900	  
Andhra	  
Pradesh	  &	  
Telengana	  
Bihar	   Chamsgarh	  Jharkhand	   Odisha	   West	  
Bengal	  
Total	  State-­‐wise	  surrender(2006-­‐2012)	  	  
 	  
	  
7	  
	  
Figure	  3	  
Aggregate	  Annual	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  India	  (2006-­‐2014)	  	  
The graph above shows that between 2006-2012 there is a rough match in the surrender 
data drawn from two sources.The MHA data is slightly higher than the SATP data, but both data 
sources represent a similar yearly trend.8 However, SATP misreports exceptionally high number 
of surrender in Odisha in 2013, which spiked SATP surrender data way above MHA data. On 
examination of the underlying media reports that SATP used to compile this data, I found that 
they include en masse ‘surrender’ of activists of a popular tribal organization (Chasi Muliya 
Adivasi Sangh, CMAS), even though New Delhi does not recognize them as Maoists. These are  
tribals who never went underground, never trained as insurgents or joined Maoist party.9 SATP 
also misreports very high surrender in Chhattisgarh in 2014. However, subsequent media reports, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  During	  interviews	  with	  the	  author,	  SATP	  data	  analysts	  explained	  that	  their	  dataset	  is	  built	  on	  media	  reports	  and	  it	  
is	  possible	  that	  some	  surrender	  cases	  do	  not	  get	  reported.	  It	   is	  also	  possible	  that	  state	  police	  departments	  exag-­‐
gerate	  the	  surrender	  figures	  while	  submitting	  their	  annual	  reports	  to	  MHA.	  
9	  A	  very	  popular	  local	  Maoist	  leader,	  Sabyasachi	  Panda,	  fell	  out	  with	  central	  leadership	  of	  CPI(Maoist)	  during	  this	  
time.	  He	  complained	  about	  Telugu	  domination	  of	  Odiya	  pride	  among	  other	  things.	  Media	  reports	  gave	  the	  impres-­‐
sion	  that	  with	  Panda	  thousands	  of	  ordinary	  people	  also	  quit	  the	  Maoists	  in	  what	  seemed	  like	  an	  Odiya	  assertion.	  In	  
fact,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  underlying	  media	  reports	  reveal	  that	  1765	  or	  total	  1960	  surrenders	  reported	  in	  Odisha	  in	  
2013	  happened	   in	  one	  district	   (Koraput)	  between	  April	  6	  and	  17	   from	  one	  organization,	   the	  CMAS	   (Chashi	  Muli	  
Adivasi	  Sangha),	  which	  is	  not	  considered	  a	  Maoist	  organization	  in	  policy	  circles.	  At	  best,	  it	  is	  a	  tribal	  landless	  agri-­‐
cultural	  workers	  association	  and	  the	  Maoists	  are	  eager	  to	  recruit	  them.	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and my personal inquiries with local activists and journalists revealed that high numbers of 
surrender in Chhattisgarh in 2014 were made up for political expediency. The police allegedly 
orchestrated fake surrenders events, with an aim to secure political mileage for state government 
and seek more financial resources from New Delhi.10  
However, despite discomfort over accuracy of surrender data (Odisha, 2013 and 
Chattisgarh, 2014), there is a consensus among politicians, bureaucrats, mediapersons and 
scholars that surrender of Maoists is significantly higher in Andhra Pradesh compared to all other 
simimlarly affected states.11 During Annual meetings among Chief Ministers of Maoist-affected 
states, the prime minister of India routinely sings the praise of Andhra Pradesh for its remarkable 
success in luring rebels away. The example of Andhra Pradesh was repeatedly invoked during 
my meetings in policy circles in Delhi and in the state capitals of Jharkhand and West Bengal as 
well. Thus we are faced with the question: What sets AP apart? 
1.2.2	  What	  sets	  the	  1990s	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  apart?	  
	  
The reputation of Andhra Pradesh as the state that crushed some Maoists and lure the rest back 
into democracy is built on relatively high surrender incidents in the state between 2006-2014. 
However, during my fieldwork in Andhra Pradesh, I met many rebels who quit during the early 
and mid-1990s. This led me to question the dominant narrative in policy circles that surrender 
increased and the movement waned only around 2010. The nineties were, on the other hand, high 
noon of Maoist activity and strength in the state. Available data on surrender of Maoists in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   See	   for	   example,	   Ground	   Report:	   The	   Truth	   About	   Chhattisgarh’s	   Recent	   Maoist	   Surrender	  
http://scroll.in/article/775849/ground-­‐report-­‐the-­‐truth-­‐about-­‐chhattisgarhs-­‐recent-­‐maoist-­‐surrenders	  	  
11	  In	  Ranchi,	  the	  capital	  of	  Jharkhand,	  I	  spent	  time	  idling	  around	  and	  talking	  to	  mid-­‐	  and	  high-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  in	  
Jharkhand	  secretariat.	  It	  became	  apparent	  that	  they	  were	  under	  pressure	  from	  Home	  Ministry	  in	  New	  Delhi	  to	  
match	  up	  high	  surrender	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	  The	  police	  officers	  in	  charge	  of	  anti-­‐Naxal	  operations	  in	  the	  Police	  
Headquarters	  in	  Ranchi	  expressed	  frustration	  over	  the	  constant	  belittling	  by	  state	  bureaucrats	  and	  Ministers	  for	  
their	  inability	  to	  secure	  more	  Maoist	  surrender	  at	  par	  with	  their	  counterparts	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh.	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state dating back to the 1990s supported my field discovery: surrender during nineties was, in 
fact, much higher than that between 2006-2014, approximately 4 times higher than that in the 
fifteen years between 2000 and 2014.  
 
Figure	  4	  
Rebel Retirement in Andhra Pradesh (1990-2014) 
1.2.3	  What	  sets	  certain	  districts	  apart?	  
	  
Another interesting spatial pattern in rebel retirement is that it tends to concentrate in certain dis-
tricts in Maoist affected states. I found that Maoists, whether they had worked in their home state 
or in neighboring Chhattisgarh and Odisha, inevitably returned to Andhra Pradesh to surrender. 
It is a well-known fact. It is not unusual that when rebels retire they come back to what they call 
home, which is often their ancestral village. The most common explanation of this offered to me 
by police and administration in Andhra Pradesh is that the state has a lucrative surrender package 
and has also built a reputation of implementing it.  
However, Chandranna, a shy toddy-tapper (backward caste) in his early 50s, who hails 
from Karimnagar district and worked as Maoist district-committee secretary in Dantewada 
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(Chhattisgarh), chose to surrender in Khammam district. His wife, Vijaya, also from Manthani, 
Karimnagar, surrendered in Kothugudem, Khammam. Later they settled down in his ancestral 
village in Adilabad district. After several meetings with retired rebels both in the North and 
South, I found that rebels chose to surrender in certain districts and not others in their chosen 
states. As I looked into the district level surrender data between 2006 and 2014 it showed that 
surrender cases indeed tend to be concentrated in certain districts in the Maoist-affected states. 
75% of total surrender in Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh is concentrated in two districts of 
Warangal and Khammam. In coastal AP, 80% of total surrender is concentrated in Vishakhapat-
nam.  
  
Figure	  5	  
District-Level Rebel Retirement in Andhra Pradesh (2006-2013)  
Surrender cases are concentrated in one or two districts in the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, 
Odisha and West Bengal as well. In Bihar, surrender is concentrated in Rohtas and Muzaffarpur. 
In Jharkhand, surrender is concentrated in capital Ranchi and neighboring Khunti district. In Od-
isha, surrender was concentrated in the district of Koraput. In West Bengal, surrender was con-
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centrated in West Midnapore. Chhattisgarh is an exception, where surrender is spread across all 
affected districts.  
 
Figure	  6	  
District-Level Concentration of Rebel Retirement in India 
State surrender policies do not vary from district to district. Yet rebels choose some dis-
tricts over others to surrender. What does this tell us about the process of rebel retirement? In 
addition to the three dimensions of the empirical puzzle of rebel retirement illustrated above, 
pathways out of the movement and choice of post-retirement life and livelihood of rebels also 
vary significantly between the two pockets of Maoist influence. There is a systematic regional 
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variation in the micro-processes that transpire between a rebel’s first desire to quit and the ulti-
mate step to disarm and finally reintegrate into new life and livelihood. A typical retired Maoist 
in Telangana, for example, could pursue any career from homemaker to criminal, moonshiner to 
professor. In the North, however, a typical retired rebel is almost always an aspiring politician 
clad in stiffly starched white cotton kurta-pajama, the quintessential trademark of an Indian poli-
tician. He jumps parties during election cycles, joining any party, right or left that offers him a 
nomination for local, state or national elections. He moves around heavily guarded by his per-
sonal crew of tough guys, who trot around with illegal guns and their faces half masked even in 
state legislative assemblies in broad daylight. I also grapple with associated questions like how 
rebels communicate their decision to quit to their comrades and superiors. Who they reach out to 
in the outside – police, administration, political leaders or family? What are their biggest appre-
hensions and aspirations?  
1.3	  Insights	  from	  literature:	  Explaining	  the	  puzzle	  of	  rebel	  retirement	  in	  India	  	  
	  
These questions on rebel retirement and lure of democracy in India are embedded within 
another enduring puzzle in comparative politics: the old literature on the puzzling contradiction 
of India’s high levels of political violence within a democratic political system. It has long been 
viewed as a “paradox” in comparative politics. (Weiner 1989; Lijphart 1996) How the world's 
largest and most heterogeneous democracy survives counter to Mill's proposition (that democra-
cy is "next to impossible" in multiethnic societies and completely impossible in linguistically 
divided countries) and Selig S. Harrison's prediction of impending democratic failure and/or ter-
ritorial disintegration remains an enduring puzzle.(Mill 2004; Harrison 2003) During the last 64 
years since India gained its independence from the British, several violent political mobilizations 
rocked her in spells of dooms and despair. However, none of these ethnic, linguistic, religious or 
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left extremist movements are able to punch a permanent dent on the body politic of the demo-
cratic goliath. Like a big sponge, she continues to absorb all shocks and stresses and fall right 
back in shape. Except a brief interlude in the 1970s, the democracy functions uninterrupted.  
Scholars examining India’s democratic survival through recurrent violence propose sev-
eral factors like consociational power sharing (Brass 1994; Wilkinson 2006), pork barrel politics, 
decentralization and strategic patronage distribution (Sadanandan 2012) as possible factors keep-
ing many violent mobilization at bay. The mantra of radical redistribution (socialism, populism, 
abolition of princely privileges) chanted alongside the conservative politics sans any substantial 
reallocation has so far accommodated the most powerful challengers through ad hoc concessions 
of rights and dignity, even if not of wealth. (Kohli 1991; Kohli 2001) However, with the rising 
turnout of the poor in Indian elections (Yadav 2004), demise of welfare state, end of Congress 
domination, and concomitant success of local, regional, religious, ethnic and caste parties (Jaf-
frelot 2003; Hasan 2004; Chandra 2007) it is becoming increasingly challenging to continue the 
fine balancing act of serving the interests of the rich and powerful without fully alienating the 
weak and poor. This project proposes that the lure of democracy even for those who had once 
violently denounced it provides an important site for searching for reasons for India’s surprising 
democratic survival. The primary assumption here is that democracy is able to co-exercise its 
benign and brutal face in a way that makes it both feared and desired, hated and endearing. In 
contexts like India where there are precedents of insurgent groups making an electoral switch, it 
is inevitable that the Maoist party, which boycotts elections, struggles to undermine the lure of 
democracy for its cadres.  
It is important to note that unlike some other identity based movements in India that seek 
a greater share of the democratic pie, the Maoists want to destroy it. Therefore, unlike other sep-
 	  
	  
14	  
aratist groups, the Maoists come back to democracy not in vindication of their political demands, 
but often in total negation of their insurgent ideology and careers. To them, the democratic insti-
tutions of India, designed to protect the entrenched class interests of the feudal remnants and the 
comprador bourgeoisie, are systematically biased against the wellbeing of the proletariat. In such 
a semi feudal, semi colonial system, elections offer a limited choice among representatives of 
dominant classes unwilling to make any real changes.  Therefore, the Maoists boycott elections 
and wage an armed struggle to overthrow the current political system and reinstate a new one. 
Thus they refuse conciliatory power sharing gestures from the state and instead raise a People’s 
Liberation Army from among the poorest of the poor in the country and declared a protracted 
people’s war (henceforth PPW) with the stated goal of violently overthrowing the Indian democ-
racy.  
Although the abovementioned questions take particular significance in contemporary In-
dia, India is hardly an exception in this regard. The militant leaders of organizations like Fara-
bundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Unified Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) in Nepal, the Tupamaros movement in Guatemala, the Workers Party in Brazil, 
the Movement for Socialism party (MAS), the cocalero trade union in Bolivia, the Irish Republi-
can Army (IRA) in Ireland have all shunned their militant pasts to embrace the path of legitimate 
power politics. Not much is known about when, why and how such insurgent democratic transi-
tion become more likely.  
Related to the questions of subnational variation of rebel retirement is also the question of 
the impact of rebel reintegration on a functioning democracy. It is probably one of the very few 
valid generalizations in the literature on social protest and collective mobilization that move-
ments arise only when aggrieved groups cannot work through established channels to communi-
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cate new claims into the political process of authoritative decision- making. (Kitschelt 1993) But 
violent movements do not necessarily further weaken a functioning democracy. Experimental 
research indicates that the political legacy of violent conﬂict can be positive:  past violence in 
northern Uganda is shown to lead to increased political engagement among ex combatants. 
(Blattman and Miguel 2009; Annan et al. 2011; Bellows and Miguel 2009) Although generaliza-
bility of these finding requires more evidence to judge, they point to important new avenues of 
research. These questions acquire particular salience in India. During interviews with this re-
searcher, former combatants turned legislators in India suggested that their experience in vio-
lence led to personal growth and political activation, a possibility supported by psychological 
research on the positive effects of traumatic events. (Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004) In the existing 
political science literature, however, violent political contentions in India have received much 
scholarly attention. The impact of peaceful reincarnation of violent groups as political parties has 
gone relatively unnoticed.  
In looking to the broader literature on insurgency for clues, one reason rebels retire from 
violent politics is material incentives embedded in reintegration schemes offered by govern-
ments. Referred to as DDRR (Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation) 
in the literature, these schemes try to include positive social, economic, and stabilization benefits 
for individual rebels to lure them away from violence one at a time. In addition to substantial 
cash award, states promise education, vocational training, employment and housing assistance. 
Drawing from Sun Tzu, the US military in Afghanistan calls its approach for reintegration of in-
surgents ‘golden surrender’, which promises reintegration of former combatants into their com-
munities with ‘dignity and honor’, protection and security’, education, vocational training, and 
cash awards.(Waldman 2010; Horgan and Braddock 2010; Kurtenbach and Wulf 2012) Insurgent 
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reintegration programs have been run in Singapore, El Salvador, Mozambique, Yemen, Iraq, Af-
ghanistan and Colombia. Economic dimensions of post-conﬂict reintegration receive priority in 
the literature; proponents argue that ‘‘ex-combatants must be able to earn a livelihood through 
legitimate means’’ (International Peace Academy 2002) Given that a higher risk of conﬂict is 
associated with an absence of income-earning opportunities for young men (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004), risk-reducing demobilization and reintegration programs seek to create economic oppor-
tunities for combatants. 
The government of India, taking cue from the DDRR schemes worldwide, argues that its 
surrender and rehabilitation policy for the Maoists can ‘wean away the misguided youth …who 
have strayed into the fold of Naxal movement’. Their rationale is as follows: “As the naxal prob-
lem has arisen on account of real and perceived neglect, deprivation and disaffection, mainly to-
wards the downtrodden, the solution should aim at providing gainful employment and entrepre-
neurial opportunities to the surrendered naxalites so that they are encouraged to join the main-
stream and do not return to the fold of naxal movement.” 12At present, different states in India 
offer varying 'financial packages' to Maoists who surrender. Recently the federal government 
moved to increase its share by 15 times to help cash-strapped states offer uniform incentives and 
to pursue surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy more vigorously. There is a considerable variation 
in the outcome, with some states like Andhra Pradesh reporting high surrender rates, while others 
like Chhattisgarh reporting none.   
A consensus appears to be emerging in policy circles from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone 
that material incentives as parts of multidimensional peacekeeping measures improve the pro-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The	  Naxal	  Surrender	  and	  Rehabilitation	  Program	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  India	  available	  at	  
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=67973	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spects for peace, democracy, and improved economic performance in the aftermath of conﬂict 
(Walter 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 2010; Doyle and Sambanis 2000) Further post conflict case 
studies in Mozambique, South Africa, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Nicaragua show that if  de-
mobilized  combatants  are  not  placed into  employment  or  provided  with  skills-training  op-
portunities,  the  lack  of  an income source increases their propensity to commit  crimes, even 
turning them into banditry.(Kingma 2008; Batchelor, Kingma, and Lamb 2004; Knight and 
Ozerdem 2004; Weiss Fagen 1995)  Despite the confidence policy makers have shown in the use 
of material incentives as a means of inducing rebel retirement, the available literature on the sub-
ject is full of country specific reports, which cannot vary either the dependent (policy outcome) 
or the independent variables. Further, identifying the role of material incentives in facilitating 
transition from bullets to ballots is difficult at the macro level. These programs rarely take place 
in isolation. They typically are complemented by other military, social, and economic interven-
tions. But it the lure of lucre remains an important alternative explanation of insurgent democrat-
ic transition.  The most important shortcoming of the DDRR literature is that it is written from 
the perspective of policy makers, offering before-after impact measurement of certain surrender 
and rehabilitation programs. It begins with the assumption that rebels can be bought over, and 
delves into the debate over what can be the most effective incentive for rebels – land, jobs, cash 
transfer or some combination of those. I look at the question from the perspective of rebels, fo-
cusing on their apprehensions and aspirations. In addition, the DDRR literature has very little to 
offer the steps before reintegration and livelihood. I shed light on the protracted process of dis-
engagement that transpires between the desire to quit and actually disarming, which come prior 
to the concerns for livelihood.  
 	  
	  
18	  
Another explanation of insurgent democratic transition is institutional cooptation, ex-
plored in the literature on social movement organizations. In the classic Weber-Michels model, 
movement leaders modify organizational goals to accommodate societal norms and avoid con-
flict.  In addition, professional organizers seeking access to dominant institutions through third 
party sponsors (Jenkins and Perrow 1977) or through the mass media (Gitlin 2003)  end up "de-
mobilizing mass defiance" (Jenkins 1983) and thereby pasteurizing the movement's ideological 
challenge, thereby inciting insurgent democratic transition. This model assumes that external 
pressure is always towards conservatism. Further, it assumes that the rank and file are inert or 
only intermittently concerned with movement goals (Schwartz et al., 1981).  
Along similar lines are explanations centered upon elite strategy. Movement leaders shun 
bullets and choose ballots if the probability it attaches to being victorious in democratic competi-
tion is greater than some minimum. (Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997; Colomer 2000)  These 
works, analyzing the circumstances under which democracy is preferred to fighting, focus only 
on the payoffs from democracy with an exogenous payoff to fighting. They conclude that the cir-
cumstance most propitious to the consolidation of democracy is evenly matched party competi-
tion.  However, the factors that influence the probability that a party wins power under democra-
cy (viz. popular support) will also influence its ability to win a fight if it decides to violate the 
democratic rules. In trying to assess the potential outcome of their choice of insurgent or demo-
cratic path, movement leaders choose the democratic option when one group among two fighting 
sides is dominant. (Chacon, Robinson, and Torvik 2006)  
In a functioning democracy like India, where Maoist insurgents contend with legitimate 
political parties for popular support, the spread of insurgency is a result of rise of regional parties 
and consequent fragmentation of the party system. Paradoxically enough, as the number of polit-
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ical parties in India explodes, high fragmentation makes it impossible and unnecessary for any of 
these parties to win majority votes in order to emerge victorious. On the contrary, these parties 
have incentives to remain small clubs with closed membership to win elections with minority 
support of core group of committed followers. This leaves a large young population, with un-
sought, unaffiliated allegiance, pushing them into the arms of Maoists, who are the only political 
platform that try to recruit them. (Chandra 2011) On the flip side, therefore, decrease in political 
fragmentation, with reduction in number of political parties, should lower insurgent recruitment 
and hence increase the likelihood of insurgent democratic transition.  
Recent research in social psychology and anthropology suggests some other plausible de-
terminants of this transition. A rich empirical literature has examined the impact of exposure to 
violence on the part of noncombatants (Dyregrov, Gjestad, and Raundalen 2002; Husain et al. 
1998) on prospects of rebel transition. This study argues that civilian casualty in itself is not a 
good indicator of noncombatant hostility to insurgents, without knowing if it were the insurgents 
or the police, who were help responsible for the damages suffered by noncombatants. Some sin-
gle-country studies in Sierra Leone have examined the reintegration prospects of particular sub-
groups of combatants, notably youth (Richards et al. 2003) and women and girls (Mazurana et al. 
2002). Yet another possible explanation comes from the research comes from a specific strand of 
the literature that emphasizes that to the extent that ex-combatants gain acceptance from family 
members, friends, and neighbors through formal or informal processes of reconciliation, formers 
combatants are more likely to integrate into civilian life. Others found that individuals do leave 
terrorist movements and paramilitaries in Colombia on their own, albeit for largely idiosyncratic 
reasons: fear of excessive punishment, disillusionment with the group’s leadership, or recogni-
tion of the impossibility of achieving the group’s goals. Collective disengagements are typically 
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executed as a result of calculated strategy on the part of the group’s leadership, with fighters re-
turning to democracy still ideologically adherent to their former group’s objectives. (Ribetti 
2010) 
An attempt to understand rebel retirement remains incomplete without looking into the 
rich and growing literature on rebel recruitment. Moral economists argue that when market 
economies penetrate traditional societies destroying the security of subsistence in local moral 
economies, peasants react with a moral outrage, which provides a radical thrust to political pro-
test. (Scott 1977; Wolf 1969) Their rationalist critics argued that unless the shared, non-
excludable public good sought by the revolutionaries for all is accompanied by some selective 
incentives, which are private gains distributed only to those individuals that participate in rebel-
lion, rational individuals abstain from participation and opt to free-ride. (Olson 1965) Within ra-
tionalist paradigm, scholars eventually recognized the role of ideology complementing selective 
incentive (Mark I. Lichbach 1994) and dispelled the assumption that non-participation is rela-
tively costless in insurgency.(Kalyvas and Kocher 2007) Other critics of selective incentive ar-
gue that people participate in armed uprising in a quest for moral agency and that risks of partic-
ipation far outweigh any selective incentives. (Elisabeth Jean Wood 2003) However, moral 
economists cannot explain how and when moral outrage quenches itself. Rational choice theories 
of civil war termination on the other hand describe the combatants’ process of making a decision 
to quit either in terms of straightforward utilitarian calculations (Mason and Fett 1996), or in 
terms of credible commitment ((Walter 1997; Walter 1999; Walter 2004) or in terms of demo-
graphic separation model (C. Kaufmann 1996; C. D. Kaufmann 1998).However, rational choice 
theory can not explain why combatants sometimes choose losing battles over surrender and re-
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habilitation, and brush them away as irrational and it struggles with the empirical question of 
how combatants assess and compare utilities when making choices. 
 In yet another alternative explanation of how combatants make decisions to continue or 
quit fighting, scholars employ prospect theory to argue that under conditions of risk and uncer-
tainty surrounding an insurgency, combatants not only employ rational choice decision making 
for objective measure of options, outcomes and likelihood of each outcomes, but also supple-
ment it by a second step where combatants modify outcome values by employing aspiration lev-
els and salient historical comparisons. Thus, although decisions to quit through compromise 
might seem rational given the gain compared to status quo, they will confront rebels as losses 
compared to their aspirations. Since losses must be recouped, combatants will continue to fight 
and adopt more risk taking behavior contra rational choice expectations. This explanation thus 
explains rebel participation better than rebel retirement. (Butts 2007)  
Based on single case studies, the thin literature on rebel retirement identifies some indi-
vidual-level factors why individuals shun bullets for ballots: disillusionment with the group; a 
loss of faith in the ideology; a desire to lead a normal family life; questioning of their involve-
ment after a traumatic event including violence; negativity and a lack of support within the 
group; internal intolerance and authoritarianism within the group; an individual’s positive expe-
riences of wider society or support from someone outside the group. (Horgan and Braddock 
2010; Horgan 2009; Horgan 2008)  
The policy makers and analysts in India attribute high Maoist surrender in Andhra Pra-
desh to the two prongs of counterinsurgency literature: repression and development. The “An-
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dhra Model”, which, since 2006, evoked much admiration in policy and media circles in India13, 
particularly after the Prime Minister of India identified the Maoist insurgency as the biggest in-
ternal security threat, combines ruthless/efficient policing by specially trained commandos 
(Greyhounds) with rapid financial liberalization and efficient implementation of targeted welfare 
and lucrative surrender packages. In other words, Andhra model stands for successful three-
pronged counterinsurgency: (a) efficient policing forced Maoists to abandon their stronghold in 
Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh14 (b) aggressive targeted welfare created improved living 
conditions which dried up Maoist recruitment (c) lucrative surrender and rehabilitation package 
lured rebels into surrender. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to investigate if these three 
measures indeed precipitated weakening of the Maoists and their surrender in Andhra Pradesh. In 
the subsequent chapters on Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand I offer evidence to question the causal 
connection between counterinsurgency and high surrender as proposed in the Andhra model.  
The causal argument in the Andhra model, as propounded by its proponents, generally 
goes like this: unlike other Maoist-affected states, Andhra Pradesh police built their intelligence 
network and trained specialized commando forces (Greyhounds) that hunted down Maoist lead-
ership and shut down their organization in the state, subsequently forcing rebels to surrender.15 ( 
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  KPS	  Gill,	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Police	  in	  Punjab,	  credited	  with	  the	  counterinsurgency	  operations	  that	  broke	  the	  
backbones	  of	  Punjab	  insurgency	  hailed	  the	  Andhra	  model	  http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/guest-­‐
writer/all-­‐states-­‐should-­‐learn-­‐from-­‐andhra-­‐and-­‐defeat-­‐maoists-­‐on-­‐their-­‐turf-­‐kps-­‐gill/articleshow/20405630.cms	  	  
14	  Ajai	  Sahni,	  Wilful	  Blindness,	  Outlook	  Magazine,	  July	  15,	  2011,	  available	  at	  
http://www.outlookindia.com/article/wilful-­‐blindness-­‐/277672	  	  
15	  D.	  M	  	  Mitra,	  an	  Indian	  Police	  Service	  (IPS)	  officer	  drafting	  a	  proposal	  for	  federal	  funding	  for	  raising	  greyhound	  
like	  forces	  in	  other	  states	  said	  during	  an	  interview	  (Nov	  12,	  2013)	  with	  the	  author	  that	  greyhound	  fighting	  units	  are	  
not	  only	  trained	  by	  army	  to	  fight	  in	  the	  jungles,	  they	  are	  small	  groups,	  and	  made	  of	  local	  young	  officers	  familiar	  
with	  a	  particular	  jungle.	  The	  force	  has	  low	  age	  profile,	  with	  a	  mixture	  of	  local	  tribals	  and	  outsiders.	  It	  is	  a	  state	  
agency,	  unlike	  central	  forces	  sent	  to	  fight	  Maoists,	  and	  its	  personnel	  would	  get	  very	  high	  incentives	  to	  work	  in	  the	  
force.	  Mitra	  also	  argued	  that	  to	  raise	  greyhounds	  in	  other	  states,	  this	  force	  would	  have	  to	  be	  equipped	  with	  ap-­‐
propriate	  arms,	  equipment	  and	  food.	  They	  will	  be	  imparted	  rigorous	  training	  and	  will	  not	  be	  used	  for	  any	  other	  
kind	  of	  work.	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Mitra 2005) There are several tenuous links in this causal path that is difficult to substantiate by 
evidence. For example, it assumes that increased repression compels rebels to quit. Given the 
high risk-acceptance of rebels who join and stay in an insurgent group, and the high sunk cost 
involved in quitting, it has to be assumed that police repression in Andhra Pradesh imposed costs 
high enough for rebels to discount their lifelong sacrifices. We do not get any sense of how the 
cost of repression was any different from what it was when they made the initial decision to join 
and the subsequent choice to spend over 10 years of their lives in the movement. 
The evidence in the literature on repression and political violence is at best indeterminate. 
Some have argued in favor of a linear function whereby repression dampens recruitment by rais-
ing the costs to individuals of joining insurgent organizations.(Tullock 1971) But there is no evi-
dence that raised costs implore seasoned rebels to quit. Others have specified a concave function 
whereby participation peaks at intermediate levels of repression but declines thereafter. (Gurr 
1970) Finally, others have claimed that the relationship between repression and protest is con-
vex: higher levels of repression increase resentment and, therefore, repression feeds protest and 
rebellion. In this argument, repression against its own citizens reduces legitimacy of the govern-
ment, politicizes the apathetic, radicalizes free riders into revolutionaries, thereby spreading con-
flict and engulfing an entire nation. (M. I. Lichbach 1987) Wood also argues along similar lines 
that rebels successfully incorporate the government’s indiscriminate violence into their appeals 
to recruit more supporters. (E. J. Wood 2003) Therefore, there is nothing in the literature to sup-
port the claim that police repression by specialized commando force can take the credit for in-
ducing high surrender rates in Andhra Pradesh.  
Turning to empirical evidence, as shown in the graph below, Maoist fatality in Andhra 
Pradesh actually decreased over the years as surrender of rebels increased and continued to at-
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tract national attention. Thus there is no empirical basis in this case to claim that Maoist rebels in 
Andhra Pradesh quit in hordes for fear for severe repression causing their death.  
 
Figure	  7	  
Rebel Retirement and Casualty in Andhra Pradesh 
Maoist fatalities in Andhra Pradesh are also significantly lower than those in Jharkhand, 
Chhattisgarh and Odisha, where surrender continues to be much lower than Andhra Pradesh. In 
fact, comparing across states, Maoist arrest figures are also lowest in Andhra Pradesh. It is the 
only exception, where surrender incidents remain highest despite lower arrests and fatalities of 
Maoists. In other words, taking arrests and fatality as rough indicators of state repression, rebel 
retirement in AP increased even when repression was low. 	  
It is true that the Greyhounds hunted down and killed Maoist rebels and leaders (crush 
the proverbial snakehead), shielded by political support and untraceable accountability. 
(Balagopal 1981) But as shown in the graph below, every year between 2006 and 2014 Maoist 
casualty has consistently been highest in Chhattisgarh. Other than West Bengal, all other states 
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record higher Maoist casualty than Andhra Pradesh. Yet that did not lead to higher surrender in 
these other states, which indicates that we must look elsewhere for an explanation.  
Post economic liberalization boom is also another factor invoked in explaining success of 
Andhra Pradesh in securing high surrender. In recent years, the interconnection between devel-
opment and security – or the development–security nexus – has attracted a good deal of academ-
ic, donor and practitioner interest. Reducing alienation through satisfying peoples’ basic needs, 
so it is thought, lessens the risk of social tension and therefore conflict (Collier et al., 2003). In-
deed, for most of the post-Cold War period, the promise that development can increase security 
has been embraced wholeheartedly.(Piazza 2006) Skeptics criticize an overreliance by counterin-
surgents on winning hearts and minds. Research on the supply of rebels suggests that popular 
support is largely irrelevant where states are weak and where government could not act on in-
formation if it had it. (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011) 
 It is also important to note that this high exodus in Andhra Pradesh in the early 1990s 
happened before the first lackluster version of their surrender and rehabilitation program was 
even formulated in 1998. Many retired rebels I spoke to in Andhra Pradesh did not receive any 
significant cash reward or livelihood assistance. In fact, highest mass exodus from the Maoist 
movement predates not only the fabled fame of Greyhounds, formed in 1989. It was also before 
economic liberalization of India, which is said to have unleashed a plethora of new opportunities 
to lure the youth away from revolution.16 In the light of these sequence of events entered as new 
evidence, we need to question the dominant narrative that Andhra Pradesh secured high rebel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  In	  their	  own	  analysis,	  the	  CPI(Maoist)	  argues	  that	  the	  economic	  liberalization	  of	  India,	  and	  the	  plethora	  of	  self-­‐
help	  groups	  and	  World	  Bank	  development	  projects,	  together	  with	  telephone-­‐television	  took	  people	  in	  the	  South	  
away	  from	  the	  path	  of	  revolution.	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retirement due to lucrative surrender package, its spectacular economic development or due to its 
exceptional policing. 17 
Therefore, summing up, the literature on insurgency delves deep into why men and wom-
en rebel as well as into how insurgency spreads. But has little to say on why and how rebels quit. 
The counterinsurgency literature on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is 
focused too narrowly on confiscation of arms and livelihood concerns of ex-combatants. It sheds 
little light on actual process of disengagement that transpires between the desire to quit and the 
final reintegration of rebels into mainstream. I also depart from existing writings on rebel retire-
ment in psychology, sociology, and criminology that identify ‘push’ (like disillusionment with 
personnel, strategy and ideology, fatigue/burnout) and ‘pull’ factors (like lucrative surrender 
package, amnesty, desires to establish a family) influencing rebel retirement. I show that in be-
tween push-pull factors that affect insurgents’ desire to exit, and DDR programs, is the protract-
ed process of disengagement whereby rebels establish contact with the outside and plan post-
retirement safety and livelihood strategies. The various pathways out of violent movements and 
how these chosen paths vary remains largely unexplored. This project shows how a set of demo-
graphic, social, economic and other contextual factors interact with individual level motivations 
to account for successful reintegration across individual combatants and across various states in 
India. .  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Similar	  arguments	  can	  be	  made	  about	  comparable	  development	  in	  assets	  and	  services	  in	  other	  states	  not	  pro-­‐
ducing	  similar	  results	  in	  terms	  of	  weakening	  and	  surrender	  of	  Maoists.	  (Appendix,	  Chapter	  3)	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  devel-­‐
opment	  narrative	  of	  AP	  is	  also	  suspect.	  	  The	  strongest	  advocate	  of	  ‘India	  Shining’	  model	  of	  rapid	  economic	  liberali-­‐
zation,	  chief	  minister	  N	  Chandrababu	  Naidu,	  suffered	  massive	  electoral	  defeat	  in	  AP	  in	  2004	  and	  2009	  due	  to	  mas-­‐
sive	  neglect	  and	  decline	  of	  agriculture	  sector.	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/South_asia/3756387.stm	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1.4	  Mechanisms	  of	  Rebel	  Retirement:	  	  Introducing	  Informal	  Exit	  Networks	  
The central argument of this thesis is that rebel quit through exit networks, which are ex-
pensive to create, sustain, reproduce and transpose. Exit networks can be ‘harmonic’ like in the 
South, encouraging higher exit and broad reintegration of rebels. Exit networks can also be ‘dis-
cordant’ like in the North, exacerbating fear and insecurities of rebels and restricting their reinte-
gration into the mainstream. Emergence of a particular kind of exit network is contingent on pre-
war social bases of insurgency, on the vertical and horizontal ties forged by insurgent organiza-
tion and on the dynamics of interaction between the state and a banned armed movement in the 
grey areas that separate them.  
This argument is built on my fieldwork in conflict zones, where conversations with mul-
tiple stakeholders in the ongoing conflict revealed that the primary concern of retiring rebels is 
that they would be killed as soon as they disarmed. They feared that family members of former 
landlords, some of whom perpetuate their feudal domination in the garb of elected offices, would 
conspire to kill them in retribution. The rebels have fought long battles against the state, and 
were ideologically primed to distrust the police and the politicians. But former rebels argued that 
they were, in fact, convinced that given the reputational rewards and career boosts that police 
officers and career politicians get enough career boost and reputation rewards for orchestrating 
Maoist surrender for them to not sabotage the process. However, once the dust settles on surren-
der fanfare, there is nothing in the land/job/cash/training programs in state surrender and reha-
bilitation package that prevents their former enemies from colluding with local police to attack 
unarmed former rebels and their families. 
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Returning rebels, it is common knowledge, will have a heavy price to pay (for example, 
shot in fake ‘encounter’ or harassment of family members by police) if they reneged on their 
commitment and returned to the Maoists. However, the democratic state does not lose much if it 
fails to keep the rebels alive after they disarm. This is a problem of credible commitment. The 
high and mighty in rural India can kill with impunity. I argue that informal exit networks in the 
South ensure locally that returning rebels continue to enjoy life and livelihood and thereby com-
pensate for the lack of institutionalized credible commitment in democracy.   
 A former area commander in Karimnagar district of Telangana described how she was 
afraid that she will be ‘encountered’ just like her husband, brother, and sister-in-law. She was 
referring to the practice of police shooting suspects in the back and filing an official report that 
shots were fired to prevent a criminal from fleeing the scene (Balagopal 1981). The area com-
mander, a Dalit from Karimnagar, quit the Maoist movement, but still feared the same brutal 
death by hired guns of the sons of former Dora (landlord), one of whom was a influential mem-
ber of a national political party. So she reached out to her comrades who had retired before her. 
They put her in touch of with the wife of local elected MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly), 
who was from the same village as her dead husband. The wife of the MLA, a respected human 
rights activist in her own right, assured her that she would ensure her safety on return. This MLA 
was considered trustworthy because the charismatic Maoist leader Ramakrishna was his child-
hood friend. He was known for his sympathy for the movement, and his reputation for securing 
safe passage for other rebels before her. There is a pipeline of people in place, police, bureau-
crats, and down to village school teacher, who work in the grey areas of democracy, one foot in 
the state and one foot in the banned movement, to ensure safe return of rebels.  
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These informal exit networks grow in the shadow of formal organizations. In the South, 
there is a dense network of voluntary organizations based on caste, religion, gender, profession 
and so on, that flourish at village/town and district levels, creating routine contact and shared 
norms among ordinary civic-minded individuals. Above them there is also an overarching pow-
erful and visible network of state-level organizations for civil liberties/human rights, cultural, 
womens’ organizations that include famous poets, academics, lawyers and civil servants, who 
draw attention to excesses of the rebels and failures of the state with equal commitment and 
prominence.  
In Chapter 4 I show that this two-level infrastructure of vigorous civic participation with-
in democracy creates a platform for civic-minded citizens in cities and villages and across differ-
ent professions and castes, to come together and work in harmony to ensure safe passage of re-
turning rebels. I also show how this infrastructure of associational culture that energizes the 
grassroots in Telangana was born out grassroots mobilization by the Maoists but soon emerged 
as independent informal platform for concerned citizens to build peace in ravaged conflict zones 
of Telangana. Thus exit networks in the South operate in the shadow of its rich grassroots asso-
ciational life, sometimes under the radar in extra-democratic capacity, to prevent further loss of 
lives in the villages and build peace bottom up.  
The exit networks are made up of two kinds of actors, the Movement Entrepreneurs and 
Reintegration Stewards, linked by different kinds of relationship. Movement Entrepreneurs (ME) 
are highly visible, geographically and socially mobile opinion makers, who share political pref-
erences and normative commitments, control the flow of information and coordinate collective 
action in conflict zones. They maintain one foot in democracy and one foot in the banned re-
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sistance movement and claim limited autonomy from both. Through the leaky walls the state 
erects around rebels, political actors on both sides are tied to the MEs. They may share pre-war 
social ties with both rebel leaders and democratic politicians/bureaucrats; for example, they 
might have grown up together in the same village, trained together in college, or belonged to the 
same caste group/extended family. The ties may grow outside personal acquaintance, through 
shared political vision. MEs emerge as influential middle grounds or voice of conscience be-
tween state and rebels. On the one hand, they nurture a nascent movement and drum up support 
for rebel causes. On the other hand, they also critique rebel excesses and concurrently nudge the 
frontiers of democracy bit by bit. Eventually (and inadvertently) MEs generate a whirlwind of 
debates and critiques around resistance that sucks core constituents out of rebel movement into 
democratic platforms.  
As they generate a powerful impetus for exit within rebel organization, reintegration 
stewards (RS) resolve crucial last-mile problems in the process of rebel retirement. RS emerge 
from the local social base of the insurgency, and they are geographically embedded. Employed in 
diverse occupations like law enforcement, district courts, coalmines, village administration, pri-
mary school, political party, local mafia or rural health centers, these everyday people weave a 
bulwark of all local stakeholders in rebel return through an informal but effective system. RS 
compensate for the institutional lack of credible commitment locally by ensuring that retired re-
bels would not be killed.   
I argue that exit networks in the South are ‘harmonic’ in that they weave together multi-
ple stakeholders in an amalgam of roles and alliances, who work in sync to build momentum for 
exit and manage myriad uncertainties of reintegration. These exit networks co-evolve, over years 
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of conflict, with legitimate/state and illegitimate/rebel politics in conflict areas to facilitate a very 
high number of retirement and broad rebel reintegration. In contrast, retirement is low in the 
North (Jharkhand/West Bengal) due to the emergence of a ‘discordant’ exit network that is fall-
ing apart at the seams due to relentless skirmish among the primary stakeholders, exacerbating 
mistrust and fear among key players and deterring rebel reintegration. Pro-social RS connected 
to ME dominates harmonic exit networks. Anti-social RS, disconnected with ME, dominates dis-
cordant networks.  
In the North, the most well known face of Maoist return to democracy is Kameshwar 
Baitha. When I met him in 2013, he was the sitting Member of Parliament (MP) from Palamau 
constituency in Jharkhand MuKti Morcha (JMM) ticket. He told me how he had a change in 
heart while he was in jail, facing 46 criminal cases ranging from murder and extortion to killing 
several policemen in a landmine blast triggered on the Bihar-Jharkhand border in 2002. He 
fought and won the 2009 parliamentary elections from Palamau, the forested, poor region he 
dominated as a dreaded Maoist commander. As I talked to several others in Palamau and in JMM 
it became clear to me that unless he contested elections and made himself a valuable lynchpin in 
their access to political power and associated patronage network, the informal network of politi-
cians-criminals-police-bureaucrats-loyalists would not offer him their benefaction and protec-
tion. He was deeply plugged in this network since his insurgent days. In other words, in Jhar-
khand Maoists decide to surrender after they are arrested. He would never find his way out of the 
extensive bulwark of cases and evidence of murder, extortion and kidnaps against him.  
Subsequent interviews with other surrendered Maoists as well as the police in the North 
made it amply clear that Maoists in the state are persuaded to accept a surrender package after 
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they are already apprehended. The relatively well known among them are encouraged to contest 
elections at village, state or national levels. The much-publicized return to democracy offers am-
ple career rewards to the politicians, bureaucrats, police, journalists, and criminals overseeing 
this insurgent democratic transition. In other words, the corrupt nexus that controls rebel retire-
ment in Jharkhand restricts surrender opportunity to a select few who seek a political career in 
electoral democracy. More importantly, unlike in the South, the northern Maoists take out death 
warrants against surrendered rebels condemning their electoral ambitions, forcing them to with-
draw further in the protection of this corrupt nexus.  
Emergence of two different kinds of exit network is contingent on three broad processes 
(a) pre-war social bases of insurgency (b) organization and mobilization techniques of insurgent 
groups (c) protracted interaction between (a) and (b) in conflict zones. Depending on the milita-
rization of landed aristocracy and polarization of antagonistic social groups, and on the degree of 
mass mobilization by rebels, insurgent organization forges strong or weak vertical and horizontal 
ties, which precipitates a open/virtuous, harmonic exit network or a closed/vicious, discordant 
interaction among key stakeholders on both sides of conflict (state and rebel). I link macro (envi-
ronmental), meso (organizational) and micro (individual) conditions to explain the protracted 
process of rebel retirement.  These processes co-evolve spanning different levels of analysis and 
are connected with each other in feedback loops. Theoretically, I argue that insurgent mobiliza-
tion unleashes profound social change, transforming social actors, structures, norms, and practic-
es at the local level, reconfiguring existing networks and creating new ones. Local dynamics of 
insurgent mobilization leaves a lasting legacy on rebel retirement.  
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The mechanisms of emergence of harmonic versus discordant networks in the South and 
North respectively are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Harmonic exit makes democracy seem 
more lucrative. Comparing outcomes of the two different paths of retirement, harmonic exit is 
likely to facilitate the robust reintegration of retired rebels in various white and blue-collar pro-
fessions across rural and urban areas. Discordant exit is likely to severely restrict post-retirement 
livelihood alternatives for rebels. A few retired rebels may still become henchmen of criminal 
real estate gangs even in areas with harmonic exit network. But it is the dominant trend for re-
tired rebels in discordant exit to latch on to the same mafia-police-politician-bureaucrat nexus 
that had earlier propelled them to join the insurgents in the first place. With the money, gun 
power, and readymade local support base, these rebels become political leaders post-retirement, 
trying to get themselves elected in various levels of democratic governance, from village admin-
istration to the national parliament.  
1.5	  Chapter	  Outline	  
	  
The rest of this dissertation is divided into five chapters, and employs a multilevel and mixed-
methods approach to analyzing the central puzzle of rebel retirement. In doing so this project of-
fers the first systematic analysis of the process by which armed actors quit extremist groups and 
return to democracy. Chapter 2 sets the stage for analyzing the emergence of two different exit 
networks by historically tracing the different ideological lineage, mobilization and recruitment 
strategies of the northern and southern Maoists. Through interviews with leaders of various fac-
tions of Indian Left, particularly the Maoists, as well as archival research of strategic party doc-
uments and leaked reports, I lay out the regional specificities of Maoist organization, mobiliza-
tion and recruitment in North and South India. A significant contribution of this chapter is to es-
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tablish how the despite unified leadership and ideological commitments that insurgent organiza-
tions are locally embedded.  
In Chapter 3, I presents results of a series of statistical tests that shows that organizational 
density, measured at district level in terms of membership in voluntary organizations, is a better 
predictor of rebel retirement than alternative explanations in terms of development (access to as-
sets), public service provision (access to healthcare and education), industrialization, mining, and 
repression. Based on household level survey data from Indian Human Development Survey 
(Phase 1 and 2), I defined civic participation in terms of organizational density, which measures 
the extent of citizen membership in 12 different kinds of voluntary organization based on cross-
cutting markers of identity like caste, religion, profession and gender. Based on Census data 
(2001 and 2011), district level development is measured in terms of improvement in access to 
specific household assets (radio/transistor sets, televisions, bicycles, two-wheelers and cars) that 
give a sense of improved standard of living to the lowest strata (Scheduled Caste and Scheduled 
Tribe) of rural society in conflict areas. Access to education and healthcare service, computed 
from IHDS and cross checked with Census data, is taken as a proxy for public goods provision at 
district level. I also obtained data on investment in 6 Industry types: Construction, Energy (Elec-
tric), Public, Private-Foreign, Private-Domestic, Mining from the Center for Monitoring the In-
dian Economy’s (CMIE) Capital Expenditure Database (CapEx). I also include data on volume 
of bauxite, iron-ore and coal extraction for the period 2001-2005 from Indiastat.com. In addition, 
district level data on Maoist casualty from World Incident Tracking System (WITS) and South 
Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is used as a proxy for police repression.  I do not find any compel-
ling evidence that development/improved standard of living, public service provision, and im-
proved living standards can produce higher rebel retirement. But there is a statistically significant 
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positive relationship between rebel retirement and organizational density. Thus the findings sug-
gest that rebels are more likely to quit in locations where there is a thriving civic participation. 
However, this statistical analysis, while useful for testing preliminary intuitions about the role of 
grassroots democratic participation in rebel retirement, is not useful in uncovering the causal 
mechanisms.  
To explain the vast difference in number of surrender cases in the North and the South,  
and to uncover the mechanisms and pathways of rebel retirement that explains this difference, I 
carried out fine grained field research in the two regions, specifically Telangana region of An-
dhra Pradesh in the South and Jharkhand in the North (known an Paschimanchal-Jharkhand Cul-
tural Zone in Maoist spatial organization). Chapter 4 looks into the process of rebel retirement in 
the South where both the measure of associational membership as well as surrender of rebels is 
high. Chapter 5 is studies the process of rebel retirement in the North, where both associational 
membership and surrender of rebels is low. Both these chapters flesh out the causal mechanisms 
that lead to high rebel retirement in one region and low retirement in the other. To do so, I rely 
on extensive interviews of current and former rebels, members of different Maoist frontal organ-
izations, their theoretical leaders, police, administrators, ordinary villagers, elected politicians, 
journalists and human rights activists in the two conflict zones.  
I argue that emergence of two different kinds of exit network is contingent on three broad 
processes (a) pre-war social bases of insurgency (b) organization and mobilization techniques of 
insurgent groups (c) protracted interaction between democracy and rebel movement in conflict 
zones. I argue that exit networks in the South  are ‘harmonic’ in that this rebel-democracy inter-
action is robust, multifaceted, and protracted allowing an intricate weaving of multiple stake-
holders in an amalgam of roles and alliances, who work in sync to build momentum for exit and 
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manage myriad uncertainties of reintegration. In contrast, retirement is low in the North (Jhar-
khand/West Bengal) due to the emergence of a ‘discordant’ exit network that is falling apart at 
the seams due to relentless skirmish among the primary stakeholders, exacerbating mistrust and 
fear among key players and deterring rebel reintegration. Informal exit networks (harmonic or 
discordant) grow at the grassroots level, either strengthened through civic participation or stifled 
by a corrupt nexus dominating the democracy-insurgency interface. In highlighting how social 
networks compensate for the failings of state institutions in luring rebels back to the democracy, 
the argument presented here have broader implications for the debates on state-society relation-
ship.  
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Chapter	  2:	  	  Setting	  the	  Stage:	  Local	  Embeddedness	  of	  Informal	  Exit	  Net-­‐
works	  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter sets the stage for explaining the emergence of two different kinds of informal exit 
networks, employed by rebels in North and South India respectively, producing divergent retire-
ment outcomes. I delve deep into the historical factors that set the conflict zones on two different 
trajectories despite being led by the same Maoist party. In this chapter I also show how insurgent 
organizations as well as the exit paths out of them are embedded in local politics and preexisting 
class/caste divisions in the conflict zones. I also argue that the democratic allure that draws re-
bels out of an armed group is forged locally and incrementally via the everyday interaction be-
tween democracy and the rebel movement through the leaky walls that separate them. Maoist 
groups in North and South India, otherwise united in leadership, ideology, broad goals, strategy, 
and structure, develop locally specific mobilization and recruitment tactics in the face of distinc-
tive social divisions, resource bases, historical learning and target audiences. Moreover, rebel 
organizational structures, strategies, and tactics in a particular location are not frozen in time; 
they evolve continually with changing background conditions. I emphasize the importance of the 
history of an armed movement to understand its strengths and weaknesses, recruitment, and re-
tirement of its rebels. This chapter (and the dissertation as a whole) makes the case that rebel re-
tirement is high in the South, because rebels there led popular mass movements forging a robust 
democracy-insurgency interface where the rebel grassroots agenda and membership overlapped 
with democratic civic associations. It is in this overlapping grey area of grassroots politics where 
harmonic retirement networks emerged in the South. In contrast, rebel retirement is lowest in 
northern areas where rebels neglected grassroots organizing for greater militarization, creating a 
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restrictive democracy-insurgency interface where the informal exit network, devoid of popular 
participation, was discordant (and therefore failed). 
This chapter is organized as follows: the next section highlights how the Maoists 
emerged as the leading faction in communist agrarian struggles in India. In a sweeping overview 
of the major episodes of communist peasant uprising in India over the last seventy years, I re-
view the persistent precursors of rural rebellion in India. I also show how the mobilization, re-
cruitment, and resistance strategies adopted by Indian Maoists evolved in ways that are distinct 
from other communist factions in India. I draw upon extensive archival research of Maoist doc-
uments, party publications, theoretical treatises, published and unpublished memoirs of Maoist 
leaders, and my interviews with leaders, members and supporters of various Maoist organiza-
tions in India(Mazumdar 1967; Mazumdar 2001).18 Section 3 highlights the similarities and dif-
ferences between the northern and southern Maoists. I argue that the Maoists in the North and 
South are united in organization, leadership and ideology. However, they have grown out of dif-
ferent legacies of agrarian uprisings and distinct local conditions that differ in their underlying 
caste/class structure. The distinct legacy and local conditions in the North have generated a cor-
rupt, limited, violent insurgency-democracy interface there. In contrast, in the South, a robust, 
cooperative interface propagates where insurgent mobilization energizes democratic grassroots 
politics, creating a symbiotic overlap between the two. It is in the underbelly of grassroots civic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  archival	  research	  had	  three	  main	  parts:	  first,	  at	  the	  Taraknath	  Das	  Research	  Center,	  Calcutta,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  
access	   vernacular	   newspaper	   reports	   from	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   the	  Naxalbari	   uprising	   in	   1967	   to	   the	  most	   recent	  
Maoist	   incidents	   in	  West	  Bengal,	  Bihar,	  and	   Jharkhand.	  Second,	   I	  was	  able	   to	  access	   the	  debates	   in	   the	  CPI(ML)	  
camp	  that	  eventually	  led	  to	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  radical	  left	  as	  published	  in	  Naxal	  journals	  Deshabrati	  (The	  Patri-­‐
ot),	  Liberation,	  and	  the	  Peoples’	  March.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Frontier	  Weekly	  edited	  by	  Samar	  Sen	  and	  started	  in	  1968	  
was	   the	   important	   platform	   for	   debate	   among	   various	   ML	   factions.	   It	   is	   now	   digitalized	   and	   available	   at	  
http://www.frontierweekly.com/.	  Third	  I	  was	  able	  to	  interview	  the	  surviving	  Naxalbari	  leaders	  in	  Calcutta,	  includ-­‐
ing	  Santosh	  Rana.	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life where informal exit networks emerge allowing for rebel retirement. The final section con-
cludes.  
2.2	  Agrarian	  Uprisings	  in	  India:	  Emergence	  of	  the	  Maoists	  	  
	  
Historically there has been no dearth of agrarian disturbances in India. They were endem-
ic throughout British rule, and go farther back to the Mughals (16th and 17th Century). There are 
110 known instances of violent peasant uprisings in 117 years, from 1783 to 1900 (Guha 1999; 
Guha 1982). Rural uprising has erupted in many forms, ranging from local riots to war-like cam-
paigns that spread over many districts. During British rule, violent uprisings like the Chotanag-
pur Tribal Revolt (1807-08), Munda Rebellion (1832, 1867-90), Kol Rebellion (1831-32), San-
thal Rebellion (1885-86), Rampa Rebellion (1879-90), Madri Kalo Revolt (1898), and others 
posed a major threat to British administration. In 1946, as India was on the verge of independ-
ence from British rule, communist leaders organizing agrarian struggles wanted to make sure that 
the lingering exploitation of ordinary peasants did not become insignificant and invisible to the 
indigenous leaders at the time of overwhelming celebrations of national independence.. A July 
rebellion in South India (Telangana, Madras) was followed by similar uprisings in East India 
(Tebhaga, Bengal) in September and further South (Punnapra Vayalar, Kerala) in October. Two 
decades later, however, most of the agrarian issues including rural indebtedness and feudal ex-
ploitation remained virtually unaddressed in independent India leading to massive agrarian vio-
lence in East and South India in the late 1960s. Most recently, between 2006 and 2008, three 
more agrarian crises erupted in the state of West Bengal (Singur, Nandigram, and Lalgarh) on 
issues of land grab and disruptive industrialization, which brought into light persistent agrarian 
issues and problems of incomplete land reform even in the more modern era.  
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I argue that while the poorer rural sections, landless laborers, tenants, sharecroppers, and 
small landholders formed an essential part of the mass base of the Indian National Congress 
(INC) in its struggle for swaraj (self-rule) and poorna swaraj (independence), the most militant 
peasant movements in India have all operated within the ideological framework of Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism (Herring 1991; Gough 1968; Gough 1974; Panikkar 1989). Even though the 
theoretical foundations of Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism have been questioned and the possi-
bility of an international communist revolution is virtually non-existent (at least in the current 
sociopolitical environment), the specter of an ‘Indian revolution’ thrives on. In fact, the Com-
munist Party of India (Maoist) re-emerged as “the biggest internal security threat to the Indian 
state” in 2005 at a time when the Soviet Union no longer existed and the People’s Republic of 
China had steered itself away from Mao’s vision into a firm embrace of capitalism (Sundar 
2011). In the sub-section that follows I provide an overview of these communist-led peasant up-
risings in India that highlight the emergence of Maoism as a distinctive faction within the Indian 
Left.  
2.2.1	  The	  Forties:	  Violent	  Agrarian	  Uprisings	  across	  India	  
	  
As India was moving towards independence in the mid-1940s, various parts of the coun-
try also witnessed a series of agrarian uprisings. Among them, the Tebhaga uprising in the east, 
the Warli uprising in the west, and the Punnapra-Vayalar and Telangana uprisings in the South 
deserve special mention. The Tebhaga (literally, three parts) movement of 1946 was a struggle of 
sharecroppers to keep two-thirds share of their produce instead of just half (Dhanagare 1976; 
Bandyopadhyay 2001; Sen 1972). It was concentrated in the Jessore and Khulna districts of un-
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divided Bengal that eventually went to Pakistan after the partition of India (Panjabi 2010).19 The 
idea that the sharecroppers should claim two-thirds of their produce, letting the landlord take on-
ly one-third, originated from the recommendations of the Land Revenue Commission (published 
in March 1940) of the colonial British government. The Bengal branch of All-India Kisan Sabha 
(Communist Peasants’ Organization) adopted the idea and quickly mobilized sharecroppers in 19 
of the 27 Bengal districts, involving six million peasants within the span of four months (Sen 
1972; Rasul 1969).20  
During the same time Kisan Sabha led the Warli Tribal Movement (1945-47) in Maha-
rashtra in western India. The organization mobilized Warli tribal communities against bonded-
labor, unpaid labor, surrender of half-share of produce to landlords, perpetual indebtedness, and 
extra-economic exploitation like abduction and rape of tribal women. The landlords were the lo-
cal face of authority, exploitation and domination, which kept the men under constant fear, so 
much so that they remained submissive and silent (Parulekar 1975).21  
In both the Tebhaga and Warli uprisings, violence was not part of the early communists’ 
conscious strategy in confronting the landlords and moneylenders, though incidents of violence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The	  central	  grievance	  that	  motivated	  the	  movement	  was	  that	  sharecroppers,	  known	  as	  adhiar	  (from	  adha	  mean-­‐
ing	  half)	  in	  North	  Bengal,	  bhagchasi	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  province,	  and	  as	  bargadars	  in	  the	  statutes,	  had	  to	  hand	  
over	  50	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  crop	  to	  the	  jotedar	  (landlord)	  as	  land	  rents	  while	  the	  entire	  cost	  of	  cultivation	  was	  borne	  by	  
the	  sharecropper	  himself.	  Historically	  exploited	  in	  the	  feudal	  regime,	  the	  peasants	  in	  the	  modern	  day	  joined	  the	  
Bengal	  provincial	  branch	  of	  the	  All-­‐India	  Kisan	  Sabha	  and	  the	  Bengal	  Provincial	  Committee	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  
of	  India	  (CPI).	  
20	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  fact-­‐rich	  writings	  on	  Tebhaga	  are	  in	  Bengali.	  Some	  examples	  are	  Krishna	  Benode	  Roy’s	  Tebha-­‐
gar	  Larai,	  which	  is	  a	  thin	  booklet	  full	  of	  rich	  anecdotes	  on	  how	  the	  movement	  started.	  Sumit	  Chakravarty’s	  edited	  
work,	  Tebhaga	  Sangram	  Rajat	  Jayanti	  Smarak	  Grantha	  (Calcutta:	  Kalantar	  Publications),	  is	  a	  twenty-­‐five	  year	  me-­‐
morial	  volume	  on	  the	  uprising.	  The	  arguments	  made	  here	  are	  based	  primarily	  on	  the	  accounts	  of	  Bhowani	  Sen	  en-­‐
titled,	  Banglar	  Tebhaga	  Andolan,	  and	  printed	  in	  this	  edited	  volume.	  	  
21	  The	  movement	  was	  led	  by	  Godavari	  Parulekar	  and	  her	  husband,	  Shamrao	  Parulekar,	  both	  urban,	  educated,	  
members	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India	  (CPI).	  The	  movement	  was	  the	  strongest	  in	  the	  Dahanu	  and	  Umbergaon	  
taluks	  (blocks)	  of	  the	  Thane	  district	  of	  Maharashtra,	  where	  Warlis	  formed	  55	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  population,	  and	  
hence	  the	  name	  of	  the	  movement.	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did occur. In Warli, for example, the farmhouses of landlords were often burned down because 
tribal women were routinely raped in these houses. These acts of violence against the landlords’ 
property were more manifest acts confirming the activists’ self-respect and dignity than an orga-
nized expression of their revolutionary zeal to reject the unequal relationship with the landlord, 
question his moral authority, and overthrow the system and the state. In Tebhaga, as well, the 
struggle was agitational, not revolutionary, in  character, and communist activity was concentrat-
ed on enlistment of members, founding of local chapters of Kisan Sabhas, holding provincial 
conferences and meetings at the district, taluqa (block), and village levels, organizing marches, 
mass demonstrations and rallies, etc. And when they resorted to more direct action, the ‘action’ 
was very similar to the one adopted by the avowedly non-violent, non-communist Gandhians, 
which included refusal to pay government taxes, land revenue, and courting arrests. The com-
munists’ altogether lack of group-sanctioned violence stands juxtaposed to the fact that com-
munist movements have no ideological or moral inhibitions against resorting to using force, in 
whose ideology, in fact, there is a predilection rather than aversion towards the use of force.  
The Punnapra-Vayalar revolt, organized against the princely state of Travancore in the 
southern part of Kerala during ten days of October 1946, was the largest and the only instance of 
the Indian working class setting up armed enclaves and fighting pitched battles.22 However, de-
spite communist mobilization led by agricultural workers against the corrupt nexus of a feudal 
landlord and national bourgeoisie, there was no organized attempt at forcefully altering the exist-
ing agro-economic structure, property relations, and the nature of the state. In fact, the demand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	   In	  1946,	  Sir	  C.	  P.	  Ramaswami	   Iyer,	   the	  Diwan	  of	  Travancore,	  proposed	  constitutional	   reforms	  which	   the	  com-­‐
munists	  opposed	  as	   too	  similar	   to	   the	  "American	  model"	  of	  administration.	  The	  communists	  opposed	  this	  move	  
with	  the	  slogan	  "American	  Model	  Arabi	  Kadalil"	  (chuck	  the	  American	  model	  into	  the	  Arabian	  sea).	  The	  Punnapra-­‐
Vayalar	  uprising	  was	  named	  after	  the	  two	  places	  in	  Kerala	  where	  it	  was	  most	  intense.	  It	  emerged	  as	  a	  continuation	  
of	  the	  Coir	  factory	  workers	  strike	  in	  1938	  and	  the	  Mopala	  rebellion	  (by	  Muslim	  tenants	  in	  Malabar	  region	  of	  Kerala)	  
of	  1921.	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never shifted from wage reforms, and success was measured in terms of electoral achievements 
of the communists in panchayat (village self-government) elections (Bouton 2014). In fact, the 
Communist Party was so weighed down by tactical adjustments and confusing signals emanating 
from Russia that their leadership refused to take a more determined stand on violence and vio-
lently changing the status quo (Herring 1986).  
Among the agrarian uprisings later in the 1940s, the Telangana movement (1946-1951) 
stands out as an exception in its use of organized violence against the state and not just the local 
faces of feudal exploitation. The movement transitioned from being opposed to local landlords, 
to becoming a resistance against the Nizam (King) of the Kingdom of Hyderabad,23 and eventual-
ly against the newly independent Indian state. The primary grievances of the farming community 
centered around similar economic structural issues as discussed above, like forced unpaid labor , 
forceful seizure of land by landlords, peasants’ dependence on landlords’ consumption loans for 
subsistence, rape of women, extralegal and excessive extortion, and forcible grain levies. The 
communists organized people into village defense squads to protect themselves from the attacks 
of the Nizam Police. Eventually, about 4,000 villages in three districts (Nalgonda, Warrangal, 
and Khammam) became “liberated areas” (called gram rajyams meaning village republics) ad-
ministered outside the control of the Indian state. Local communists redistributed land to the 
landless, raised guerrilla squads, attacked police camps, prosecuted rape convicts, and expound-
ed women’s equality and the abolition of untouchability. However, as soon as the Indian army 
occupied the kingdom of Hyderabad, the communists withdrew from the struggle abruptly on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Under	  the	  patronage	  of	  the	  Nizam,	  an	  organization	  called	  Majlis-­‐e-­‐Ittehad	  sent	  their	  militant	  arm	  known	  as	  ra-­‐
zakkars	  (paramilitary	  forces)	  to	  plunder,	  kill,	  rape,	  and	  generally	  terrorize	  members	  of	  peasant	  resistance	  groups.	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grounds that they shared rather than opposed the ideological proclivities of Prime Minister Neh-
ru.24 
Some of the leaders in Telangana upheld Mao’s idea of “New Democracy” in opposition 
to the 1948 Calcutta thesis that represented the dominant view of the all-India leadership of the 
Communist Party of India (CPI).25 During this time, CPI General Secretary, B.T. Ranadive, and 
the peasant leaders of the Andhra region were among the first in the world to debate the legiti-
macy of Mao's contribution to Marxism-Leninism. When the party leaders like Ajay Ghosh, C. 
Rajeshawara Rao, M. Basavapunniah, and S.A. Dange terminated the Telangana movement fol-
lowing the victorious march of the Indian army into the princely state of Nizam’s Hyderabad,26 
the pro-Mao faction strongly resented the party’s abandonment of the revolutionary struggle and 
its squandering of its gains in Telangana to join parliamentary politics (Ghosh 2009). 
Inner party resentment became more intense as the Communist Party leadership adopted 
a resolution condemning “Chinese aggression” during the Sino-Indian War in 1962. The radical 
left faction within the party decried the war as an aggression by the capitalist Indian state against 
socialist China. The Nehru government promptly arrested several of these pro-Chinese com-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India	  (CPI)	  upheld	  Khrushchev’s	  thesis	  of	  ”peaceful	  coexistence”	  presented	  in	  the	  Twen-­‐
tieth	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  held	  in	  1956,	  which	  repudiated	  the	  need	  of	  revolution-­‐
ary	  war	  against	  class	  enemies	  and	  proclaimed	  that	  transition	  to	  socialism	  was	  possible	  through	  parliamentary	  
means.	  Following	  Khrushchev’s	  thesis,	  the	  Palghat	  Program	  (April	  19-­‐29,	  1956)	  of	  CPI	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  party’s	  
participation	  in	  the	  Second	  General	  Elections	  in	  1957.	  Subsequently,	  the	  CPI	  government	  was	  formed	  in	  Kerala.	  
Further,	  during	  the	  Khruschev-­‐Nehru	  entente,	  CPI	  leadership	  advocated	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Congress,	  which	  they	  
recognized	  as	  a	  party	  of	  “national	  bourgeoisie”	  fighting	  against	  the	  principal	  enemies	  of	  imperialism	  and	  feudalism	  
on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Indian	  poor.	  
25	  At	  the	  second	  congress	  of	  CPI	  in	  Calcutta	  on	  February	  28,	  1948,	  Ranadive	  upheld	  the	  Zhdanov	  line	  of	  insurrection	  
against	  Joshi’s	  line	  of	  collaboration	  with	  Congress.	  Ranadive’s	  open	  call	  for	  taking	  up	  arms	  is	  known	  as	  the	  “Calcut-­‐
ta	  thesis”.	  
26	  The	  Telangana	  movement,	  initially	  organized	  in	  protest	  against	  the	  local	  feudal	  landlords,	  soon	  became	  directed	  
against	   the	   royal	   family	   of	   the	  Nizam	  who	   ruled	   the	   state	   of	   Hyderabad.	   People	   organized	   into	   village	   defense	  
squads	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  the	  attacks	  of	  the	  Nizam	  Police	  and	  razakars.	  When	  the	  Nizam,	  aided	  by	  the	  
Ittehadul	  Muslimeen	  (a	  Hyderabad-­‐based	  political	  party)	  and	  its	  military	  branch,	  the	  razakars,	  resisted	  accession	  to	  
India	  in	  1947,	  the	  Indian	  army	  marched	  into	  Hyderabad	  and	  defeated	  the	  razakars.	  CPI	  argued	  against	  the	  necessi-­‐
ty	  of	  the	  same	  guerrilla-­‐type	  struggle	  when	  it	  was	  fighting	  against	  the	  Congress	  government.	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munists, who conferred in prison to form a separate breakaway communist party. The Com-
munist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M), soon became the dominant left party in India. How-
ever, the formation of CPI(M) carried within it the seeds of further splits. The pro-Mao radicals 
within this new party accused the centrist leaders of CPI(M) of undermining class struggle and 
the revolutionary goal by including peaceful protest as a means of class struggle in India.27 These 
radicals argued that India remained a “semi colony” because this transfer of power merely re-
placed the Western imperialists with a local leadership that owed undivided allegiance to their 
foreign masters. In other words, contrary to the CPI(M) depiction of the Indian bourgeoisie as a 
national bourgeoisie with somewhat progressive and anti-imperialist character, the pro-Mao rad-
icals insisted that the Indian bourgeoisie was comprador (foreign agent) and continued to serve 
imperial interests.28 The implication of this ideological debate on the character of the bourgeoisie 
was that while the CPI(M) official position on the national bourgeoisie opened possibilities of 
selective cooperation with the ruling classes, the Maoists’ characterization of the ruling class as 
comprador made violent struggle inevitable.  
Thus agrarian uprising in India in the forties and the fifties witnessed many local instanc-
es of heroic sacrifices and even some painstaking grassroots organization in different parts of 
India. However, the early Indian communists wavered in their use of violence, most drastically 
evident in the abrupt suspension of the Telangana uprising. The uprising’s suspension triggered 
furious debates on the appropriate role and nature of violence in agrarian uprisings. Out of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Part	  VII	  of	  the	  1964	  Party	  Programme	  also	  states	  that	  “The	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India	  (Marxist)	  strives	  to	  achieve	  
the	  establishment	  of	  people's	  democracy	  and	   socialist	   transformation	   through	  peaceful	  means.	  By	  developing	  a	  
powerful	  mass	   revolutionary	  movement,	  by	  combining	  parliamentary	  and	  extra	  parliamentary	   forms	  of	  struggle,	  
the	  working	  class	  and	   its	  allies	  will	   try	   their	  utmost	   to	  overcome	   the	   resistance	  of	   the	   forces	  of	   reaction	  and	   to	  
bring	   about	   these	   transformations	   through	   peaceful	   means.”	   Quoted	   from	   http://cpim.org/content/party-­‐
programme	  (accessed	  on	  September	  12,	  2009)	  	  
28	  Part	  VII	  of	  the	  1964	  Program	  held	  that	  the	  party	  would	  ”not	  hesitate	  to	  lend	  its	  unstinted	  support	  to	  the	  Gov-­‐
ernment	  on	  all	   issues	  of	  world	  peace	  and	  anti-­‐colonialism…	  on	  all	   economic	   and	  political	   issues	  of	   conflict	  with	  
imperialism,	  and	  on	  all	  issues	  that	  involve	  the	  questions	  of	  strengthening	  our	  sovereignty	  and	  independent	  foreign	  
policy.”	  For	  further	  details,	  see	  http://cpim.org/content/party-­‐programme	  (accessed	  September	  12,	  2009)	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tussle emerged two separate communist parties: CPI and CPI(M). The newly formed CPI(M), 
despite moving away from the right-wing old school leaders of CPI, remained fraught with inter-
nal tension as the pro-Mao radical left faction within it advocated violent overthrow of Indian 
democracy rather than participation in it through contesting elections.  
2.2.2	  The	  Sixties:	  Fragmentation	  of	  the	  Indian	  Left	  
 
It was in the context of ideological disagreements on violent revolution versus electoral 
participation that a prominent leader of the radical pro-Mao faction, Charu Mazumder, fondly 
called CM, authored “Eight Documents” to help crystallize the alternate political program of the 
violent radicals.29 Condemning CPI(M)’s electoral participation as revisionism and economism, 
CM led the Naxalbari uprising in the Darjeeling district of North Bengal in 1967, fortifying 
hopes of revolution among the radical leftists all over India.30 These were tumultuous times in 
Indian politics. Economic problems, like chronic food shortages, sharp inflationary price spirals, 
unemployment, low industrial output, and stagnant rates of public investment, created mounting 
popular frustration with ruling parties. For the first time since independence, INC was defeated 
in the 1967 elections in 8 states.  
Arguably the most momentous incident in the communist history of India was the afore-
mentioned armed uprising of a group of landless peasants and sharecroppers in the Naxalbari 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  These	  documents	  borrowed	  heavily	  from	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  China	  under	  Mao	  Zedong.	  
In	  a	  feeble	  attempt	  to	  bridge	  the	  growing	  ideological	  divide	  between	  the	  two	  warring	  factions	  within	  CPI(M),	  and	  
to	  distinguish	  itself	  from	  CPI,	  the	  CPI(M)	  conceded	  during	  the	  1968	  Bardhaman	  Plenum	  that	  the	  bourgeoisie	  in	  
India	  had	  “dual	  character”	  that	  both	  collaborates	  and	  contends	  with	  imperialism.	  By	  not	  explicitly	  stating	  which	  of	  
these	  two	  characteristics	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  was	  dominant,	  the	  CPI(M)	  hoped	  to	  prevent	  another	  ideological	  split	  
of	  the	  party.	  	  
30	  Among	  the	  radicals,	  a	  faction	  known	  as	  the	  “debatists,”	  focused	  on	  the	  inner	  party	  theoretical	  polemic	  to	  expose	  
the	  ideological	  inconsistencies	  of	  the	  CPI(M)	  path	  of	  electoral	  participation	  and	  parliamentary	  struggle.	  In	  contrast,	  
the	  “actionists,”	  led	  by	  Charu	  Mazumdar	  and	  enamored	  by	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  in	  China,	  advocated	  that	  the	  
time	  was	  ripe	  for	  following	  up	  the	  Naxalbari	  uprising	  of	  March	  and	  April	  of	  1967	  with	  nationwide	  revolutionary	  
armed	  agrarian	  movement.	  	  
 	  
	  
47	  
block of Darjeeling district of North Bengal. The landless poor seized plots of land that they had 
cultivated from landlords and started harvesting the crops they grew, precipitating the first clash 
between sharecroppers and police/landlord militia in May 1967. This was followed by violent 
clashes and the forcible seizure of land and confiscation of food grains by armed units of the 
Kisan Sabha.31 The use of violence in Naxalbari, though lower in intensity, scale, and duration 
than the Punnapra-Vayalar or Warli uprising, it was premeditated by the communist leadership 
with the long-term goals of structural change in agrarian relations and, ultimately, overthrow of 
the state.  
The significance of the Naxalbari uprising lies in the unleashing of an avalanche of agrar-
ian uprisings attacking the very democratic foundations of the Indian state and not just localized 
systems of exploitation.32 With the news of Naxalbari spreading to other parts of India (duly aid-
ed by Peking radio), CM and his supporters first formed the All India Coordination Committee 
of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) within the CPI(M) on November 13, 1967. Eventually 
the AICCCR severed ties with the CPI(M) and categorically rejected its parliamentary path in a 
“Resolution on Elections” on May 14, 1968. One year later, on April 22, 1969, the leaders of the 
AICCCR in Calcutta decided to form a new communist party called the Communist Party of In-
dia (Marxist Leninist) [CPI(ML)] with support from members in the districts of Andhra Pradesh 
(Srikakulam District Committee), Bihar, Delhi, Karnataka, Jammu and Kashmir, Orissa, Punjab, 
Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. The Communist Party of China, formally recognized CPI(ML) in 
July 1969. Some other radical left factions like Dakshin Desh and a breakaway faction of the 
Andhra Communists (APCCR) left CPI(M) too in protest against its non-revolutionary, centrist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  The	  CPI(M)	  leaders,	  who	  were	  then	  in	  power,	  first	  tried	  to	  pacify	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  having	  failed,	  
Jyoti	  Basu,	  the	  CPI(M)	  leader	  and	  also	  the	  home	  minister	  of	  West	  Bengal,	  ordered	  the	  police	  to	  reign	  in	  the	  situa-­‐
tion.	  Finally	  paramilitary	  forces	  were	  deployed	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  movement	  lasted	  for	  less	  than	  six	  months.	  	  
32	  They	  formed	  a	  Committee	  in	  Aid	  of	  Naxalbari	  and	  Peasant	  Struggles	  in	  Calcutta	  as	  early	  as	  June	  1967.	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politics but they did not join CM. These trends later became part of the current Maoists. The dia-
gram below (Figure 1) depicts the fragmentation of the Indian Left and the most important fac-
tions emerging out of it up to the 1970s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wave 1: From “Leftist” Splits in CPI to CPI (ML) 
	  
Note:	  The	  names	  in	  bold	  font	  indicate	  political	  party.	  The	  other	  factions	  in	  the	  figure	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
Figure	  8	  
Splits	  in	  the	  Indian	  Left:	  Wave	  1	  
Quickly, the CPI(ML) jumped into organizing armed uprisings in parts of Bihar (Musha-
hari and Lakhimpur Kheri districts) , West Bengal (Debra-Gopiballavpur and Birbhum districts, 
North Bengal region, and in the capital city of Calcutta) and Andhra Pradesh (Srikakulam dis-
tricts). It advocated the boycott of elections, insurrection by armed squads, and annihilation of 
class enemies by combat groups. In emphasizing secretive politics and assassination activities, 
the organization condemned the use of mass mobilization strategies, including trade union activi-
ties, terming these as economistic and non-revolutionary (Mazumdar 1967; Mazumdar 2001; 
Mohan 1971). In a tribal farming community in Srikakulam in South India, communists aligned 
with CPI(ML), led by two school teachers, revolted against the formidable CPI(M) leadership in 
Andhra Pradesh and organized forcible harvest of crops and land occupations. They formed 
guerrilla squads, and on November 25, 1968, in one of the largest uprisings of the time, 250 trib-
APCCR	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al farm workers raided a landlord’s house, took out a procession of hoarded food grains, and 
burned hundreds of documents that fraudulently claimed peasants were indebted to the landlords. 
By October 1969, the government sent in 12,000 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the 
movement leaders were arrested, assassinated, or maimed, and the uprising swiftly ended.  
A distinctive feature of the armed agrarian uprisings in the 1960s is that, unlike previous 
episodes, the leadership in these uprisings was convinced that, despite formal independence from 
British rule in 1947 India, was a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country, where comprador bourgeoi-
sie was still serving the interests of imperialists. Under such circumstances, grievances of the ru-
ral poor were neither coincidental nor local. They were systemic and could only be tackled by 
systematic violence aimed at complete overthrow of the state and its political-economic infra-
structure. The new Indian communists aligned with the CPI(ML) were on a path of protracted 
people’s war, a concept borrowed from Mao Zedong, until a new democratic revolution could be 
launched in India. They considered violence not a passive self-defense mechanism against ruling 
class violence, but an integral strategy in their path to liberation through guerilla warfare.  
Local leaders joined forces to forge a nationwide strategy of arming and mobilizing peas-
ants, creating rural liberated base areas that would eventually encircle and capture the cities. The 
radical left leadership of these uprisings rejected parliamentary politics, called for the boycott of 
elections, and fought against the economism, legalism, and reformism that characterized the In-
dian mainstream left. Though the Naxalbari uprising and other agrarian uprisings all over India 
were swiftly crushed, their leadership killed, maimed, or jailed, their significance cannot be 
clearer as the start of radical Indian politics espousing violent overthrow of the Indian democracy 
as a solution to agrarian problems.  
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2.2.3	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century:	  Agrarian	  Discontent	  and	  New	  Mobilization	  
	  
Due to severe repression of communist radicals in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a pro-
tracted lull in armed agrarian uprisings in India until the massive land grab by the state of West 
Bengal to facilitate construction of an automobile factory by the Tata Group occurred in 2006. 
This land grab threatened the largely agrarian population in Singur, West Bengal.33 The subse-
quent resistance movement started with the formation of non-violent civic associations like the 
Krishijami Raksha Committee (Save the Agricultural Land Committee) in June 2006. Violence 
in Singur was set off by draconian laws passed by state government suspending constitutional 
rights of free citizens to assemble and protest land acquisition. However, these were only sporad-
ic acts of confrontation with the police or local ruling party operatives, who also belonged to the 
mainstream left. As soon as the High court declared government land acquisition legal under the 
1894 law, recognizing the Tata automobile project as a ‘public good,’ the resistance fizzled out. 
The Singur uprising, despite its high symbolic value for reviving agrarian resistance in post-
liberalization India, was mostly a conservative movement against a specific land grab with no 
agenda for capturing state power.   
The Singur struggle, however, rekindled agrarian mobilization in the adjacent Nandigram 
block in January 2007,34 where protesters in 28 villages in the region clashed with police for sev-
eral days and formed human barricades blocking access to their villages. Within a month of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  The	  town	  of	  Singur	  in	  West	  Bengal	  has	  very	  fertile	  multi-­‐crop	  land.	  Agriculture	  was	  (and	  still	  is)	  a	  relatively	  sus-­‐
tainable	  economic	  endeavor,	  though	  the	  majority	  of	  	  the	  	  agrarian	  	  population	  	  (33%	  	  directly	  	  involved	  	  in	  	  cultiva-­‐
tion)	  	  	  was	  	  marginal	  farmers	  or	  landless	  laborers.	  Agricultural	  land	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  livelihood	  of	  villagers	  in	  Sin-­‐
gur,	  whether	  directly	  	  as	  	  farmers,	  and	  agricultural	  	  laborers	  	  or	  	  indirectly	  	  as	  	  vegetable	  	  vendors,	  	  animal	  grazers,	  	  
workers	  	  in	  	  cold	  	  storage	  ,	  and	  	  so	  	  on.	  	  	  
34	  The	  Nandigram	  block,	  comprising	  28	  villages	  with	  a	  population	  of	  175,000	  people,	  was	  selected	  to	  be	  converted	  
into	  a	  Special	  Economic	  Zone	  (SEZ):	  the	  Salem	  group	  	  was	  approved	  to	  head	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  chemical	  hub.	  
Nandigram	  was	  very	  similar	  to	  Singur:	  land	  was	  multicrop	  and	  fertile;	  over	  60%	  of	  the	  population	  depended	  on	  
land,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  for	  livelihood;	  life	  was	  modest,	  but	  comfortable;	  the	  average	  landholding	  was	  about	  1	  
acre,	  classifying	  most	  farmers	  as	  marginal	  cultivators	  or	  landless	  agricultural	  laborers.	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first uprising, the West Bengal government backed down and declared that there will be no state 
land acquisition in Nandigram. However, the villagers wanted written assurance from the gov-
ernment and demanded that court cases against protesters be withdrawn. When the CPI(M)-led 
state government refused, events took a violent turn when state forces killed many protesters, 
raped women, and unleashed atrocities that catalyzed civilian resistance, until  the  state govern-
ment  withdrew  police  forces  and instead unleashed CPI(M) party  cadres  to  use unprecedent-
ed  violence  against  villagers  active  in  the  resistance.  
After the Singur and Nandigram uprisings rocked West Bengal in 2006 and 2007, respec-
tively, the Lalgarh uprising began in 2008. Unlike the two earlier uprisings, the population in 
Lalgarh was primarily tribal and  much  more  impoverished; the  area was  forested  and  re-
mote,  land  not  as fertile and agriculture primitive. In 2007, the Jindal group was given land 
rights to set up a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the area for a steel project. In November 
2008, a landmine almost killed the state chief minister visiting the area, which heightened police 
atrocities against the local tribal population. Soon afterwards, hundreds of tribals armed in tradi-
tional weapons descended on police stations, seized arms, destroyed infrastructure, and entered 
into an armed confrontation with the state. This was distinct from the violent episodes in Singur 
and Nandigram, because it was a Maoist militant mass mobilization. The Maoists were the most 
important actors in this mobilization, even though the local population, much like in Singur and 
Nandigram, formed the People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities, immediately after the 
high profile landmine attack. The area was soon converted into a “liberated areas” with virtually 
no state control, which lasted up until December 2009, when the state finally regained control.  
The Singur-Nandigram-Lalgarh uprisings in the state of West Bengal rocked India in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century. In analyzing the uprisings, the Polanyi-esque idea of a 
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‘great transformation’ as a cause of peasant radicalism resonates strongly (Polanyi 2001). The 
popular uprisings in Singur and Nandigram employed violent agitation methods to resist devel-
opment-induced displacement. But despite moral outrage, these uprisings merely sought to pre-
serve or resurrect a feudal moral economy that guarantees peasant subsistence. In Lalgarh, on the 
other hand, the movement went beyond popular uprising against police atrocities and involved 
organized attack on police camps, hijacking of a popular train and an attempted assassination of 
the sitting Chief Minister. Mainstream political parties distanced themselves from the Lalgarh 
uprising even though the socioeconomic condition of the tribal peasants in Lalgarh was worse 
than that of peasants in Singur or Nandigram.  
Summing up, this section highlights the origin and evolution of the Maoist movement in 
India as it emerged out of the greater communist movement. The grievances that motivated peas-
ants to take up arms remained fairly consistent over the years regardless of who led the country. 
What distinguished Naxalbari in 1967 and subsequent Maoist uprisings from other agrarian up-
risings were not unique gripes or violent means. I argue that preoccupation with classifying 
struggles as either violent or non-violent is, in fact, misleading. Pushed to the wall in misery and 
exploitation, peasants everywhere have resorted to violent resistance and heroic acts of sacrifice. 
But what distinguishes Maoists is that they propound organized revolutionary violence, which 
targets not the immediate face of exploitation but the state apparatus that perpetuates it. Maoists 
argue that reforming institutions through compromise and consultation does not eliminate the 
root cause of class exploitation. They pursue the ultimate goal of overthrowing state institutions 
and seizing political power.	  The following two sections elaborate how, despite this shared ideo-
logical commitment to the goal and method of armed revolution as well as a unified command 
structure, the Maoists in North and South India evolved differently due to their distinct ideational 
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history and heritage, underscoring how insurgent organizations are locally embedded in local 
socioeconomic and political conditions as well. 	  
2.3	  Maoists	  in	  North	  and	  South	  India:	  Similarities	  and	  Differences	  	  
 
The arguments and evidence presented in this section illustrate the ideational unity but opera-
tional differences between Maoists in North and South India. This section is divided into two 
parts: the first part underscores the unified command structure of the northern and southern Mao-
ists as well as their shared commitment to ideology of the nature of the Indian state and the ap-
propriate methods of struggle and political-military strategy; the second part highlights how, de-
spite their common leadership, goals, and strategies, the Maoists in North and South India each 
evolved with their distinctive local conditions such that the legacy of Maoism is distinctly re-
gional. In doing so, this analysis of the divide between North and South Indian Maoists sets the 
stage for Section 4, which delineates how distinct realities on the ground in the two regions, spe-
cifically regarding caste structure and land relations, eventually created conditions for the emer-
gence of regionally-specific rebel exit networks in North and South India.  
2.3.	  1	  Unifying	  Elements	  of	  Maoist	  Ideology:	  State,	  Struggle,	  and	  Strategy	  
	  
Indian Maoists are united in their commitment to three ideological pillars on 1) their un-
derstanding of the Indian state as “semi-feudal,” 2) their expectations about the protracted nature 
of struggle against the state, and 3) their choice of militant mass mobilization strategy in this 
struggle. 
2.3.1.1	  Nature	  of	  the	  Indian	  State:	  Semi-­‐Feudal,	  Semi-­‐Colonial	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All Maoist factions are united in their characterization of the Indian state as a “semi-
feudal, semi-colonial” country. By “semi-feudal” they mean that uneven capitalist development 
in India has been superimposed on feudal remnants. By “semi-colonial” the Maoists imply that 
India is not fully independent of imperial control despite official independence in 1947. They 
argue that the British transferred power to the comprador ruling classes who continue to advance 
foreign imperialist interests over those of Indian citizens. As a result, they advocate a “new dem-
ocratic revolution” in India, a concept borrowed from Mao, which entails a struggle for “people’s 
democracy” and liberation from both foreign imperialist and domestic feudal control (Ghosh 
2009). Thus Maoists deem the current democratic institutions in India “as an outright fraud 
framed in the deceptive name of biggest democracy of the world” and build justification for 
armed confrontation as the only way to restore power to the people.35  
The four observable implications of a semi-feudal system are share cropping, perpetual 
rural indebtedness, landowner as moneylender, and inaccessibility of the market. Indebtedness is 
a consistent characteristic of a semi-feudal system, particularly because the landlord,  after  tak-
ing  away  a substantial  portion  of  what  the  peasant  produces,  lends  some  of  that  back  to  
them as a consumption loan. Thus the peasant is tied to the landowner and the particular piece of 
land due to this unpaid debt, virtually reducing him to a traditional serf. In this type of economy, 
the peasants do not have much access to the market – they are not worthy of credit in the com-
mercial banking industry because they have no assets to borrow against. What is more, the peas-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35Other	  non-­‐Maoist	   left	  parties	  of	  India	  critique	  this	  somewhat	  outdated	  characterization	  of	  the	  Indian	  state.	  For	  
example,	   the	  parliamentary	   left	   recognizes	  that	  capitalism,	   though	  “slow	  and	  uneven,”	   is	   the	  dominant	  mode	  of	  
production.	  Even	  some	  ML	   factions,	   like	  CPI(ML)	  Red	  Flag	   faction,	  active	   in	  Kerala,	  argue	   that	  “neocolonial”	   is	  a	  
more	   apt	   description	   of	   the	   character	   of	   the	   Indian	   state	   than	   “semi-­‐feudal,	   semi-­‐colonial.”	   Other	   factions	   like	  
CPI(ML)	  Liberation	  and	  CPI(ML)	  New	  Democracy,	  emerging	  from	  the	  Naxalbari	  tradition,	  while	  subscribing	  to	  the	  
‘semi-­‐feudal,	  semi-­‐colonial’	   thesis,	  still	  participate	   in	  state	  and	  national	   legislatures	  as	  means	  of	  political	  change.	  
The	  Maoists	  consider	  all	  these	  critiques	  “revisionist;”	  the	  other	   left	  groups,	   in	  turn,	  dub	  the	  Maoists	  as	  “left	  sec-­‐
tarian”	  and	  “anarcho-­‐militarist.”	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ant-tenant and his family members have to regularly render unpaid labor services. In contrast, in 
a capitalist system, production is based on wage-labor, it is for the market and not for self-
consumption, and surplus value gets invested back in production guaranteeing new research and 
technological innovation (Bhaduri 1973; Bhaduri 1977; Thorner 1982). In this formulation of 
capitalist agriculture, landless laborers can negotiate a high price for their labor when their de-
mand is high. Small farmers have access to credit options other than the landlord, and since they 
are not tied to any particular landlord, they sell their produce to the highest bidder in the market.  
Conceiving the Indian state as semi-feudal and semi-colonial has important implications 
for the Maoists’ mobilization. First, it limits the spread of Maoists to primarily rural hinterlands 
that are weak underbellies of the state with democratic institutions reinforcing rather than replac-
ing deep-rooted feudal structures of exploitation. Second, the Maoists advocate revolutionary 
violence as the only path to socio-political change when the conditions on the ground are semi-
feudal. In remote areas it becomes impossible to differentiate state institutions from traditionally 
exploitative feudal agencies of landholding and money lending. The Maoists seek to attack the 
local landlords, moneylenders, forest guards, state police, paramilitary forces, and bureaucrats 
who together represent the abusive character of the Indian state. These assaults are much more 
salient in remote tribal villages than in urban areas, because even though economic grievances 
are as pervasive in urban areas, the state is much more protean in the latter, moving between be-
nevolence, indifference, and inequity.  
2.3.1.2	  Nature	  of	  the	  Struggle:	  Protracted	  People’s	  War	  
 Given this irrevocably exploitative depiction of India as a semi-feudal, semi-colonial 
state, the Maoists advocate a protracted people’s war (henceforth PPW) as “the only correct and 
appropriate strategy in India for dealing with a superior enemy” by taking advantage of the vast 
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terrain, weak infrastructure in remote areas, a huge agrarian population, and the internal conflicts 
in the ruling class. On the military side, PPW denotes an extended and fluid front and bleeds the 
ponderous war machinery of the Indian state under the strain of tortuous struggle in unfavorable 
terrain. On the political side, PPW stands for winning popular support in remote neglected parts 
through sustained mass organizations. Mao conceptualized PPW primarily as a war of Chinese 
national resistance against foreign (Japanese) subjugation, but the concept of PPW is applied in 
the Indian context as a political-military strategy of long-term armed revolutionary struggle 
against the Indian state (Mao 1967a). As long as hunger, starvation, inequality, unemployment, 
disease, and discrimination exist in India, the Maoists are confident in finding a steady supply of 
recruits in this “see-saw battle” with the state.36 Further, given their mobile warfare strategy, if 
the state succeeded in clearing them out of certain pockets, the Maoists would proliferate to other 
adjacent areas. Thus the Maoist battle call proclaims, “They can kill all the flowers, but they will 
not hold back the spring” (Mao 1967a).  
The Maoists infuse optimism among the foot soldiers that even if the enemy (the mighty 
Indian state in this case) enjoyed strategic advantage at the beginning of an armed struggle, re-
bels should persist, consolidate their strength, and grow in battle experience to eventually force 
the enemy into a strategic retreat.37 Mao conceived PPW in Clausewitzian terms as an extension 
of politics rather than its alternative. However, PPW is impregnated with the risk of sidelining 
mass mobilization, without which insurgents fail to generate political consciousness among its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  This	  is	  based	  on	  an	  interview	  with	  comrade	  Katakam	  Sudarshan	  aka	  Anand,	  Polit	  Bureau	  member	  and	  the	  secre-­‐
tary	   of	   Central	   regional	   Bureau,	   CPI(Maoist).This	   article	  was	   published	   in	  Maoist	   Information	   Bulletin	   13,	   dated	  
December	   7,	   2009,	  which	   is	   available	   on	  http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPIMIB/MIB-­‐13.pdf	   (Accessed	   on	  
October	  2,	  2011).	  
37	  For	  additional	  reading	  on	  the	  Maoist	  urban	  strategy,	  see	  the	  document	  titled	  	  “Urban	  Perspective:	  Our	  Work	  in	  
the	  Urban	  Areas”	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/documents/papers/Urbanperspective.htm	   	   (Accessed	   on	  
October	  8,	  2011)	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constituency and public opinion against their purported enemy elsewhere. But it also provides 
Maoists a clear strategy of recruitment from amongst the poorest of poor, the Dalit (India’s low-
est class), and the landless, who have little to lose.  
2.3.1.3	  Maoist	  Strategy:	  Militant	  Mass	  Mobilization	  
	  
The current CPI (Maoist) upholds the formation of revolutionary mass organizations as 
the means to engender public political consciousness in preparation for armed struggle. Militant 
mass mobilization involves indoctrination of the masses, formation of village defense squads, 
people’s militia groups, and eventually a professional guerilla people’s army. The mass organiza-
tions that undertake mobilization efforts are distinct from the Party, which remains underground 
and secretly directs mass organizations and the armed forces. Mass organizations are thus in-
struments for the revolutionary party to recruit people and raise their political consciousness for 
an eventual revolution.  
The political objective of CPI (Maoist) is to organize a socialist revolution in India 
through a two-stage process. The first stage, a.k.a. “New Democratic Revolution,” includes the 
overthrow of the current “semi-feudal, semi-colonial” state through a “Protracted People’s War” 
and founding of the “People’s Democracy.” This lays the foundation for the second stage, social-
ism, and finally communism. The “New Democratic Revolution” is primarily an agrarian revolu-
tion in which the Party wants to exploit the existing class contradictions in Indian society and 
sharply polarize it into three groups – (a) Motive Forces which will lead and support its objec-
tive, (b) Enemy Forces which will oppose its objective, and (c) Middle-of-the-roaders, who are 
neither enthusiastic supporters nor die-hard enemies. The following table (Table 1) sums up the 
 	  
	  
58	  
class profile of Indian society from the Maoist perspective and highlights what the Maoists con-
sider the most appropriate strategy against them.   
Class Name Class Composition Position vis-à-vis 
Maoist Objective 
Landlords Includes rich and middle-class agricultural bosses who 
own significant amounts of arable land, do little or no 
farming by themselves, but rent or lease the land and em-
ploy sharecroppers and agricultural workers. They often 
have additional means of livelihood as merchants, agro-
based traders, usurers, quarry owners, contractors to local 
and central governments or large corporations. They are 
the key backers of the current state. 
Enemy 
Comprador Bureau-
cratic Bourgeoisie 
Indian “big” capitalists who benefitted from British 
patronage. They are the key supporters of neoliberal 
world order. This class also includes the upper stra-
tum of bureaucrats, leadership of major political par-
ties, and some intellectuals and professionals. 
Enemy 
Urban Proletariat Class dispossessed of all means of production and 
compelled to sell physical labor to earn a livelihood. 
Includes wage earners in organized (both public and 
private sectors) as well as unorganized sectors (typi-
cally, workers in small scale industries, construction 
workers, and contract and casual laborers in large en-
terprises). 
Motive 
Rural Proletariat Landless peasants including agricultural workers who 
do not have their own land and agricultural tools and 
depend mainly on selling their physical labor to earn a 
living. 
Motive 
National Bour-
geoisie 
Middle and small capitalists who neither have any 
share of state power nor any control over state funds. 
They are in conflict with and exploited by the compra-
dor bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Politically very weak and 
vacillating class. 
Middle-of-the-
roaders—some will 
turn into enemies, 
some stay neutral, and 
some support the 
Maoists once revolu-
tion gains momentum. 
Semi Proletariat This class owns limited land or tools. Includes poor 
peasants, handicraftsmen, carpenters, masons, and 
mechanics. In urban areas, this class includes street 
side peddlers (hawkers), rickshaw and auto rickshaw 
drivers, temporary construction workers, and house 
servants. 
Middle-of-the-roaders 
Middle Peasants This farming class owns land and agricultural tools. 
Does not sell physical labor but does not exploit oth-
ers. May rent surplus land to landless and poor peas-
ants and employ agricultural workers—but that’s not 
Middle-of-the roaders 
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their primary income. 
Rich Peasants This class owns considerable amounts of land, but is 
also involved in day-to-day farming. Over 50% of 
their income comes from renting lands to landless 
and poor peasants and they employ a large number of 
agricultural workers.  They may have other means of 
livelihood too. Unlike landlords, rich peasants are in-
volved in day-to-day farming activities by themselves 
and do not necessarily support the agenda of globali-
zation, privatization and liberalization like the former 
overwhelmingly do. 
Middle of the road-
ers—some will support 
the enemy, some stay 
neutral, while a small 
faction will support the 
Maoists once revolu-
tion gains momentum 
Petty Bourgeoisie This heterogeneous group is not a class. It includes 
small scale producers, small traders, lower level intel-
lectuals including teachers of schools and colleges, 
students, professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers, engi-
neers), lower level management, and supervisory staff 
in public and private organizations –largely the mid-
dle class. It can be divided into three groups: 
(a) A “right wing” section of the petty bourgeoi-
sie benefits from the current state structure 
and policies of economic liberalization, pri-
vatization, and globalization. They generate 
surplus income. 
(b) A section of the petty bourgeoisie generates 
just enough income to support themselves, 
no surplus. 
(c) A third “left wing” section of the petty bour-
geoisie deals with declining incomes and re-
lated drops in quality of life.   
Middle of the roaders 
– the right-wingers will 
actively oppose the 
revolution, while the 
left-wingers will active-
ly support it, especially 
when the revolution 
gains momentum. In-
tellectuals like teachers 
and students, profes-
sionals like doctors and 
lawyers, and artisans 
and traders may be left 
wingers irrespective of 
their quality of life. 
Lumpenproletariat Urban and rural unemployed who are actively in-
volved in petty criminal activities, sex trade, human 
trafficking, and panhandling. While they can be natu-
ral allies of communist revolution, their hatred for the 
current state makes them anarchists, and they are of-
ten easily lured by the enemies to counter the revolu-
tion. 
Middle-of-the-roaders 
– Maoists have a neu-
tral / cautious outlook 
towards them. 
 
Figure	  9	  
Maoist Concept of Class Structure in Rural India 
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The purpose of mass organizations is to sow the seeds of radicalism among the supporters 
and middle-of-the-roaders, who will eventually nurture and rally around guerrilla forces when 
they confront the state. As Mao wrote, mobilization of the common people throughout the coun-
try will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for 
our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every diffi-
culty in the war (Mao 1967b). The Maoists have several mass organizations. The most well-
known among them in South India are the Rythu Coolie Sangham (Agricultural Laborers Associ-
ation),	   Singareni Karmika Samakhya (Singareni Collieries Workers Federation), Radical Stu-
dents Union, and the Revolutionary Writers Association. The Lok Sangram Morcha (People’s 
Struggle Front), Mazddor Kisan Mukti Morcha (Workers-Peasants Liberation Front), Jan Mukti 
Parishad (People’s Liberation Council), and the Nari Mukti Sangharsh Samiti (Women’s Libera-
tion Struggle Association) operate in the North.  
In terms of armed forces, the Maoists have a two-tiered structure–the heavily armed Peo-
ple’s Liberation Guerrilla army consisting of full-time combatants and part-time militia squads is 
supported by smaller village-level defense committees, made up of peasants and other supporters 
recruited primarily through the mass organizations.  
There is an inherent tension in the coexistence of secret Party, trained guerrilla army, and 
open mass organizations. Even though the Maoists have a detailed blueprint on appropriate mo-
bilization and recruitment strategies, they are compelled to adapt these strategies to local condi-
tions, often due to historical operational strategies of different factions. 
2.3.2	  Regional	  Specificities	  of	  Maoists:	  Legacy	  and	  Local	  Conditions	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In this section I show that insurgent organizations are locally embedded by demonstrating how 
the Maoists in North and South India, despite overarching ideological and organizational unity, 
took different trajectories in mobilization and recruitment, which, in turn, led to emergence of 
different informal exit networks in the two regions. The Maoists in North India emphasized 
armed resistance more than building a strong mass organization while their southern comrades 
painstakingly built robust grassroots networks as a precondition for military mobilization. This 
section is divided into two parts: the first part demonstrates that the regional specificities of Mao-
ist insurgency were rooted in differences in ideological legacies, and the second section argues 
that local ground conditions also played a role in the emphasis and operating procedures of the 
insurgents in the two regions.  
2.3.2.1	  Fragmentation	  of	  the	  Radical	  Left	  in	  India:	  Maoist	  Factions	  in	  the	  North	  and	  South	  
 
The first wave of Maoist uprising (1967-1972), led by the charismatic Charu Mazumdar 
(CM) and the breakaway radical faction of CPI(ML), ended abruptly with intense state repres-
sion. The short-lived upsurge deployed primarily urban, college-educated, middle-class youths in 
Calcutta to organize armed agrarian uprisings in far-flung rural areas. The leadership promised 
swift, bloody revolution in five years through “secret annihilation” of class enemies that perpe-
trated exploitation and inequality (Mazumdar 1967; Mazumdar 1969; Mazumdar 2001). As the 
state unleashed police and paramilitary forces,  successfully eliminating the entire top and middle 
level CPI(ML) leadership, including the arrest and suspicious death of CM in police custody in 
1972, the CPI(ML) disintegrated into several dozen bickering factions amidst widespread deser-
tions. Over the eighties and the nineties three predominant trends grew out of these factions.  
The first trend emerging out of the intense debates and factionalism in CPI(ML) camps 
staunchly upheld the strategy of secret annihilation without mass organizations. The most promi-
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nent leaders and factions of this trend, who worked primarily in the northern pocket, however, 
eventually abandoned the path of revolution altogether in the nineties to return to electoral poli-
tics.38 CPI(ML) Liberation, for example, led the armed agrarian uprisings in Central Bihar, 
fighting many bloody wars against upper caste militias of big landlords. They established a mas-
sive following among the Dalit peasants in the plains of Bihar until they abandoned armed strug-
gle for electoral politics, gradually losing their support base.  
The second trend, also concentrated in the North, completely rejected annihilation poli-
tics, choosing electoral politics and parliamentary struggle.39 As they merged with the parliamen-
tary left and eventually lost influence in their former strongholds, this trend was unable to influ-
ence the gradual militarization of the Maoist struggle in the North through the eighties and the 
nineties. By the nineties, following their adoption of electoral politics, these two trends in the 
North lost all support and leverage in Maoist politics. Thus the dominant players in the North 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  The	  CPI(ML)	  2nd	  Central	  Committee,	   formed	   in	  1972	  under	  the	   leadership	  of	  Azizul	  Haq,	  Nishith	  Bhattacharya,	  
and	  Mahadeb	  Mukherjee,	  and	  represented	  this	  pro-­‐CM	  trend.	  They	  supported	  the	  Gang	  of	  Four	  line	  (Mao’s	  wife	  
and	  her	  followers)	  in	  China,	  upheld	  the	  goal	  of	  revolutionary	  armed	  struggle	  in	  India,	  and	  rejected	  mass	  mobiliza-­‐
tion	  and	  electoral	  participation.	  Soon	  after	  formation,	  however,	  this	  faction	  was	  further	  divided	  when	  the	  pro-­‐Lin	  
Biao	  members	   led	  by	  Mukherjee	  were	  expelled	   from	  the	  party.	  Another	   important	  pro-­‐CM,	  anti-­‐Lin	  Biao	   faction	  
(named	  after	  Lin	  Biao,	  Mao’s	  chosen	  successor	   later	  condemned	  as	  traitor)	  was	  known	  as	  the	  “Bhojpur	  Commit-­‐
tee.”	  Led	  by	  Subroto	  Dutta	  (Jauhar),	   the	  faction	  opposed	  the	  Gang	  of	  Four	  and	  supported	  the	   leadership	  of	  Hua	  
Guofeng	  in	  post-­‐Mao	  China.	  Rigid	  in	  opposition	  to	  mass	  mobilization	  during	  its	  initial	  period	  of	  armed	  insurgency	  in	  
Bhojpur	  (Bihar),	  this	  pro-­‐CM	  group,	  now	  known	  as	  CPI(ML)	  Liberation,	  subsequently	  plunged	  into	  electoral	  politics.	  
Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Vinod	  Mishra,	  it	  emerged	  as	  the	  most	  successful	  ML	  electoral	  party	  with	  representatives	  in	  
the	  state	  assemblies	  of	  Bihar,	  Jharkhand	  and	  Assam.	  
39	  Prominent	  groups	   in	   this	   trend	   included	   the	  CPI(ML)	  Provisional	  Central	  Committee	  or	   “CPI(ML)PCC,”	  CPI(ML)	  
Kanu	  Sanyal	  and	  the	  CPI(ML)	  New	  Democracy.	  CPI(ML)	  PCC	  descends	  from	  the	  Bihar	  State	  Committee	  of	  CPI(ML)	  
led	  by	  Satyanarayan	  Singh,	  who	  was	  expelled	  from	  CPI(ML)	  in	  November	  1971	  for	  accusing	  CM	  of	  left	  sectarianism.	  
This	  group,	  opposed	  to	  the	  Gang	  of	  Four	  and	  supportive	  of	  the	  leadership	  of	  Hua	  Guofeng	  and	  the	  Three	  Worlds	  
Theory,	  was	  the	  first	  among	  ML	  groups	  to	  contest	  elections.	  Kanu	  Sanyal,	  the	  second	  in	  command	  of	  the	  Naxalbari	  
uprising	  after	  CM,	  also	  denounced	  the	  left	  adventurist	  deviation	  of	  CM	  and	  formed	  the	  Communist	  Organization	  of	  
India	  (Marxist	  Leninist).	  His	  group	  maintained	  its	  own	  identity	  and	  sphere	  of	  influence	  in	  North	  Bengal	  amongst	  the	  
farmers	  and	  tea	  plantation	  workers.	  In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  he	  formed	  an	  alternate	  CPI(ML)	  by	  merging	  with	  a	  faction	  
of	   the	   Central	   Reorganizing	   Committee-­‐CPI(ML)	   that	  worked	   in	   Kerala	   and	   conceptualized	   the	   Indian	   state	   as	   a	  
neo-­‐colony,	  rather	  than	  a	  semi-­‐feudal,	  semi-­‐colony.	  Other	  prominent	  groups	  in	  this	  second	  trend	  were	  the	  CPI(ML)	  
Janashakti,	  which	  has	  flip	  flopped	  between	  periods	  of	  electoral	  participation	  and	  armed	  insurgency,	  and	  CPI(ML)	  
New	  Democracy,	  which	  participates	  in	  elections	  and	  has	  had	  some	  success	  in	  the	  states	  of	  Bihar	  and	  Andhra	  Pra-­‐
desh.	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post-1990s belong to a third trend emerging from this churning in ML politics that upheld the 
boycott of elections, rejected annihilation politics, and focused on creating liberated areas 
through a combination of people’s guerrilla army and mass mobilization.40  Of the two major 
factions in this trend, CPI(ML) Party Unity (PU) worked in the North and CPI(ML) Peoples’ 
War Group (PWG) worked in the South.  
In addition, both in the North and in the South there were some pro-Mao factions that al-
ways operated outside CM and his CPI(ML) (shown in Figure 1). Of them the Andhra Pradesh 
Revolutionary Communist Committee (APRCC) dominant in the South rejected secret annihila-
tion and advocated grassroots mass mobilization and worker’s movement alongside guerrilla 
warfare.41 In contrast, the Dakshin Desh faction (shown in Figure 2 evolved into the Maoist Co-
ordination Committee in the North and was the most ruthless and violent Maoist faction. The fol-
lowing diagram shows how different factions of the ML movement divided and united between 
the 1970s and the early 2000s.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  The	  CPI(ML)	  People’s	  War	  Group	  (PWG),	  long-­‐dreaded	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  and	  the	  CPI(ML)	  Party	  Unity,	  equally	  
feared	  in	  Bihar	  and	  Jharkhand,	  were	  the	  proponents	  of	  this	  trend.	  The	  CPI(ML)	  PWG	  was	  founded	  on	  April	  22,	  1980	  
in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  by	  Kondapalli	   Seetharamaiah	   from	  a	   faction	  of	  CPI(ML)	  Central	  Organizing	  Committee	   (COC),	  
which	  descended	  from	  the	  undivided	  CPI(ML).	  Another	  faction	  of	  CPI(ML)	  COC	  led	  by	  M.	  Appalasuri	  and	  operating	  
in	  Palamau-­‐Jehanabad	  area	  of	  Bihar	  formed	  the	  CPI(ML)	  Party	  Unity.	  	  
41	  The	  AICCR	  met	  on	  February	  7-­‐8,	  1969	  and	  abruptly	  disaffiliated	  the	  APCCCR	  alleging	  that	  they	  were	  not	  loyal	  to	  
the	   Chinese	   Communist	   Party,	   that	   they	  were	   not	   supportive	   enough	  of	   the	   Srikakulam	   struggle,	   and	   that	  Nagi	  
Reddy	  did	  not	  resign	  from	  the	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  State	  Assembly	  (Ghosh	  2009).	  APRCC	  later	  split	   into	  CPI(ML)	  New	  
Democracy	  operating	  primarily	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  and	  the	  UCCRI(ML)	  active	  in	  parts	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  Bihar,	  and	  
Punjab.	  One	  major	   faction	  emerging	   from	  Unity	  Center	  of	  Communist	  Revolutionaries	  of	   India	   (Marxist	   Leninist)	  
[UCCRI(ML)]	  merged	  with	  six	  other	  communist	  groups	  to	  form	  CPI(ML)	  Janashakti.	  The	  new	  faction	  retained	  a	  fra-­‐
ternal	  relationship	  with	  the	  Maoists,	  but	  never	  merged.	  It	  carried	  on	  open	  mass	  activities	  for	  some	  time,	  but	  later	  
became	  re-­‐immersed	  in	  armed	  struggle.	  Currently,	   it	  maintains	  its	   independent	  existence	  in	  parts	  of	  Andhra	  Pra-­‐
desh,	  but	  has	  been	  severely	  weakened	  by	  desertions,	  state	  repression,	  and	  clashes	  with	  CPI	  (Maoist).	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Figure	  10	  
Wave 2: Splits and Mergers in the Radical Left Movement in India 
Thus PWG, also known as Peoples’ War (PW), and APCCR dominating the South shared 
the legacy of emphasizing grassroots mass mobilization as a precondition for successful armed 
struggle. In fact, APCCR did not join CM on the ground because he neglected mass organization 
in his recipe for quick revolution. PW emerged from the Srikakulam group that initially broke 
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away from APCCR leadership to support CM in his annihilation politics. But after the disastrous 
defeat in Srikakulam they attributed their failure to resist massive state repression to lack of mass 
organizations as social safety nets for insurgents fleeing a powerful state. With this realization 
the surviving PW leaders were devoted to organizing mass movements.  
In the North, on the other hand, although PU shared the same ideological legacy as PW 
and APCCR, there were other dominant northern Maoist trends that did not. For example, the 
MCC has earned a name for itself as the most violent Maoist outfit that neither developed mass 
organizations nor raised a people’s guerrilla army. They remained an underground organization 
that ruthlessly punished enemies and suspected informants in brutal beheadings and amputations 
called for by in kangaroo courts, instilling terror among civilians. PU cadres despised MCC as 
anarchist bloodhounds uneducated in the politics of revolution. MCC and PU became embroiled 
in two decades of violent turf war, which militarized PU as well (Louis 2000a). The other domi-
nant Northern faction, Liberation, was also embroiled in bloody caste wars against landowner 
militias in the plains of central Bihar (Bhatia 2005).  
Due to sharp ideological differences, mistrust of electoral democracy, and a decade of 
bloody turf war, the insurgency-democracy interface in the North has been rife with suspicion 
and mistrust, fear and many secret assassinations. In contrast, Maoist factions in the South, de-
spite ideological differences, have a history of working together, particularly on building a robust 
mass base. Diverse Southern Maoist factions have worked side by side in mass organizing activi-
ties: forging progressive forces and grassroots civic associations from rural areas to college cam-
puses, without fear of ostracism and poaching. In the North, however, this interaction has been 
severely restricted because the Maoist factions were deeply suspicious of civic actors and terror-
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ized them violently, leaving a bloody trail that deterred future collaboration in the democracy-
insurgency interface. 
Not much changed with the unification of different factions, primarily PW in the South 
and PU and MCC in the North, into CPI (Maoist) in 2004 even though emphasis on mass mobili-
zation became incorporated as a central Maoist tenet. I argue that mass line, emphasizing open 
mass organizations alongside secret party and guerrilla army, continues to have very different 
connotations for rebels in the North and South. The rebels in the North remain suspicious of de-
mocracy as an erosive, treacherous trap to be avoided assiduously. Rebels in the South, on the 
other hand, despite boycotting elections, remain open to exploring agrarian revolution and armed 
struggle alongside mass mobilization in a way that prepares common people for a protracted rev-
olutionary struggle towards the goal of forcefully overthrowing democratic institutions when the 
time is right.  
	  
2.3.2.2	  Pre-­‐War	  Social	  Conditions:	  Democracy-­‐Insurgency	  Interface	  in	  North	  and	  South	  India	  
	  
The ideological evolution of the Maoists in the North and South did not happen in a so-
cio-political vacuum.  There is considerable evidence that pre-existing social conditions which 
vary in the kinds of social resources they can provide to organizers determine the nature of in-
surgent organizations (Staniland 2012). In fact, insurgent groups with similar ideologies, ethnici-
ty, state enemies, and even, in this case, organizational unity can grow in dramatically different 
ways in interaction with their local contexts (Staniland 2014). In this part of the chapter I focus 
on the mediating role of the underlying social factors, specifically local caste/class structure, in 
shaping the outcomes of Maoist mobilization in North and South India. I show how southern 
Maoists were able to mobilize in a way that energized grassroots politics within a democratic 
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framework, engendering a thriving associational life. In contrast, Maoists in the North, faced 
with a distinct caste/class structure, were compelled to militarize to an extent that undermined 
grassroots politics. It is in this distinctive evolution of the democracy-insurgency interface that 
two different kinds of informal exit networks evolved in the Maoist-controlled areas in North and 
South India. 
Underlying Caste/Class Structure and The Democracy-Insurgency Interface in the North 
In the 1970s, when the Maoists were struggling to establish their foothold in villages 
around central and South Bihar, the caste hierarchy was divided into three broad groups: the up-
per castes at the top, the backward castes enjoyed intermediate status, and the Dalits (formerly 
untouchables) were at the bottom. The upper castes, or rural elites, comprised about 13 percent 
of the rural population and owned over 80 percent of the land. Although the big landlords be-
longed exclusively to the upper castes, the majority of these high caste households were small 
landlords with landholding similar to many upper backward caste rich peasant households. De-
spite comparable economic status, however, inter-caste marriages were prohibited among upper 
castes and backward castes. Some backward caste families, in contrast, earned their livelihoods 
as landless farm laborers alongside Dalits (formerly, untouchable castes) without much social 
interaction like dining or marrying across caste lines. The Dalits, who comprised 14 percent of 
the rural population were the rural proletariat, who, due to their landlessness, were historically 
powerless in local social affairs and invisible in state politics and administration (Frankel 1989; 
D. Bandyopadhyay 2006; Corbridge 1987).  
True to the Marxist theory of mobilization, the Maoists were focused on recruiting and 
mobilizing along class lines, targeting mostly the landless/land-poor as motive forces against the 
enemy class of rich landowners. Although Dalits constituted the majority of the rural poor, the 
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Maoists also enjoyed considerable popularity among the land-poor upper backward castes. How-
ever, these upper backward castes, particularly the Yadavs (the single largest caste in Bihar), 
have converted their numerical superiority into spectacular success in electoral politics in Bihar 
since the 1990s (Chaitanya 1991; Witsoe 2012; Witsoe 2011; Robin 2004). In fact, the political 
party based on Yadav identity more than doubled their representation in state legislative assem-
blies between 1952 and 2002 riding on the wave of popular participation in the electoral process 
in North India since the late 1980s, described as the “second democratic upsurge” in India 
(Yadav 1999) and even a “silent revolution” (Jaffrelot 2003). The percentage of upper caste 
members in state legislatures, on the other hand, halved from 46 to 26 percent (still twice their 
share of population, 13.6 percent) during the same time (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2012).  
The symbolic significance of the rise of the backward castes was enormous, particularly 
in the villages. The backward caste upsurge also hijacked the Maoists rhetoric of redistribution 
of land and jobs while also offering greater representation within the democracy (Kumar 2013). 
Since they virtually promised the same outcome as the Maoists within the limits of legality, elim-
inating the risks of an armed rebellion, the Maoists started losing their backward castes support 
base in the 1990s. In fact, as the backward castes got a taste of power within democracy, they 
used their kinship networks to crush Dalit economic aspirations with severity no less formidable 
than the upper castes domination of them. The poorest among them also aligned themselves with 
their caste and kinship networks, because both small and large landowners were fighting the 
wage increase of the Dalit agricultural labor force.  
With their popular support base eroding in the early 1990s, the Maoists also began facing 
increasingly militant resistance from the landowning, feudal upper castes who, having lost some 
of their political clout in the face of the rise of the plebeians, were determined to protect their 
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rural landed interests from Maoist mobilization of Dalits in the villages. In fact, every cluster of 
10-15 adjacent villages in northern districts began raising its own upper caste army (locally 
known as sena), led by the locally dominant landowning caste that was devoted to attacking and 
decimating Dalit neighborhoods (Ashwani Kumar 2008; Das 1986; A. Sinha 1978; Louis 
2000a).42 The most deadly and infamous of the upper caste private militias in Bihar was Ranveer 
Sena (literally, brave warrior army) founded in September 1994 in Belaur village of Bhojpur dis-
trict of Central Bihar following the merger of several private caste armies (Arvind Sinha and 
Sinha 2001; Louis 2000a; Chandran and Gupta 2002). 
The caste militias could not have operated with total impunity without active support of 
powerful caste-based patronage networks pervading political, administrative, and law enforce-
ment circles in Bihar. For example, Bhumihar (part of the upper caste) landlords had the support 
of the Congress Party in raising their caste militia called Brahmarshi Sena.43 The Rajput land-
lords in the Congress Party backed the Kunwar Sena and the Kurmi caste landlords in the Con-
gress Party backed the Bhoomi Sena and so on. Even the upper backward castes, specifically the 
Yadav among them, had the support of the mainstream left (CPI) in backing the Lorik Sena.44 
Sunlight Sena in South Bihar had the active support of the two-time chief minister of Bihar and 
of former Governors, elected members of local and central legislatures who all belonged to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  In	  the	  Chhatra-­‐Palamu	  districts	  of	  South	  Bihar,	  the	  dominant	  Rajput-­‐Pathhan	  landowning	  castes	  formed	  the	  Sun-­‐
light	  Sena	  to	  counter	  the	  most	  dominant	  Maoist	  faction	  in	  the	  region	  (MCC).	  Closer	  to	  Patna,	  the	  capital	  of	  Bihar,	  
the	  Kurmi	  landowners	  set	  up	  the	  Bhoomi	  (means,	  land)	  Sena.	  Yadav	  landowners	  set	  up	  the	  Lorik	  Sena.	  Rajputs	  in	  
Bhojpur	  set	  up	  the	  Kunwar	  Sena,	  and	  the	  Brahmins	  set	  up	  the	  Ganga	  Sena.	  Mere	  forty	  kilometers	  from	  the	  state	  
capital	  city	  of	  Patna,	  Kisan	  Sangh	  set	  up	  its	  armed	  wing,	  the	  Kisan	  Security	  Tigers,	  patronized	  by	  Janata	  Dal.	  	  
43	  It	  had	  the	  blessings	  of	  ‘King’	  Mahendra,	  former	  MP,	  MLAs	  like	  Abhiram	  Sharma,	  Sardar	  Krishna	  Singh	  of	  Arwal,	  
Jagdish	  Sharma	  and	  others,	  with	  the	  present	  Congress	  Legislative	  Party	   leader,	  Ramashraya	  Prasad	  Singh,	  then	  a	  
powerful	  Minster,	  backing	  them	  in	  Patna.	  
44	  CPI	  leader	  and	  Member	  of	  Parliament,	  Ramashraya	  Singh	  Yadav,	  had,	  in	  the	  meanwhile,	  set	  up	  the	  Lorik	  Sena,	  
exploiting	  the	  linkages	  between	  the	  Yadav	  landowners	  and	  the	  contractor-­‐caste	  criminal	  combine	  to	  take	  on	  the	  
left	  squads.	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landholding Rajput caste.45 Former Prime Minister name? and defense and home ministers of 
India belonging to the rightwing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were among the patrons of the 
Ranveer Sena.46 Thus prominent upper caste politicians in opposing political parties across the 
left-right ideological spectrum joined hands to offer patronage and protection to these caste-
based militias.  
The Maoists did not back down in the face of escalating violence, a frenzied arms race, 
and a succession of devastating hate crimes in rural Bihar. The MCC was the first to establish 
military domination over upper caste landowners in 500 villages in South Bihar by sponsoring 
extraordinarily vicious massacres of upper caste landlords, the most brutal of which was orga-
nized in the summer of 1987 (the Baghaura-Dalelchak massacre) killing 54 upper caste men in a 
small village. The Maoist army identified every single upper caste (Rajput) man in the village, 
from 6 months to 87 years, threw some of them alive into a bonfire set up in the middle of the 
village, and chopped off the heads of the rest with blunt axes, forcing the women to witness. 
Then they drenched their standing crops in their blood and burned down their houses. This inci-
dent frightened upper castes everywhere in the North, and panic pervaded the upper caste net-
works in the police, legislature, and administration, setting off an avalanche of upper caste re-
tributive carnage across other parts of Bihar ( Sinha and Sinha 2001; Jaoul 2011; Sahay 2008; 
Louis 2000b).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Prominent	  political	  personalities	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Sunlight	  Sena	  included	  Ram	  Naresh	  Singh,	  MLA	  and	  later	  MP,	  
who	  was	  close	  to	  Satyendra	  Narain	  Sinha,	  former	  two-­‐term	  Chief	  Minister	  of	  Bihar,	  and	  belonged	  to	  the	  princely	  
Deo	   family	  of	  Aurangabad.	  Among	  other	  well-­‐known	  patrons	  of	  Sunlight	  Sena	  were	  Bhisma	  Narain	  Singh,	  of	   the	  
Manatu	  family	  of	  Palamu,	  former	  Governor	  of	  Tamil	  Nadu	  and	  Tripura.	  Ram	  Naresh	  Singh	  was	   looked	  upon	  as	  a	  
savior	  of	  the	  Rajput	  landowners	  of	  the	  erstwhile	  Palamau	  Paragana	  and	  Chatra	  regions.	  Ram	  Naresh	  Singh’s	  alias	  
was	  Lootan	  Singh:	  Lootan	  means	  one	  who	  loots	  or	  grabs.	  He	  started	  his	  career	  as	  a	  wagon	  breaker,	  and	  later	  went	  
on	  to	  become	  a	  contractor.	  
46	  In	  2015,	  evidence	  came	  to	  light	  that	  many	  BJP	  leaders,	  including	  Murli	  Manohar	  Joshi,	  C.	  P.	  Thakur,	  and	  former	  
PM	  Chandra	  Shekhar	  were	  complicit	   in	  the	  Bihar	  Dalit	  massacres	  committed	  by	  the	  Ranvir	  Sena,	  while	  the	  back-­‐
ward	  caste	  governments	  of	  Nitish	  Kumar,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  arch	  rivals,	  Lalu	  Prasad	  Yadav	  and	  Rabri	  Devi	  declined	  to	  
order	  investigations	  into	  the	  massacres	  despite	  knowledge	  of	  them.	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Upper caste kinship networks also mobilized unprecedented state resources for counterin-
surgency against the Maoists in the North, both in the form of repression and development initia-
tives. To add to this was a highly controversial decision by upper caste Chief Minister in 1986 to 
arm the landlords against the rebels. By the 1990s, every village in Bihar was armed to the teeth. 
Thousands of licensed guns exchanged hands in rural Bihar, creating a booming black market of 
weapons. The enormous and growing arsenal of both licensed and illegal arms spewed a deathly 
arms race between state-backed upper castes and the Maoist army of Dalits and other poor. Thus 
the democratic state in the North, with all major institutions from politicians, bureaucrats, and 
judges down to village police officers, became implicated in daily bloodbath, orchestrated mostly 
along caste lines. State counterinsurgency against the Maoists became indistinguishable from 
illegal rampages of upper caste militias, particularly given overlap of personnel, shared camps, 
and arms. 
As illegal firearms became freely available, private gangs of arms smugglers, drug deal-
ers, and traffickers recruited themselves into various Maoist factions. In this feverish escalation 
in the countryside, the Dalits sought protection of the Maoist groups. However, they became 
suspicious of non-Dalit Maoist cadres and leaders, disrupting the cohesiveness and military ca-
pability of the insurgent organization. In addition, some rebel factions started running protection 
markets, whereby they offered protection to isolated individual landowners in specific regions 
for hefty payments, or in exchange for some land or guns. This tactic later took on the form of an 
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extended protection racket, and competing Maoist factions clashed among themselves in turf 
wars, and over these protected landowners.47  
Landlord militancy here built on caste loyalties, and caste militias pitted against Maoists 
vitiated rural Bihar in multiple layers of police and gang violence, political and administrative 
corruption, and a mockery of rule of law where lawmakers and law-breakers were indistinguish-
able from each other (Jaoul 2011; Sahay 2008; Chaitanya 1991). The ordinary people in the vil-
lages as well as the urban middle class permanently deserted the Maoists in the middle of the 
growing militancy in the North. Broken connections with civil society were further exacerbated 
when some rebel factions became embroiled in a fraudulent network of police-politicians-
bureaucrats-smugglers in a corrupt business of extortion and rent-seeking that further terrified 
and alienated ordinary people. Thus the Maoists lost their revolutionary credibility, the state lost 
its legitimacy, and their interface became permanently implicated in a vicious cycle of corruption 
and violence.   
Underlying	  Caste/Class	  Structure	  and	  The	  Democracy-­‐Insurgency	  Interface	  in	  the	  South	  
In sharp contrast, the democracy-insurgency interface in the South evolved very differ-
ently, creating multiple crosscutting networks of collaboration that flourished through the porous 
leaky walls that separated them. I argue that the underlying caste/class structure in the South, 
shaped by previous left agrarian uprisings, allowed the Maoists there to pursue successful mili-
tant mass mobilization against the Indian state without getting sucked into a violent death spiral 
that amplified body counts and alienated common people.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  This	  has	  become	  a	  norm	  in	  Bihar.	  See	  "Where	  blood	   is	   flowing	  along	  the	  Sone":	  HT/Patna,	  February	  28,	  1999.	  
"Exit	   Policy	   for	   landowners,"	   HT/Patna	   March	   12,	   1999.	   "Police	   tormenting	   them	   more	   than	   the	   Naxalites"	  
HT/Delhi,	  March	  1,	  1999.	  "PWG	  circulates	  hit	  list	  for	  selective	  killings",	  HT	  Patna,	  January	  30,	  1999.	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While caste is no less significant in Southern politics (Elliot 1970; Kohli 1988; Vaugier-
Chatterjee, Jaffrelot, and Kumar 2009; Karli Srinivasulu and Sarangi 1999), unlike parts of North 
India, the upper caste (Brahmins) lost their pre-eminent position in Southern society as of the 
1930s due to a strong, homegrown anti-Brahmin movement (Irschick 1969; Ramaswamy 1978). 
Further, upper castes in the southern pocket of Maoist influence (corresponding primarily to the 
state of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh) also constituted merely two to three percent of the state’s 
population and, due to a head start in education, they had been severing their rural ties by divest-
ing their landholdings and migrateing to urban areas since the 1950s.   
However, the resistance came from non-Brahmin caste groups, such as the Reddys, 
Kammas, Kapus and Velamas, whose main occupation had been cultivation and were the most 
important social groups in the state in terms of numerical strength, land control, and access to 
political power.48 Their socioeconomic status in the villages was comparable to the rich peasants 
of the upper backward castes (Yadav or Kurmi) in the North. However, unlike their Northern 
counterparts, they were classified as forward castes in the South. The Reddys, who represented 
about 8–10 percent of the state’s population, were the most prominent among the forward castes 
primarily because of their firm base in agricultural wealth (Khan, 1969), their early exposure to 
European education, and substantial economic advancement. These factors enabled them to shed 
feudal values, challenge Brahminical dominance, and join the communist party in the Telangana 
region in the South (Suri 1996; Ramakrishna 1993; C. J. Baker and Washbrook 1975; C. Baker 
1975; Irschick 1969). In addition, there were about fifty backward caste groups constituting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  The	  Kammas	  made	  up	  about	  four	  to	  five	  percent–5%	  of	  the	  state’s	  population,	  but	  they	  are	  mostly	  concentrated	  
on	  the	  coasts,	  which	  is	  outside	  the	  purview	  of	  this	  study.	  The	  Velamas	  constituted	  another	  one	  to	  two	  percent	  of	  
the	  population.	  They	  are	  as	  wealthy	  as	  the	  Reddys	  and	  the	  Kammas	  and	  are	  concentrated	  mainly	  in	  the	  two	  Tel-­‐
angana	  districts	  of	  Karimnagar	  and	  Khammam	  and	  in	  the	  northern	  coastal	  district	  of	  Visakhapatnam.	  The	  Kapu	  
caste	  constitutes	  10–12	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  and	  forms	  the	  caste	  base	  of	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  regional	  parties	  in	  
the	  South	  (Telugu	  Desam	  Party).	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about 36 percent of the population in the South.49 The motive forces of the Maoists in the South 
were the Dalits, who were the lowest in caste hierarchy, comprising approximately 16 percent of 
the state’s population and working primarily as agricultural laborers. The Maoist support base 
was primarily made up of the Malas and Madigas, the two foremost Dalit castes that constituted 
more than 90 percent of the state’s Dalit population (Thirumali 2003; Rao 1979).  
The pattern of landholding in Telangana was exceptionally concentrated and exploitative. 
The largest Reddy landlords were known as Deshmukhs/Dora, a combination of feudal lord and 
revenue official, with control over land as well as land records, which made them powerful arbi-
ter of destinies of thousands of peasant-cultivators. Below them were the rich cultivator-owner 
class, who were financially well off but socially inferior to Doras (Iyengar 1951). Both the feudal 
lords and rich peasant classes belonged to the same forward caste groups, Reddy and Velama 
(Iyengar 1951).  
Paradoxically the landowning Reddy peasants targeted by the Maoists in the South were 
the primary supporters of the communist agrarian uprising in Telangana back in the 1940s. The 
Reddy peasants had sought recognition as liberal, moderate, reformist representatives of the non-
feudal agrarian sector (variedly described as small landlords or rich peasants or market integrated 
rural rich) against upper caste Brahminical domination. The urban intelligentsia, students, and 
nationalist elements of the communist alliance were always ill at ease with them (Elliot 1970). 
But when the first phase of agrarian uprisings in Telangana ended abruptly in October 1951, the 
Reddy communists, true to their class interests, stopped short of robust land reforms. Once they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  These	  castes	  have	  been	  given	  reservation	  under	  the	  Other	  Backward	  Castes	  (OBCs)	  category	  since	  1961.	  	  
Out	  of	  the	  50-­‐odd	  backward	  castes	  listed	  by	  the	  Indian	  government,	  the	  major	  ones	  are	  the	  Yadava,	  Gowda,	  Pad-­‐
masali,	  Rajaka,	  Mangali	  (who	  call	  themselves	  Nai	  Brahman),	  Kamsali	  (Viswa	  Brahman),	  Mudiraju,	  Boya,	  Waddera,	  
Uppara,	  Kummari,	  Kammari,	  Medara,	  Pallekari	  (Agnikula	  Kshtriya),	  Perika,	  Gandla,	  Bhatraju	  and	  Kalavanthavulu.	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redistributed land from feudal lords to Reddy cultivator-owners and broke the power of the tradi-
tional elite, they retained a very high landholding ceiling of 50 acres, which let them emerge as 
the new rural landowning class (Appu 1975; Khusro 1958; Pavier 1974). The failure of the 
communist uprising in Telangana led to a split in the communist movement in India, with mod-
erate factions defending these small gains and radical Maoist factions advocating the renewal of 
armed agrarian struggle to redistribute lands further down to the landless Dalits. 
The South also saw little agricultural advancement because of soil conditions and limited 
irrigation. Very few landlords, even in the 1980s, had tractors or cultivated anything other than 
paddy and millets, which were of the traditional variety rather than the fertilizer-hungry high-
yield variety. The surplus appropriated by landlords was not transformed into productive capital 
but instead was either consumed or “invested” in mercantile activities like Public Works De-
partment contracts, wine shops, and real estate. The land-poor and landless in the South, given 
their recent communist tutelage, were deeply conscious of land inequality and resentful of their 
former Reddy comrades, who gradually abandoned communism for a greater share in political 
power in the centrist Congress Party that had hijacked the policies of the mainstream left. Be-
sides the Soviet Union also approved this bonhomie between mainstream left and the Prime Min-
ister Nehru’s Congress Party due to Nehru’s pro-Soviet stance in macroeconomic and foreign 
policy of newly independent India. However, Congress Party rule in Andhra Pradesh became 
synonymous with “Reddy Raj” (rule of the Reddys). In the first 13 out of 16 years of Andhra 
Pradesh as a separate state (1956-1972), not only was the state ruled by Reddy chief ministers, 
but also the most important portfolios in various state departments were distributed to Reddys 
(Bernstorff 1973). As the Reddy political capital was on the rise within democracy through the 
 	  
	  
76	  
eighties and the nineties, the backward castes and Dalits consolidated their village-level local 
extra-democratic political clout by riding the rise of Maoists.  
The Maoists built a potent movement around the abolition of feudal practices, particular-
ly the customary treatment of the Dalit castes as feudal farm-servants and bonded labor. The Da-
lit farm workers were paid daily or annually, but their wages were not calculated based on their 
labor-time. They were forced to do an indeterminate amount of non-productive chores in addi-
tion to productive work. In addition, the landlords routinely sexually abused the toiling class 
women, and working men were not allowed to wear a shirt or shoes in the presence of the dora 
(landlord).  
One of the strongest weapons in the anti-feudal struggle has always been what they call 
“social boycott.” When the toiling classes unleashed social boycott of landlords and police 
camps in villages, the entire village stopped service to landed families – the latter were deprived 
of cooks, wet nurses, cattle feeders, agricultural labor, washermen, barbers, etc. Social boycott 
was often sufficient to bring the landlords to their knees and was generally the first tactic em-
ployed in most villages. To the poor, low caste villagers, social boycott was the revolution. They 
had learned to accept a hundred shoe-floggings if they as much as held their heads up in the 
presence of upper caste landowners. By challenging entrenched social norms of caste domina-
tion, the Maoists enlisted the loyalty of the majority of backward caste and Dalit villagers. The 
Maoists considered it an instance of successful anti-feudal struggle, but to the common people 
accumulated miseries and anger from caste exploitation was the driving force in the southern vil-
lages (Thirumali 2003; Pavier 1974).  
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Another remarkable phenomenon during the first armed uprising in the South in late 
1940s was revolutionizing the institution of “Panchayat”. Panchayat (village local government) 
is a traditional institution in the villages of the Telangana region, where any petty dispute is pub-
licly adjudicated with the landlord presiding, and, of course, passing judgment. Panchayats were 
usurped by armed rebels,  the landlords’ authority was displaced and the revolutionary peasants 
took over the running of panchayats, and, in many cases, put the landlords on trial. Shaken by 
the strength of the movement, a lot of landlords fled to the cities (Balagopal 2006).  
The rural proletariat was still submerged in this semi-feudal agrarian system, while the 
rich Reddy landowning peasants started divesting funds to agriculture-related businesses – seed, 
fertilizer, pesticides, and in fact to usury and money lending (girgir banks in Telangana) and in-
vestments in urban institutions like schools and colleges, hospitals, and real estate. This was in 
addition to their already existing hold over civil and excise contracts they enjoyed due to the po-
litical patronage of and control over the regional power structure (K. Srinivasulu 2014).  
I argue that the Maoists were able to pursue persistent militant mass mobilization in Tel-
angana because the rural elite were neither able nor willing to match Maoist military domination 
and area control. The landed class was not able to fight bloody caste wars with the Maoists, like 
the landlords did in North India, because they were weak and divided in villages. Second, given 
their political clout and economic diversification (delayed Green Revolution), the Reddy land-
lords were unwilling to get trapped in massive bloodshed to maintain their rural domination. In-
stead they preferred to migrate to urban areas and invest agricultural income in profitable enter-
prises in entertainment, education, or real estate (Prasad 2015; Simhadri and Rao 1997). In addi-
tion to high economic clout, the political clout of Reddy landlords also enabled them to earn con-
siderable income by acting as brokers in various government development projects. Specifically, 
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the landlords reinvented themselves as “village elders” who negotiated with government and in-
ternational development agencies on behalf of the villagers and graciously accepted what are 
modestly called “expenses” in return for their services (Balagopal 2007; Balagopal 1990).  
The biggest strength of the Maoists in the South was their ability to bridge the rural-urban 
divide through a painstaking network of grassroots organizations. The Maoists recruited locally. 
The Dalam members (lowest unit in Maoist organization hierarchy) and commanders, even the 
area commanders, were all local rural residents. The district and state committee secretaries rose 
through extensive training in combat and in villages before they were promoted to leadership po-
sitions. A popular annual ritual in the Maoist Party emphasizing the importance of local villages 
were the “Go to Village” campaigns.50 These campaigns were meticulously planned structured 
training programs for the Maoists’ urban cadres. During their summer breaks, hundreds of stu-
dents attended an intense one-week political school before breaking into smaller groups of about 
seven to go to villages selected by the Party. The students spent approximately one month in vil-
lages with instructions to launch intense propaganda toward peasants on specific agrarian issues 
and the larger politics of agrarian revolution. They lived in the poorest households and familiar-
ized themselves with the day-to-day hardships of the rural proletariat.  
The student-organizers of “Go to Village” campaigns noted names of potential activists 
among the peasants and passed those names on to local party organizers who followed up with 
these individuals. By 1980 the Radical Youth League (RYL) was built in villages by these peas-
ant-activists, who later helped trigger historic peasant struggles in the region. Six years after it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  In	  Hyderabad	  students	  rallied	  around	  the	  Rameejabi	  rape	  (in	  police	  custody)	  case,	  in	  Kakatiya	  University	  it	  was	  
against	  the	  Hindu	  fundamentalists,	  in	  Bellampally	  in	  support	  of	  the	  workers	  strike,	  in	  Mahaboobnagar	  in	  support	  of	  
the	  hotel	  workers	  -­‐	  also	  there	  were	  state-­‐wide	  agitations	  on	  ITI	  and	  Polytechnic	  students’	   issues	  and	  a	  statewide	  
strike	  for	  students	  demands	  for	  better	  social	  welfare	  benefits.	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started, the ‘Go to Village” campaigns had sent 150 propaganda teams of 1,100 students to 2,419 
villages.51 By the mid-1980s, the Maoist students’ organization, Radical Students Unio (RSU), 
had established a significant presence in 18 of the 21 districts of Andhra Pradesh, with hand-
picked efficient, locally respected leaders recruiting and mobilizing ordinary people in their local 
battles.52  
It is through these student unions that Maoists in the South trained a dedicated urban in-
tellectual cadre and support base. Some of them eventually quit the movement and grew into 
prominent positions in academia, activism, media, art, literature, business, law enforcement, bu-
reaucracy, NGOs, and political parties. Many of these former Maoists have not become deradi-
calized; instead, exploiting their Maoist training in political articulation and grassroots organiza-
tion, they pursue their progressive political agenda in various democratic platforms. The Maoists 
in the South have also extended issue-based support to democratic struggles of the progressive 
democratic grassroots movement, with an aim to recruit and cultivate leadership and opinion-
makers within these movements who would push the agenda towards the left, create a crisis, and 
precipitate a confrontation that exposes state brutality.  
This has generated an embedded horizontal network of citizens within democracy who 
support the extra-democratic endeavor of Maoists while simultaneously working in their respec-
tive capacities to demand greater political and administrative accountability. This engenders a 
vibrant, robust interface between democracy and insurgency in the South, where everyday poli-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
52	  In	  the	  1982	  student	  elections	  the	  RSU	  achieved	  unprecedented	  victories	  in	  Osmania	  University	  (Hyderabad)	  and	  
in	  the	  towns	  of	  Warangal,	  Karimnagar,	  Nalgonda,	  Mahaboobnagar,	  Adilabad,	  Guntur,	  Chittoor,	  Kurnool,	  Cuddapah,	  
and	  Khammam	  district.	   These	   election	   victories	   further	   facilitated	   the	   spread	  of	   revolutionary	   politics	   in	   educa-­‐
tional	  institutions.	  The	  inaugural	  functions,	  cultural	  events,	  all	  became	  centers	  of	  revolutionary	  enthusiasm	  spread-­‐
ing	  the	  movement	  to	  every	  corner	  of	  the	  state.	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tics straddle legitimate/democratic and illegitimate/rebel politics with ease. It is in these shadowy 
underbellies of civic associations that informal exit networks for rebels emerge in the South. 
2.4	  Conclusion	  	  
	  
In this chapter, I presented a historically grounded analysis of the divergent progression 
of the Maoist organization and politics in two conflict locations in North and South India. The 
first part of the chapter traced the emergence of Maoist politics in India through many fragmen-
tations in the Indian Left. I showed that despite unifying ideology and organization, the Maoists 
in the North face underlying social conditions, including a rigid caste/class structure and landlord 
militancy, that are very different from the conditions in the South. Northern Maoists have re-
sponded to their local challenges with increasing militarization, which disrupts their support ba-
ses, and the creation of corrupt networks of bureaucrats-politicians-police-mafia, which act as an 
impediment of rebel retirement and reintegration. In contrast, southern Maoists have been able to 
build massive mass organizations bridging the urban-rural divide in a way that has energized 
grassroots politics and civic associations within democracy, fostering harmony and cooperation 
in the insurgency-democracy interface. It is in the shadowy underbelly of democratic associa-
tional life that informal exit networks facilitating rebel retirement grow in the South; these same 
types of networks do not exist in the North.  
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Chapter	  3:	  Origin	  of	  Rebel	  Retirement	  Network:	  Probing	  the	  Explanatory	  
Factors	  	  
3.1 Introduction 
 
“As the naxal problem has arisen on account of real and perceived neglect, deprivation and disaffection, 
mainly towards the downtrodden, the solution should aim at providing gainful employment and entrepre-
neurial opportunities to the surrendered naxalites so that they are encouraged to join the mainstream and 
do not return to the fold of naxal movement.” 53 
-Preamble to Surrender-cum- Rehabilitation Scheme, Government of India 
 
The How does a democracy wean youths away from extremist groups and back into the 
mainstream? As is evident in the quote above, the Indian government emphasizes on creating 
improved living conditions and livelihood opportunities to induce surrender of rebels and to fa-
cilitate their rehabilitation. Bringing a wide literature on insurgency into conversation with a 
relatively recent literature on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of rebels, I show in 
the introductory chapter that policy makers mostly assume that rebels quit when effective repres-
sion causes high enough rebel casualty and simultaneously targeted development in conflict 
zones offers access to improved standard of living and public services. On the one hand, brutal 
repression resulting in heavy casualties is expected to increase desertions. On the other hand, im-
proved standard of living and livelihood opportunities are expected to entice rebels to re-embrace 
the benevolent state.  
This benign-brutal face of India’s counterinsurgency program is encapsulated in the Inte-
grated Action Plan (IAP) adopted by the union government of India to tackle the spread of Mao-
ists in India. The four key elements of IAP are surrender-cum-rehabilitation scheme (SCR), secu-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  The	  policy	  document	  titled	  Guidelines	  for	  Surrender-­‐cum-­‐Rehabilitation	  Scheme	  of	  Left	  Wing	  Extremists	  of	  Gov-­‐
ernment	  of	  India	  is	  available	  at	  http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/SCRGuideline_22012016.pdf	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rity (law and order), development, and public perception management. 54As cited in the opening 
quote above, the SCR scheme is based on two central assumptions: first, social and economic 
grievances are root causes of Naxal/Maoist uprising; second, development and targeted welfare 
will alleviate these gripes and encourage rebels to return to the mainstream.  
In the introductory chapter I have mapped out how retirement of Maoist rebels tends to 
vary across states, and within states across districts. This thesis argues that rebel retirement is not 
driven by improved living standards, public service provision or repression. Rebels succumb to 
lure of democracy that, in fact, works at the grassroots. Extensive civic participation creates op-
portunities for rebel return to mainstream through availability of informal exit networks that 
flourish in the gray areas of democracy and safeguard life and livelihood of retired rebels. The 
purpose of this chapter is to test how civic participation fares in explaining rebel retirement com-
pared to the other mechanisms –improved standards of living, improved public service provision 
and repression.  
I use district level data on Maoist surrender over a period of ten years (2005-2014) in all 
Maoist affected states of India, derived primarily from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, but also 
cross checked with official surrender data made available by the Ministry of Home Affairs of the 
government of India. Over the years, numerous reports have surfaced, detailing episodes of fake 
surrenders in which ordinary villagers with no criminal record or petty criminals with no Maoist 
connection have been paraded by the police as extremists. The trend is at its worst in Chhattis-
garh, where even senior officers within the police establishment have raised questions about the 
genuineness of surrenders. However, given the proclivity to project surrenders as achievements 
and the state government's willingness to ignore such charges made even by insiders, such poli-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Afffairs	  published	  the	  IAP	  at	  http://mha.nic.in/naxal_new	  available	  on	  June	  7,	  2016.	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cies are likely to continue with the objective of amplifying the state's achievements. Conflict data 
is often controversial, and this case in exception. The subsequent section details how I triangulate 
data from various sources and correct for individual cases of over reporting to eliminate system-
atic errors in my dependent variable and obtain the best possible approximation of subnational 
variation of surrender incidents.  
The data for explanatory variables are derived from various sources. I use household lev-
el survey data collected from India Human Development Survey (Phase I and II) for data on civ-
ic participation, measured in terms of membership in various civic organizations. I draw data on 
household assets and public service provision from census of India (2001 and 2011) and district 
level data on landholding from Agricultural Census of India. I get data on repression measured in 
terms of percentage Maoist casualty from World Incident Tracking System (WITS) and South 
Asia Terrorism Portal. The constructed dataset is then used to analyze the impact of development 
indicators, repression and social networks on the surrender of Maoist rebels in India. The India 
Human Development Survey includes questions on membership in various organizations, trust in 
government institutions and participation in government based on responses from 44,000 ran-
domly selected individuals in about 320 districts collected in two phases (2005 and 2011-12). I 
collapsed the individual responses to obtain the district-level mean response on membership of 
various associations (caste groups, religious groups, womens’ groups, panchayat office, profes-
sional groups, agricultural co-ops etc) as well as trust and participation in various government 
institutions. I construct a district-level variable called organizational density (orgdens), which is 
then ordered as high, moderate or low to measure grassroots civic participation and act as proxy 
of grassroots-level lure of democracy in a district. A high orgdens would imply high civic partic-
ipation in a district than a moderate or low orgdens. When the ordinary people are members of 
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multiple organizations, the high contact is more than less likely to foster informal networking to 
facilitate local peace by safeguarding life and livelihood of rebels who wish to return.  Thus I 
expect that rebel retirement is higher where orgdens is higher.  
My analysis reveals that organizational density within a district has an effect on the num-
ber of retired rebels. When controlling for area and population of the district as well as the per-
centage of SC caste population, an organizational density level of 3 affects the incident rate by a 
factor of 1.9. Thus in district with the highest organizational density we expect almost twice as 
many rebels to retire compared to a district with the lowest level. Therefore, we conclude that 
organizational density is an important influence on the motivation to retire from the rebel move-
ment. This effect is also stable when we control for the other influences as well as under the 
IHDS 1 and IHDS 2 data set. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the measurement and data sources 
of the dependent variable. In the next section I discuss how I operationalize lure of democracy as 
civic participation and how I measure civic participation. Social relationships that link individu-
als to others may be institutionalized, working through objective linkages created via joint mem-
bership in formal organizations or through subjective linkages like confidence in various institu-
tions of democracy. I create a variable organizational density measured by extent of organiza-
tional membership. Organizational density, signifying civic participation, is a formal/objective 
measure of lure of democracy at the grassroots. High confidence in state institutions is a for-
mal/subjective measure of high democratic efficacy and its lure for extremists. The purpose of 
the statistical analyses undertaken here is to ascertain if lure of democracy explains rebel retire-
ment and to discriminate between two different mechanisms of civic participation and confi-
dence in institutions. Section 3 discusses operationalization and measurement of alternative ex-
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planations of rebel retirement in terms of development, investment, mining, public service provi-
sion and repression. The following section, Section 4, describes my hypotheses and empirical 
model. Section 5 then presents my main results and robustness tests. The final section concludes.  
3.2 Dependent Variable 
To test my argument about whether civic participation, development and repression have 
an effect on the extent of rebel retirement, I create a district level data on Maoist surrender over a 
period of ten years (2005-2014) in 318 districts of ten Maoist affected states of Andhra Pradesh, 
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha Uttar Pradesh and West 
Bengal, generally referred to as the Red Corridor. Of these 318 districts, a total of 77 districts 
have been reported as affected by Maoist insurgency. (See Appendix for list of affected states 
and districts) Of these 77 affected districts, retirement of Maoist rebels has occurred at least once 
in 43 districts over ten years. Over 75% of these retirement events are, however, concentrated in 
14 districts in 6 states. The data on rebel surrender is taken from South Asia Terrorism Portal da-
tabase, which, based on reports of Maoist surrender in the print media, presents district–level 
surrender data in various Maoist-affected states.55  
The SATP data roughly matches roughly the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) data on 
surrender of Maoists between 2005 and 2012.56 In 2013 and 2014, however, SATP data on sur-
render is disproportionately higher than MHA data. In 2013, while the MHA reports a total 671 
surrender events, SATP reports 1950, of which 1765 were in one district (Koraput) in Odisha 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  It	  is	  sometimes	  argued	  that	  some	  Maoist	  rebels	  might	  have	  returned	  without	  the	  police	  and	  media	  knowing	  about	  it.	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  rebels	  just	  quietly	  quit	  and	  come	  back	  without	  going	  through	  the	  ritual	  of	  surren-­‐der.	  Based	  on	  my	  interviews	  with	  police,	  administrators,	  rebel	  leaders,	  civil	  liberty	  activists	  I	  assert	  that	  in	  the	  period	  of	  this	  quantitative	  analysis	  (2005-­‐2014)	  police	  vigilance	  in	  villages	  in	  conflict	  zones	  is	  so	  high	  that	  no	  one	  can	  stop	  being	  Maoist	  and	  quietly	  slip	  back	   into	  mainstream	  without	  going	  through	  the	  surrender	  pro-­‐cess.	  Therefore,	  I	  consider	  the	  surrender	  data	  is	  a	  very	  good	  approximation	  of	  total	  desertion.	  	  
56	   In	  my	  conversation	  with	  Ajai	  Sahni	  who	  oversees	  data	  collection	   in	  SATP,	  he	  suggested	  that	   it	   is	  possible	   that	  
some	  surrender	   incidents	  were	  not	  reported	   in	  the	  national	  media,	  but	   logged	  in	  police	  records.	  MHA,	  based	  on	  
police	  records,	  can	  be	  slightly	  higher	  than	  SATP.	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between April 6 and 17. Further investigation of the underlying media reports show that SATP 
wrongly counted return of tribals belonging to a landless labor organization (Chashi Mulia Adi-
vashi Sangh, CMAS) to their villages as Maoist surrender. 57 In 2014, SATP records 651 surren-
ders in Chhattisgarh compared to MHA data of 157. SATP overestimates surrender in Chhattis-
garh because of exaggerated media reports that the state hit the jackpot in securing rebel surren-
der by advertising generous offers in its new surrender policy in BBC radio, which the Maoists 
regularly tune into.58 Subsequent media reports and widely publicized interviews of activists and 
academics working in Chhattisgarh has, however, raised doubts on the spiked up surrender data 
of 2013. 59 As a result I excluded these extreme observations, that had a strong effect on the size 
of confidence intervals around the regression line, was excluded from further analysis. (Figure 1, 
in Appendix). 
3.3	  Lure	  of	  Democracy:	  Operationalization	  and	  Measurement	  
	  
That democracy is the most suitable form of governance is no longer a subject of scholar-
ly debate. The procedural minimum definition of democracy emphasizes regular, free and fair 
elections in which participation and contestation is open and guaranteed. (Dahl 1971; Sen 1999) 
But for the purpose of this study, I argue that the lure of democracy that weans rebels away from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  The MHA does not recognize CMAS, a popular tribal organization, as Maoist. 1765 surrender over a few months 
in a single year is political propaganda by state governments.	  I cross checked with police and bureaucrats with work 
experience in Koraput and Malkangiri. For example,	  in	  2013,	  during	  my	  meetings	  with	  R	  Vineel	  Krishna,	  who	  was	  
abducted	  by	  the	  Maoists	  when	  he	  was	  collected	  in	  Malkangiri	  in	  Odisha,	  he	  confided	  that	  such	  abruptly	  high	  sur-­‐
render	  is	  highly	  unlikely.	  	  He	  doubted	  if	  there	  were	  as	  many	  Maoists	  in	  the	  area.	  	  
58	  Naturally	  suspicious	  of	  All	  India	  Radio(AIR),	  the	  rebels	  are	  known	  to	  prefer	  BBC	  because	  BBC	  has	  done	  reporting	  
from	  the	  Naxalite	  heartland	  in	  Chhattisgarh	  with	  a	  reporter	  stationed	  in	  Bastar.	  
59	  See,	  for	  example,	  http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/chhattisgarh-­‐cops-­‐stage-­‐fake-­‐surrender-­‐drama-­‐for-­‐
publicity/story-­‐xzD95wjiqePZbYeZWnqzpM.html	  	  and	  activist	  reports	  http://scroll.in/article/775849/ground-­‐
report-­‐the-­‐truth-­‐about-­‐chhattisgarhs-­‐recent-­‐maoist-­‐surrenders	  .	  BBC’s	  Suvojit	  Bagchi,	  who	  has	  worked	  on	  the	  
Maoists	  in	  Chhattisgarh	  for	  many	  years,	  well	  known	  Gandhian	  activist	  Himanshu	  Kumar,	  and	  renowned	  academic	  
Bela	  Bhatia	  alleged	  in	  independent	  conversations	  that	  Chhattisgarh	  police	  faked	  those	  high	  surrenders.	  The	  state	  
government	  and	  administration	  had	  received	  a	  lot	  of	  flak	  in	  the	  past	  for	  its	  failure	  to	  secure	  rebel	  surrender.	  Many	  
tribals	  peddled	  as	  surrendered	  Maoists	  in	  Chhattisgarh	  do	  not	  even	  have	  criminal	  records,	  despite	  draconian	  polic-­‐
ing	  known	  for	  arresting	  anyone	  on	  mere	  suspicion.	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Maoists work not through the ritual of elections but through less visible micro political processes 
that transpires between a banned rebel group and democracy locked in a protracted conflict. The 
states and the rebels perpetuate a discourse portraying zero sum battle between them separated 
from each other in watertight compartments. In reality, however, they co-evolve shaping a grey 
zone between them, where rebel retirement transpires through informal exit networks that, de-
pending on the dynamics of democracy-insurgency interaction, can encourage or stifle rebel re-
tirement and reintegration.  
Formation of these informal exit networks in India cannot be understood without refer-
ence to the “participation explosion” in the nineties whereby elites felt compelled to include 
large groups of politically marginalized population. (Dreze and Sen 2002) This participation 
drive at the bottom, it has been argued, fosters an ‘associational political culture’ forging new 
grassroots connections between the local and the state that keeps a exuberant democracy from 
exploding at the seams. (Almond and Verba 1963) I argue that the democratic allure for rebels in 
India thrives in the cobweb of these micro-level political processes of civic participation. A lot 
has been written on multidimensionality of associational political culture under the rich 
conceptual umbrella of social capital. The 2X2 table below shows four distinct conceptualization 
of social capital.60 
 Informal Formal 
Objective Social Networks Organizational Membership 
Subjective Interpersonal Trust Confidence in Institutions 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Based	  on	  Reeve	  Vanneman,	  James	  Noon,	  Sonalde	  Desai,	  Social	  Capital	  in	  India:	  Networks,	  Organizations	  and	  
Confidence,	  Working	  Paper	  no.	  4,	  IHDS,	  available	  at	  http://ihds.info/sites/default/files/SocialCapital.pdf	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Figure	  11	  
Conceptualization of Social Capital 
In this study, I use formal social capital (organizational membership and confidence in 
institutions) as proxies for lure of democracy for extremists who desire to quit. The informal so-
cial capital, in the form of trust and social networks, reflect more an individual’s position within 
the community and her individual linkages to the powerful than on the characteristics of an indi-
vidual’s immediate context. In contrast, formal social capital is more contextually/geographically 
rooted, depending on the presence of organizations in the local area, without which individuals 
can hardly become members or feel confident about them. 61 Local variation in the availability of 
specific organizations and in performance of democratic institutions, especially in a developing 
country setting like India, should make organizational memberships and confidence in institu-
tions the most locally determined aspect of social capital.  
Much research on social capital approaches it as either a property of individuals “ 
embodied in the relations among persons” (Coleman 1988) or as a feature of the community and 
the degree of civic engagement and trust among its members. (Putnam 1995) Following Putnam, 
I argue that as ordinary people get involved in voluntary organizations they also create norms 
and build trust, which creates spill over of cooperation on other issues of local importance. So-
cial capital at community level has been linked with outcomes such as economic development 
(Inglehart 1997), crime (Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez 2002), subjective reports of well-
being (Narayan and Cassidy 2001), political mobilization (Krishna 2002), and household welfare 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  In	  the	  extreme	  case,	  individuals	  can	  create	  new	  organizations,	  but	  the	  social	  capital	  literature	  agrees	  that	  over-­‐
whelming	  numbers	  of	  memberships	  are	  the	  result	  of	   individuals	   joining	  pre-­‐existing	  organizations.	  While	  we	  can	  
expect	   systematic	  differences	  between	   individuals	  who	   join	  and	  do	  not	   join	  organizations,	   these	  differences	  are	  
irrelevant	  when	  the	  organizations	  are	  not	  available	  to	  join.	  So	  we	  can	  expect	  that	  where	  formal	  organizations	  are	  
relatively	  rare,	  memberships	  depend	  more	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  an	  individual’s	  immediate	  context	  than	  on	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  individuals	  themselves.	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and poverty (Grootaert and Narayan 2004). I argue that high community level social capital 
measured by high incidence of membership in voluntary organizations is likely to foster informal 
citizen cooperation to safeguarding the life and livelihood of returning rebels. This promotes lo-
cal peace and stability, prevents further loss of lives and makes democracy a viable option for 
rebels who want to quit.  
I also examine if rebel retirement co-varies confidence in democratic institutions the 
other formal dimension of formal social capital. The underlying intuition here is that in a climate 
of high popular confidence in democracy,  the higher is the lure of democracy as a viable 
alternative. By operationalizing an objecitve and subjective measure of democratic allure, I hope 
to distinguish between causal mechanisms of lure of democracy.  
I use data from nationally representative survey (Indian Human Development Survey) of 
41,554 households in India, which measures all four dimensions of social capital.62 I focus on 
organizational membership (objective, formal) and confidence in institutions (subjective, formal) 
as appropriate proxies for capturing variation of local democratic allure because they are contex-
tual and are expected to show maximum variation across space.63 A household’s social position 
is far less important for organizational memberships than its locational context. This is consistent 
with the interpretation that what matters most for organizational memberships is whether these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  The	  India	  Human	  Development	  Survey	  (IHDS),	  jointly	  organized	  by	  researchers	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Maryland	  
and	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Applied	  Economic	  Research	  (NCAER),	  New	  Delhi,	  is	  a	  nationally	  representative,	  multi-­‐
topic	  survey	  of	  41,554	  households	   in	  1503	  villages	  and	  971	  urban	  neighborhoods	  across	   India.	  The	  first	  round	  of	  
interviews	  was	  completed	   in	  2004-­‐5;	  data	  are	  publicly	  available	   through	   ICPSR.	  A	   second	   round	  of	   IHDS	   reinter-­‐
viewed	  most	  of	  these	  households	  in	  2011-­‐12	  (N=42,152)	  and	  data	  is	  publicly	  available.	  
63	   The	   social	   networks	   component	   (objective,	   informal)	   of	   the	   survey	   asks	   respondents	   about	   their	   ties	   to	   ac-­‐
quaintances	  and	  relatives	  who	  worked	  in	  medicine,	  education,	  and	  the	  government,	  and	  record	  yes/no	  responses.	  
I	  excluded	  this	  measure	  of	  social	  capital	  as	  proxy	  of	  democratic	  allure	  as	  it	  is	  measured	  more	  as	  an	  individual	  char-­‐
acteristic	  than	  a	  political	  phenomenon.	  I	  exclude	  trust	  because	  the	  survey	  reports	  that	  it	  feels	  comfortable	  aban-­‐
doning	  measure	   of	   trust	   by	   the	  most	   commonly	   used	   question	   -­‐	   “Generally	   speaking,	  would	   you	   say	   that	  most	  
people	  can	  be	  trusted,	  or	  that	  you	  can't	  be	  too	  careful	  in	  life?”	  –	  because	  respondents	  chose	  to	  answer	  “both”	  in	  
most	  cases.	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organizations exist in the local community. The presence of these organizations varies greatly 
over local areas so the primary determinant of memberships is geographic location. 
In order to measure group membership, survey respondents were asked if anybody in the 
household was a member of any of nine types of religious, festival or social groups, caste associ-
ations, self-help groups, credit and savings associations, women’s groups, unions, business or 
professional associations, youth, sports, or reading groups, co-operatives, or a development non-
government organization. (see Appendix, Table 1). I collapsed the individual responses to obtain 
the district-level mean response to the questions on organizational membershipto create a varia-
ble (ORGDENS) that ranges on a scale of 0-3, with 0 signifying low organizational density and 
low civic participation and 3 high value of both.64  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Most of the variables measuring membership of various organizations (ME1-ME10) used for the construction of 
this variable are positively correlated with dependent varibale. Some	  ME	  variables	  used	  in	  construction	  of	  ORGDENS	  
are	   slightly	  negatively	  correlated,	  possibly	   causing	  problems	  with	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	  
DVa	   and	  ORGDENS.	  Within	   the	   data	   from	   IHDS#1	   the	  magnitude	   of	   negative	   correlations	   is	   low	   enough	   to	   not	  
cause	  any	  problems.	  With	  IHDS#2	  the	  problem	  is	  more	  severe.	  The	  variables	  ME2,	  ME3,	  and	  ME11	  are	  negatively	  
correlated	  with	  DVa,	  compared	  to	  the	  others	  which	  are	  positively	  correlated.	  This	  is	  discussed	  later	  in	  results.	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Figure	  12	  
 Construction of ORGDENS variable: IHDS-I (top) and IHDS-II 
 
In order to measure confidence in institutions respondents were asked how much confi-
dence they had in ten important institutions in Indian society. (see Appendix, Table 2) They were 
given choices of “a great deal of confidence”, “only some confidence”, or “hardly any confi-
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dence at all”. Analysis revealed that the principal division was between households who had “a 
great deal of confidence” and the other two responses.65  
In the survey population confidence in institutions is negatively correlated with organiza-
tional memberships, although the association is weak (-.06). A principal assumption in the social 
capital literature is a generally positive association among its various aspects. However, there is a 
slight tendency for Indian households with better networks and high memberships in various or-
ganizations to have less confidence in institutions. In our sample too, truncated for Maoist affect-
ed districts, the constructed variable ORGDENS is slightly negatively correlated with the varia-
ble CONFINST. 66 
 
Figure	  13	  
Correlation between organizational density and confidence in institutions: IHDS I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Most	   confidence	  was	   reported	   for	   banks	   (90%)	   and	   the	  military	   (87%),	   followed	   by	   schools	   (67%),	  medicine	  
(63%),	   courts	   (55%),	   newspapers	   (37%),	   panchayats	   (local	   governing	   bodies,	   33%),	   the	   state	   government	   (27%),	  
police	  (22%),	  and	  politicians	  (11%).	  	  
	  
66	  CI9	  (confidence	  in	  court)is	  the	  only	  institutional	  confidence	  variable	  that	  is	  slightly	  positively	  correlated	  with	  
constructed	  factor	  ORGNDENS	  in	  IHDS	  I.	  	  In	  IHDS	  II,	  CI10	  (confidence	  in	  banks)	  is	  the	  only	  confidence	  variable	  posi-­‐
tively	  correlated	  to	  ORGDENS	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Figure	  14	  
Correlation between organizational density and confidence in institutions: IHDS II 
Following construction of the primary variables of interest that proxy for lure of democ-
racy, I ran a correlation analysis to obtain a preliminary intuition of the relationship between the 
constructed variable measuring organizational density and the dependent variable of rebel re-
tirement, , which, as shown in the graph below, confirmed a positive correlation between organi-
zational density in both phases of IHDS and my dependent variable of rebel retirement.  
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Figure	  15	  
Correlation between Rebel Retirement and Organizational Density 
	  
3.4	  Development	  and	  Repression:	  Alternative	  Explanations	  of	  Rebel	  Retire-­‐
ment	  
	  
In the previous chapters, I have discussed that the early Maoists faced swift, efficient response 
by the Indian state, which combined brutal repression with benign development and welfare pol-
icies. Policymakers tasked with tackling the spread of Maoist movement n India focus on devel-
opment in the form of industrialization as well as targeted welfare programs that likely improves 
living standards and creates livelihood opportunities.67 Simultaneously the government also 
launched an all-out offensive by state police and national paramilitary forces to hunt Maoists 
down from their remote hideouts. Improved life and livelihood combined with severe repression 
is expected to wean youths away from the path of extremism.  
3.4.1	  Impact	  of	  Development	  on	  Rebel	  Retirement:	  Conceptualization	  and	  Measurement	  
	  
The planning commission of India, as well as successive central and state governments, 
has advocated the rooted-in-poverty hypotheses of political violence, which considers insurgency 
an expression of socioeconomic discontent and desperation. (Piazza 2006) It is assumed that 
since ordinary people living impoverished conditions join extremists groups, poverty alleviation 
will lure them back to the mainstream. This is the flip side of Berman et al.’s (2011) general as-
sessment on ‘hearts and minds’, stating that citizens may choose to support a violent challenger 
to the state if service provision is poor. I do not use income or GDP as measures of development. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  The	  most	  well-­‐known	  exposition	  of	  this	  viewpoint	  is	  the	  report	  titled	  “Development	  Challenges	  in	  Extremist	  Af-­‐
fected	  Areas:	  Report	  of	  an	  Expert	  Group	  to	  Planning	  Commission”	  available	  at	  
http://planningcommission.gov.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf	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In order to asses how development impacts the extent to which rebels quit in some locations ver-
sus others, I measure development in terms of indicators that ordinary people in conflict zones 
consider meaningful and desirable signs of socioeconomic status. I also include variables meas-
uring public service provision in terms of access to health and primary education services that is 
often mentioned as desirable goals in surveys in rural India.  
Policy makers often cite development as the panacea of all ills. It is a widely shared sen-
timent that poor, low caste and tribal groups failed to benefit from economic reforms and the ex-
pansion of the industrial economy in India (Banerjee 2005; Banerjee 2009). Development, how-
ever, is a double-edged sword, which has a tricky relationship with political violence. While tar-
geted development is expected to wean extremists, uneven development and development-
induced displacement is also diagnosed as its cause. (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Baviskar 
1999; Auvinen 1997)  
This is a common, if somewhat inconsistent, formulation in the literature on Maoists: on 
the one hand, we have the development-induced-insurgency reading, which suggests that the 
Maoists are tapping into popular frustration with strip-mining in the forest and land-grabs by 
greedy corporations. In a lyrical essay, Arundhati Roy alleges that Maoists are heroic defenders 
of adivasi (tribal) way of life in the face of merciless encroachment by corporate mining.68 On 
the other hand, Maoists leverage development to their advantage by running parallel extortion 
and kidnapping.  A thesis that has found support in some recent scholarly studies is that mining 
areas are more prone to Maoist insurgent activity than non-mining areas because it creates condi-
tions favorable for Maoist rent seeking activities and extortion industry. (Hoelscher, Miklian, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Arundhati	  Roy.	  	  “Walking	  with	  the	  comrades,”	  Outlook	  India,	  March	  29,	  2010.	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Vadlamannati 2012; Miklian and Carney 2010) Thus I highlight four different ways in which 
retirement is expected co-vary with   development.  
3.4.1.1 Development as Access to Household Assets  
First, development, it is hypothesized, can lure rebels back into the mainstream by in-
creasing access to specific household assets that give a sense of improved standard of living to 
the lowest strata (Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe) of rural society in conflict areas. Based 
on Census of India data (2001 and 2011), I measure this formulation of development by a varia-
ble (DIFFHHASSETS) that captures difference in aggregate rural SC/ST household access to 
radio/transistor sets, televisions, bicycles, two-wheelers and cars at district level. In this argu-
ment, development is expected to positively impact our variable of interest. The household assets 
increased in almost all districts, besides two. Preliminary analysis shows that there appears to be 
no strong correlation between DVa and the difference in household assets.  
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Figure	  16	  
Correlation between DIFFHHASSETS and Rebel Retirement 
3.4.1.2 Development as Access to Healthcare  
In policy circles, better public service provision, measured in terms of access to health and edu-
cation services, is the second understanding of development that is expected to increase rebel 
retirement. The IHDS questionnaires in both phases ask whether a respondent saw a doctor, a 
nurse, a pharmacist or none in case of minor illness to measure healthcare access. Healthcare 
service is a good proxy for public goods provision that requires cooperation across multiple lev-
els of government. In addition, there is enough evidence that citizens themselves consider access 
to healthcare as critically important public goods and indicator of progress and modernization. 
(A. V. Banerjee and Duflo 2007; A. Banerjee and Duflo 2009) As shown below the correlation 
between rebel retirement and access to healthcare is very weak in phase I and slightly negative in 
phase 2.    
 
Figure	  17	  
Correlation between Rebel Retirement and Healthcare Access 
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3.4.1.3 Development as Access to Education  
The data on access to education exhibits enough spatial variation for a meaningful interpretation. 
The variable measuring access to education is constructed by taking into account the highest ed-
ucation level of both male and female members, and not merely presence of schools in the vicini-
ty of a household. Access to education is a primary public service of importance in rural India. 
(Barakat and Urdal 2009; Datt and Ravallion 1998) I collapse household data to district level to 
construct an index measuring the access to education on a scale of 0-3. In the Maoist affected 
districts there are several districts with a very low literacy rate and a few with a high value of 
literacy. Literacy has slightly improved from survey 1 to survey 2. Preliminary analysis, howev-
er, shows that correlation between rebel retirement and access to education (variable name litera-
cy) is slightly negative.  
 
Figure	  18	  
Correlation between Rebel Retirement and Access to Education 
 	  
	  
99	  
3.4.1.4 Development as Industrialization  
The hypothesized impact of industrialization on retirement is dubious: development-induced dis-
placement is expected to have an adverse effect on rebel retirement while increased employment 
opportunities can encourage rebel retirment. I obtained data on investment in 6 Industry types: 
Construction, Energy (Electric), Public, Private-Foreign, Private-Domestic, Mining from the 
Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy’s (CMIE) Capital Expenditure Database (CapEx).69 I 
find that there is a slight negative correlation between the dependent variable and investments in 
the electric industry and a positive correlation between dependent variable and investments in 
construction. Other investments do not appear to be correlated with dependent variable. The scat-
ter plots showing correlations between various investment variables and rebel retirement are at-
tached in the appendix.  
3.4.1.5 Development as Mining 
In the regression analysis undertaken in this chapter I also include data on volume of 
bauxite, iron-ore and coal extraction for the period 2001-2005 from Indiastat.com. All mining 
data is given in levels, with 0 representing no mining and 11 representing high levels of mining. 
The data on crude petrol exhibits a low level of variance and is excluded from analysis. Prelimi-
nary scatter plot (in appendix) suggests a slightly negative correlation between the coal mining 
and retirement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  The CapEx database contains cost and ownership information on projects at different stages – announced, under 
implementation, completed, abandoned, stalled – across a wide variety of industries at the level of a district. The 
amounts invested in various industries are very heterogeneous for all types of investments. The approximate time 
period covered by the database is from the mid-1990s to the current year.For	  purposes	  of	  this	  analysis,	  all	  projects	  
that	  had	  a	  date	  of	  announcement	  before	  or	  during	  2009	  were	  included	  –	  projects	  in	  all	  stages	  were	  included	  in	  the	  
analysis	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  coverage.	  As	  the	  industrial	  classification	  of	  the	  different	  projects	  in	  the	  CapEx	  is	  at	  a	  
significant	  disaggregated	  level,	  the	  particular	  classification	  from	  CapEx	  was	  matched	  against	  the	  National	  Industrial	  
Classification	  (2008)	  categories	  (major	  industries	  [E.g.	  Mining]	  and	  their	  sub-­‐categories	  [Coal-­‐Lignite])	  published	  by	  
the	  government	  of	  India.	  
 	  
	  
100	  
3.4.2	  Impact	  of	  Brutal	  Repression	  on	  Rebel	  Retirement:	  Conceptualization	  and	  
Measurement	  
	  
The evidence in the literature on repression and political violence is at best indeterminate. 
Policy makers seem more convinced than academics that inflicting high casualty on rebels sup-
presses insurgency, and in this case, will likely increase desertion and return of remaining rebels. 
Some have argued in favor of a linear function whereby repression dampens recruitment by rais-
ing the costs to individuals of joining insurgent organizations.(Tullock 1971) Others have speci-
fied a concave function whereby participation peaks at intermediate levels of repression but de-
clines thereafter. (Gurr 1970) Still others have claimed that the relationship between repression 
and rebellion is convex: higher levels of repression increase resentment and, therefore, repression 
feeds protest and rebellion, reducing retirement. In this argument, repression against its own citi-
zens reduces legitimacy of the government, politicizes the apathetic, and radicalizes free riders 
into revolutionaries, thereby spreading conflict. (M. I. Lichbach 1987) Wood also argues along 
similar lines that rebels successfully incorporate the government’s indiscriminate violence into 
their appeals to recruit more supporters. (E. J. Wood 2003)  
In order to test if repression affects retirement, I measure repression in terms of Maoist 
casualty, obtained from National Counterterrorism Center’s World Incident Tracking System 
[WITS] until 2009, and from South Asia Terrorism Portal between 2010-2014. Since develop-
ment and repression work in tandem it is difficult to isolate their impact on the extent of rebel 
retirement.  
3.4.3	  Control	  Variables	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The data for the controls come from the 2001 Indian census the India Human Development Sur-
vey (IHDS). I control for three main sets of alternative explanations.   
3.4.3.1 Geography 
I included controls for the population and the size of a given district because the state is 
typically thought to have a harder time rooting out the Maoists in larger districts. Since Maoists 
are generally thought to control more remote areas and to use the forest for cover, we included 
controls for the percentage of a district’s area covered by forest.70  
3.4.3.2 Ethnicity and land inequality 
I included controls for the percentage of the population that is comprised of scheduled 
castes (Dalits) and scheduled tribes (tribals), as these are the main aggrieved groups who have 
taken up arms against the state. (Urdal 2008). 
3.4.3.2 Crime 
The IHDS also provides data on how people felt about crime in their vicinity, asking re-
spondents if they heard about theft (variable LC1), break ins(LC2), threat at knife point (LC3), 
street harassment of women in their area (LC4) over the last 12 months. However, I noticed in 
preliminary analysis (in appendix) that there is not much variation in this crime data between the 
two surveys. I also found that variables LC1, LC2, LC3 are positively correlated with our prelim-
inary explanatory variable of interest organizational density (orgdens) while LC4 is negatively 
correlated. That is intuitive because high perception of crime leads to voluntary neighborhood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 The Maoists acknowledge that the forested and hilly tribal areas — and not the plains — are currently the focus of 
their attention: ‘The forests and mountainous areas quite naturally get priority as these are the strategic areas where 
Base Areas can be set up’ (Ganapaty and Kisan 2004). 
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watch programs where ordinary people take turns to guard neighborhoods at night. In construc-
tion of the crime variable, I exclude LC4 to avoid confusion in interpretation of results.  
Descriptive statistics of all explanatory and control variables are provided in the Appen-
dix, Table 3. As the objective is to run a regression analysis, the correlation between the RTRMT 
variable and the control variables as well as the correlation within the control variables are inves-
tigated. (Appendix, Table 4)  All control variables besides the percentage of SC population is 
positively correlated with the RTMRT variable. Moreover, the forest_cover is strongly correlated 
with ln_pop, r_pct_sc, and r_pct_st. To avoid multicolinearity, forest_cover is excluded from the 
analysis, as the other controls are more relevant to explain rebel retirement. Also r_pct_st is 
strongly negative correlated with r_pct_sc. Since r_pct_sc has a stronger correlation with 
RTMRT, r_pct_sc is retained and r_pct_st is excluded from the analysis. 
3.5	  Hypotheses	  and	  Methods	  
 
I argue that rebels quit through informal exit networks that, depending on whether they 
are harmonious or discordant, can either reduce or exacerbate the fear and uncertainties of the 
dual processes of retirement and reintegration. I take the variable orgdens, constructed as de-
scribed above on a scale of 0-3, as a proxy for lure of democracy. A high value of orgdens, 
measured by high incidence of membership of voluntary organizations, is likely to foster har-
monic exit process producing an outcome of high retirement and reintegration. In contrast, a low 
value of orgdens, measured by low incidence of civic participation, is a proxy for unavailability 
of exit networks, and is expected to produce low surrender. I also test the alternative explana-
tions of rebel retirement in terms of development and repression, operationalized as described in 
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the previous section. Based on the discussion so far, I derive the following testable hypotheses 
summarized below:  
H1 (testing if organizational density matters for rebel retirement): A high rebel retirement 
is expected in those districts where organizational density is high.  
H2 (testing if improved standard of living matters for rebel retirement): A high rebel re-
tirement is expected in those districts with an improved access to household assets (transistor ra-
dio, television, bicycles, two-wheelers, cars).  
H3 (testing if improved public service provision/healthcare matters for rebel retirement) 
A high rebel retirement is expected in districts with an improved healthcare access.  
H4 (testing if improved public service provision in terms of access to education matters 
for rebel retirement) A high rebel retirement is expected in districts with improved access to edu-
cation.  
H5 (testing if investment in industrialization matters for rebel retirement) A high rebel re-
tirement is expected in districts with high investment in industrialization.  
H6 (testing if mining activities matter for rebel retirement) A high rebel retirement is ex-
pected in districts with high mining activity.  
H7 (testing if high casualty matters rebel retirement) A high rebel retirement is expected 
in districts with high Maoist casualty.  
Given the nature of the dependent variable – widely skewed with a large proportion of zeroes – I 
used negative binomial regression models. One could also use OLS but there are many values of 
1 and 2 for RTRMT, which might bias the estimator. Another model of count data is the Poisson 
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regression. However, the assumption that the conditional variance is equal to the conditional 
mean is violated. The sample size limits the number of independent variables that can be tested 
as well as the chances to find significant effects. Therefore, we will pay more attention to actual 
effect sizes than to just significance 
3.6	  Results	  	  
	  
The analysis reveals that organizational density within a district has an effect on the number of 
retired rebels. ORGDENS is treated as a factor since it is not a continuous variable. An initial box 
plot suggests that only an ORGDENS level of 3 has an effect on RTRMT. 
 
Figure	  19	  
Boxplot Showing Effect of Organizational Density on Retirement 
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When controlling for area and population of the district as well as the percentage of SC 
population, an organizational density level of 3 affects the incident rate by a factor of 1.9. Thus 
in district with the highest organizational density we expect almost twice as many rebels to retire 
compared to a district with the lowest level of organizational density. This effect is also stable 
when we control for the other influences as well as under the IHDS 1 and IHDS 2 data set, con-
firmed by the regression analysis. (TABLE 5, APPENDIX) 
I also test if other factors discussed above also influence the retirement of rebels. In the 
models I include control variables as well as the ORGDENS variable. Thus, the analysis will also 
serve as a robustness check for the initial model. I find that all forms of investments in industry 
have a negative impact on rebel retirement. On the face of it, this is against the basic assumption 
of counterinsurgency programs that development in the form of industrialization would increase 
rebel retirement. Most effects are, however, insignificant. Only domestic investments seem to 
have a significant impact. (Table 6, Appendix) With mining variables the regression results show 
a positive effect for mining activities, with an exception of mining of coal., which shows a nega-
tive effect. None of the effects is, however, significant or exhibits large effect sizes. (Table 7, 
Appendix) The effect of ORGDENS on RTRMT is stable and significant in all models. Over all 
models, the effect size is larger than estimated in previous models.  
The increase in household assets has a negative impact on RTRMT, however, not signifi-
cant, influencing retirement by a factor of 0.62. Health access, on the other hand, shows a posi-
tive effect, impacting incident rate by a factor of 11.6. The effect of education access on retire-
ment is positive but very small. Confidence in institutions has a negative impact on the number 
of retired rebels. On average it impacts the retirement rate by a factor of 0.43. (Table 8) The re-
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sults are robust using values of explanatory and control variables from IHDS2 datatset, except 
access to education has a small negative effect on retirement.  
3.7	  Conclusion	  
	  
In this chapter I statistically test my contention that rebels quit not due to access to assets 
and public services, increased industrialization and mining or repression, but due to bottom up 
lure of democracy. I argue that the lure of democracy for rebels who want to quit works through 
grassroots civic participation, which allows active citizens to forge informal exit networks in-
vested in securing life and livelihood of retiring rebels. I defined level of civic participation in 
terms of organizational density, which measures the extent of citizen membership in 12 different 
kinds of voluntary organization based on crosscutting markers of identity like caste, religion, 
profession and gender. Based on census data, I defined development in terms of access to house-
hold assets like radio transistor, bicycle, two-wheeler that ordinary villagers in conflict zones 
value as indicators of good life. I measure public service provision in terms of access to 
healthcare and education. I also include data on investment in various industries and mining data. 
Repression is measured by proportion of Maoist casualty. We explored the argument about rebel 
retirement in the Maoist affected districts of India comprising the red corridor.  
In the statistical analysis, I find that controlling for area and population of the district as 
well as the percentage of SC population, an organizational density level of 3 affects the incident 
rate by a factor of 1.9. Overall, we can conclude that organizational density has a positive effect 
on the retirement of rebels. A higher organizational density has a positive robust effect on the 
number of retired rebels. This effect is robust with respect to model specification as well as to 
IHDS 1 and 2. Moreover, the percentage of people in the SC has a negative (robust) impact on 
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the retirement. While access to health care also has a positive effect on retirement of rebels, 
where the effect size seems to be larger than the effect size of organizational density. Access to 
education, however, has a negative effect on retirement. Confidence in institutions too has a neg-
ative impact on rebel retirement in both with IHDS 1 and IHDS 2 dataset.  
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Chapter	  4:	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  the	  South:	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Harmonic	  Exit	  
Network	  
4.1	  Introduction	  
In this chapter, I analyze the origin and operation of harmonic exit networks in South India. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Telangana region in the South has been a hotbed of left revolutionary 
politics since the 1940s and yet two-thirds of the rebel retirements in India between 2005 and 
2014 were concentrated in two districts in this region. I argue that high retirement in the South is 
conditional on the emergence of these harmonic exit networks that weave together multiple 
stakeholders, who work to build momentum for rebels’ exit and manage myriad uncertainties of 
their reintegration. Although we do not have reliable data on the total number of rebels in North 
and South India to compute an accurate measure of the proportion of retired rebels in the two 
regions, high retirement in the South is exceptional given comparable movement intensity in the 
two regions (measured in terms of incidents and casualties). The Indian government, in recogniz-
ing “Southern exceptionalism” in securing a high number of rebel retirements, has applauded the 
counterinsurgency efforts in the region.  
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated statistically that organizational density, measured 
in terms of degree of civic participation via membership in grassroots organizations, explains the 
subnational variation in rebel retirement better than developmental indicators and police repres-
sion. In the current chapter, I parse out an argument that links macro (environmental), meso (or-
ganizational), and micro (individual) conditions to explain how civic associations in the Gray 
zones of the democracy-insurgency interface foster the growth of informal exit networks that en-
able high rebel retirement in the South. This chapter highlights three sets of factors in explaining 
the dynamics of rebel retirement in Telangana viz. (a) pre-war social bases of insurgency, where 
war refers to the guerilla warfare by the Maoists against the state (b) horizontal and vertical ties 
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within the insurgent organization, and (c) everyday politics at the insurgency-democracy inter-
face. The combination of these three factors across state, district, and individual levels, respec-
tively, achieves high civic participation in democracy, which, in turn, enables the rise of harmon-
ic exit networks in Telangana.   
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by situating the history and geography 
of Telangana and laying out the locations and strategy of my fieldwork in the South. Section 3 
presents ethnographic evidence of how Maoist rebels disarm and reintegrate in rural Telangana. 
Section 4 explains how distinctive macro (social) factors facilitate high caste/class polarization 
and low militancy of the landowning classes in Telangana, which allow Maoists to build a cohe-
sive insurgent organization with both guerrilla army and grassroots mass fronts. Section 5 shows 
how, given the distinct configuration of social factors, the Maoists fostered strong vertical ties 
with the local constituency and equally strong horizontal ties with a broad support base bridging 
the rural- urban divide, creating conditions for high civic participation in democracy. Section 6 
shows how a cohesive insurgent organization with robust internal vertical and horizontal ties in-
teracts with a high associational culture of democracy to produce a harmonic exit network that 
facilitates high retirement and broad reintegration.  I portray the dynamics of insurgency-
democracy interaction in Telangana by tracing the origin and evolution of the Dalit and human 
rights movements, which shows how anti-state, anti-democracy Maoist mobilization successfully 
energized grassroots political activity and inadvertently strengthened civic participation in the 
democracy that it wanted to overthrow. Thus paradoxically the lure of democracy drawing rebels 
back into the mainstream was strongest where the Maoist movement was the strongest.  
4.2.	  Telangana	  Region	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh:	  Setting	  the	  Stage	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This section is divided into two parts: the first part gives a geographical and historical back-
ground of Andhra Pradesh and specifically, the Telangana region, and notes the distribution of 
surrender events in the region. The second part describes my fieldwork locations and the strate-
gies I used to interact with Maoist rebels in the region. 
4.2.1	  Telangana:	  History	  and	  Location	  	  
	  
In 1953, the state of Andhra Pradesh was created under the State Reorganization Act by 
uniting the Telugu-speaking areas of Madras Presidency and the princely State of Hyderabad 
(Rao, 1988; Narayana Rao, 1973; Sarojini, 1968; Venkatarangaiah, 1965). 71 It was the first state 
in independent India to be formed on linguistic principle by uniting Coastal Andhra, Telangana 
and Rayalseema.72 Despite many similarities in language and culture, each region has experi-
enced different political legacies, levels of economic development, land relations, rainfall, soil 
fertility, terrain, cropping patterns, agricultural practices, irrigation methods, literacy, and 
healthcare standards. Thus the separatist movement of Telangana that started in 1969 succeeded 
in June 2014 when the 10 districts comprising Telangana separated from the two other regions of 
Andhra Pradesh to become the 29th state of India. The new state is divided into the same 10 dis-
tricts (grouped into two divisions), which are further divided into 42 revenue divisions and fur-
ther into 462 mandals (administrative unit below district in Telangana). There are a total of 12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  At	  first	  the	  Telugu	  areas	  of	  the	  erstwhile	  Madras	  State	  were	  separated	  with	  	  Andhra	  and	  the	  South	  interior	  region	  of	  Rayalaseema	  forming	  the	  ‘Andhra	  State’	  and	  Telangana	  becoming	  part	  of	  the	  Nizam’s	  princely	  state.	  Three	  years	  later,	  on	  November	  1,	  1956,	  Telangana	  was	  merged	  with	  coastal	  Andhra	  and	  Rayalseema	  to	  form	  the	  state	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  with	  Hyderabad	  as	  the	  capital.	  
72	  The	  coastal	  Andhra	  region	  consists	  of	  nine	  districts	  (Srikakulam,	  Vizianagaram,	  Visakhapatnam,	  East	  Goda-­‐vari,	  West	  Godavari,	  Krishna,	  Guntur,	  Prakasam,	  and	  Nellore)	  and	  comprised	  41.7%	  of	  the	  state	  population	  in	  (year?).	  Rayalaseema	   (meaning,	  the	  land	  of	  kings)	  consists	  of	   four	  districts	  (Chittoor,	  Cuddapah,	  Anantapur,	  and	  Kurnool)	  with	  18%	  of	  the	  population.	  Telangana	  (the	  land	  of	  Telugus)	  consists	  of	  10	  districts	  (Mahbub-­‐nagar,	   Ranga	   Reddy,	   Hyderabad,	   Medak,	   Nizamabad,	   Adilabad,	   Karimnagar,	   Warangal,	   Khammam,	   and	  Nalgonda)	  with	  40.5%	  of	  the	  population.	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cities, which include six municipal corporations and 38 municipalities. The following figure 
(Figure 1) shows a map of former Andhra Pradesh with the three regions delineated. 
 
Figure	  20	  
Three Regions of Andhra Pradesh (Source: Deccan Chronicle)  
Telangana, when compared to the other regions of former Andhra Pradesh, has a larger 
population of Dalit (scheduled castes) and scheduled tribes, who are the most backward castes as 
recognized in the Constitution of India, and whose socio-economic conditions are far inferior to 
the upper caste population. The following map (Figure 2) shows the uneven economic develop-
ment that became a driving force of the separation of Telangana.73 Given the distinctive socio-
economic profile and political legacy of leftist led armed agrarian uprisings in Telangana, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  There	  are	  many	  accounts	  of	   this	  uneven	  economic	  development	  and	  most	  of	   them	  agree	  that	  Coastal	  An-­‐dhra	  fared	  better	  because	  it	  has	  benefited	  from	  productivity-­‐enhancing	  technology	  during	  the	  “green	  revolu-­‐tion”	  (rice)	  as	  well	  as	  from	  commercialization	  (such	  as	  fruits	  and	  vegetables,	  milk,	  and	  meat	  products)	  of	  ag-­‐riculture.	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Maoist movement in the region evolved somewhat differently from that in the coastal Andhra 
region (K. Kannabiran et al. 2010; Rao 2014; Hanumantha Rao 2011; Simhadri and Rao 1997).  
 
Figure	  21	  
Uneven Economic Development in the Three Regions of Andhra Pradesh74 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Districts	  are	  grouped	  into	  poor,	  medium	  rich,	  and	  rich	  based	  on	  average	  monthly	  per	  capita	  expenditure,	  with	   1.25	   USD/capita/day	   as	   poor,	   1.26	   to	   2.00	   USD/capita/day	   as	   medium-­‐rich,	   and	   above	   2.00	  USD/capita/day	  as	  rich.	  In	  2004/05,	  more	  than	  10%	  of	  the	  rural	  population	  in	  Telangana	  lived	  in	  poverty	  in	  five	  out	  of	  ten	  districts.	  In	  Rayalaseema	  three	  out	  of	  four	  districts	  fell	  into	  this	  category,	  but	  in	  coastal	  Andhra	  only	  two	  out	  of	  nine	  districts	  fell	  into	  this	  category.	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4.2.2	  Fieldwork:	  Locations,	  Strategy,	  Experience	  
	  
This section is divided into two parts: selection of fieldwork areas and fieldwork strategy. 
The first part lists the villages where I did my fieldwork in Telangana as well as the method of 
selection of those villages. The second part makes a few definitional clarifications and describes 
my strategies in the field.  
4.2.2.1	  Fieldwork	  Locations	  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, rebel retirement has been exceptionally high in Andhra Pra-
desh, specifically in the Khammam and Warangal districts of Telangana and the Vishakhapat-
nam district of Coastal Andhra. The following district map of the former Andhra Pradesh (Figure 
3) presents the geographical pattern of rebel retirement in the state (2005-2012) with the darkest 
shades of green in three districts representing the highest concentration of surrender – retirement 
events.  
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Figure	  22	  
District-Level Surrender of Maoist Rebels in the South 
While planning my fieldwork, it seemed intuitive to interview as many retired rebels as 
possible to create a comprehensive account of the process of leaving the Maoist movement. I 
wanted to explore the mechanisms that connect a popular grassroots insurgency to a thriving as-
sociational culture, nurturing informal exit networks that facilitate rebel retirement. Further, it 
was crucial to investigate how the curious spatial pattern of Maoist surrenders with a high con-
centration in certain districts reflects on the process of retirement. With these considerations in 
mind, alongside interviewing retired rebels, I also designed focus groups with ordinary people, 
who are not rebels, in conflict zones in Telangana, both in districts of high rebel retirement as 
well as in those of low retirement.  
 	  
	  
115	  
Given that the thin literature on the topic of rebel retirement has not generated any solid 
intuition (except for the preliminary evidence from my statistical analysis) on the factors that ex-
plain rebel retirement, examining districts with the highest and lowest values on rebel retirement 
was a conscious attempt to maximize variance on the dimension of interest. This approach re-
duces the number of study cases, but the combination of careful comparisons within a shared po-
litical setting and militant group, attention to path dependence and empirical details make my 
inferences more credible than those that I might draw from a more heterogeneous and less de-
tailed set of cases. 
In the Telangana region, I conducted my fieldwork in five out of its 10 districts (Adila-
bad, Karimnagar, Warangal, Khammam, and Nalgonda), of which Warangal and Khammam had 
the highest incidence of Maoist rebel retirement events in Andhra Pradesh between 2005 and 
2015, Karimnagar had a moderate incidence, and Adilabad and Nalgonda had the lowest inci-
dence of retirement events. I excluded Nizambad, Medak, Rangareddy, Hyderabad, and 
Mahbubnagar, because these were never listed as Maoist “affected districts” released by the Min-
istry of Home Affairs in the last ten years. 
The five selected districts are made up of a total of 256 mandals. I categorized all 256 
mandals into three groups – highly-affected, moderately-affected and not-affected by the Maoist 
movement. The government and other available political datasets do not go below the district 
level; therefore I categorized the mandals based on my extensive conversations with local aca-
demics and journalists, triangulated by input from police and former rebels and crosschecked 
with newspaper reports on Maoist incidents in the Chennai edition of The Hindu between 2005 
and 2014.  
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For each of the five selected districts, I randomly chose one highly-affected mandal, one 
moderately-affected mandal, and one not-affected mandal, which added up to 15 mandals.  In 
each of the five heavily- affected mandals, I randomly selected two villages (a total of ten high-
ly-affected villages per district). In the five moderately-affected mandals, I randomly selected 
one village (a total of five moderately-affected villages per district). Finally, in each of the five 
not-affected mandals, I randomly selected one village (five not-affected villages per district). The 
following table (Table 1) is the list of mandals and villages selected for fieldwork in the Tel-
angana region of former Andhra Pradesh.  
 
 NALGONDA 
LOW EXIT 
ADILABAD 
LOW EXIT 
KARIMNAGAR 
MODERATE EXIT 
WARANGAL 
HIGH EXIT 
KHAMMAM 
HIGH EXIT 
Highly Af-
fected 
Munugode 
Mandal 
 
Villages – 
 
 1. Munugode 
2. Cholledu  
Indervelly 
Mandal 
(Vaipet forest) 
 
Villages – 
 
1. Rajampet  
2.Tejapur  
Husnabad Mandal  
 
Villages – 
 
 1. Gouravelli- 
2. Ramavaram  
Geesugonda 
Mandal  
 
Villages - 
 
1. Mogili-
cherla   
2. Manugoda  
Charla Mandal (Chen-
napuram forest area)  
 
Villages - 
1. Pusuguppa  
2.  Unjapalli  
 
Moderately 
Affected  
Narayanpur 
Mandal 
 
Village - 
1.Rochakonda 
(Lambada 
tribal) 
Laxetipet 
Mandal 
 
Village - 
1. Pothepalle 
Bheemdevarapalli 
Mandal  
 
Village - 
1. Manikyapoor  
Station 
Ghanpur 
Mandal  
 
Village - 
1. Si-
tarampur-
Kondapur 
Venkatapuram (trib-
al area)  
 
Village - 
Laxmipuram 
Not Af-
fected  
Nalgonda 
Mandal  
 
Village - 
1. Samastha 
Narayanpuram  
Neredigonda 
Mandal  
 
Village - 
1.Kuntala  
Manthani Man-
dal 
 
Village – 
1. Pandullapalle 
 
Venkatapur 
Mandal  
 
Village - 
 
1. Vet-
turalapalli  
Khammam (Urban)  
Village - 
 
1. Manchugonda 
 
Figure	  23	  
Fieldwork Areas in Rural Telangana 
4.2.2.2	  Fieldwork	  Strategies	  and	  Limitations	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I created a list of retired rebels, based on local newspaper reports. These reports also 
mentioned the police station where the rebels surrendered and often their home district. I took 
this list to local journalists and leaders of Maoist frontal organizations to locate former Maoists 
in Warangal district. The retired rebels introduced me to several other rebels in a snowball fash-
ion. Some were in my original list culled out from newspaper reports, while some were not.  
I categorized the rebels I interviewed by their point of entry into the movement (i.e., their home 
district, rural or urban, student union or peasant organization) and area of operation (in northern 
Telangana or in Chhattisgarh). Despite snowball sampling, I was able to achieve a considerable 
variation in the military experience, age, gender, caste, and organizational role of my interview-
ees. I interviewed a sample of 35 retired rebels, including men and women who served as Maoist 
squad members, Dalam commanders, area commanders and zonal commanders, and members of 
district, state, and central committees. My sample excludes many others I met with and inter-
viewed in the field, who were members of various Maoist frontal organizations and civil liberties 
organizations and who also had firsthand experience in the movement but did not serve in the 
guerrilla army.  
Thus by retired rebels, I refer to former Maoists who have experience in a Maoist guerrilla army, 
with active deployment of at least five years outside their home village/district. Even though the 
members of various Maoist frontal organizations including their theoretical leaders and ideo-
logues subscribe to the same ideology, and some have actively participated in recruitment and 
propaganda, I do not treat them as retired rebels, as they have not been active fighters.   
In an ideal world, in order for me to argue why some rebels quit and others do not, I would need 
the perspective of those Maoist guerrillas who wanted to quit but did not and continue to be de-
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ployed. In reality, it is not a practical or safe option to meet an adequate number of active insur-
gents in an ongoing conflict and ask them if they ever wanted to quit. Since I am more interested 
in the process and not the reasons for retirement, it was not a necessary research strategy for me 
to contact active rebels.  
In addition to retired rebels, I also met with Maoist supporters. By “supporters” I refer to 
those who not only provided food and shelter to the guerrillas, but also who faced the wrath of 
the police and administration and refused to give away any information that could materially 
damage the safety and security of the guerrillas. Some of these individuals self-identified them-
selves as supporters, quite enthusiastically describing their roles in aiding the guerillas and pro-
moting the cause of revolution, while others were extremely cautious before confiding in me of 
their involvement. Some of them had family and friends who were still active guerillas; others 
had lost close ones who died fighting for the cause.  
Third, I also spoke to a category of people who were once members of various Maoist 
frontal organizations. These are people who could have become guerrillas but did not. Not mere-
ly supporters, but not formal combatants either, these people wanted to join the military wing of 
the Maoist party, but could not for some reason, such as poor health and family responsibilities. 
Fourth, I met with family members of Maoist rebels, who still have or lost someone close in the 
movement. Some hoped that their children would return one day; others wondered if the fighters 
still remembered their families after so many years away. The family members of rebels did not 
uniformly support the movement. The heartbreak and personal loss, combined with fear of re-
newed police harassment, made the neighbors and extended family members I spoke with quiet 
and reticent observers. 
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Fifth, I also met people who self-identified as strongly opposed to the Maoists. Some of 
these opponents, however, admitted to having provided food and shelter to the Maoist guerrillas 
when they frequented their villages, mostly out of fear. I have used the term “helpful opponents”, 
in my field notes to categorize the abovementioned respondents.  However, it is important to 
acknowledge the complexity with such labelling. In a conflict zone such as the above, fear re-
mains an important consideration. Ordinary people, who are not rebels, are afraid of retribution – 
from police, from local politicians, and in some areas, also from rebels themselves. Confessing 
their roles vis-à-vis an armed conflict became easier only when they considered me harmless and 
trustworthy.75  
In each of the selected villages I conducted at least two (maximum of five) focus groups. 
I was not able to stick to my initial plan of randomly selecting villagers and administering a sur-
vey that was designed to ascertain how people felt about returning rebels. Meeting an outsider 
like me, and answering “important” questions is a communal affair in rural India. Even when I 
walked into a mud house in a village selected at random (say, the 10th house from the village 
center), neighbors freely walked in and joined the conversation, out of curiosity or concern. 
Sometimes my respondents wanted me to accompany them to a more “comfortable” house, 
which inevitably meant one with chairs and a bathroom where they invited other men (and on my 
request, women) to join. After a few field visits I gradually realized that this was a trend, rather 
than the exception. Thus the semi-structured interviews I conducted in villages became unin-
tended focus groups, which is the format I eventually chose. Interestingly, none of these meet-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  I	  made	  efforts	  to	  say	  (and	  convince	  my	  local	  contact	  persons	  who	  would	  eventually	  publicize	  it	  on	  my	  be-­‐half)	  that	  I	  was	  neither	  a	  journalist	  nor	  from	  a	  survey	  agency	  working	  for	  some	  politician	  before	  an	  impend-­‐ing	  election	  nor	  connected	  to	  the	  police.	  Being	  an	  academic	  researcher	  has	  its	  advantages	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  I	  admitted	   frankly	   that	   I	  had	  no	  power	  or	   connection	   to	  make	  any	  difference	   in	   their	  plight.	  As	  promised	   to	  everyone	  I	  spoke	  to	   in	   the	   field,	  and	  as	  written	   in	  my	  IRB	  form,	   I	  will	  not	  reveal	   the	  name,	   location,	  or	  any	  identifying	  characteristic	  of	  my	  informants	  in	  the	  field.	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ings saw a flare-up between supporters and opponents of the movement. This might be a result of 
my village selection strategy. 
4.3	  From	  a	  Rebel’s	  Perspective:	  Retirement	  through	  Informal	  Exit	  Networks	  	  
	  
This section narrates the story of Raju Anna, a forty-something former Maoist, who gave 
up arms and returned to his home village in the Warangal district of Telangana.76 Travelling to-
gether with my research assistant, a local from the Center for Economic and Social Studies 
(CESS), Hyderabad. We first took a long-distance bus from Hyderabad, locally called a Volvo 
that dropped us on the highway. We then waved down a trekker, a type of multi-utility vehicle 
popular in rural India as public transportation, and rode to Mogilicherla village where Raju Anna 
lives. The village is a remote hamlet and was a hotbed of Maoist insurgency till a few years back. 
It was cotton-picking season and the trekker carried about 50 women from neighboring areas 
who worked as seasonal cotton pickers. Hiring an auto-rickshaw would have allowed us a private 
and a better ride from the highway into the village, compared to the less than pleasant and one in 
the overcrowded trekker, but we couldn’t get one. The semi-pucca road (partially paved) took us 
to the village center, when I realized that four men, faces partially covered, have been following 
the trekker in two motorcycles. They waited at the village center as we thanked the women and 
the driver for the ride. One of them approached my research assistant, who showed them my pa-
pers (an introduction letter from the chair of my dissertation committee and another from the Di-
rector of the Center for Economic and Social Studies, the research institute in Hyderabad where I 
was locally affiliated). When my research assistant came back asking for a research paper on the 
Maoists that I had previously written, as a matter of validation of my status as an academic re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Real	  names	  of	  the	  former	  rebels	  have	  been	  changed	  to	  protect	  their	  identities.	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searcher on this topic, I tried to look it up on my smartphone. However, I was informed that they 
had used jammers to block my cell phone signal, to prevent outside communication.  Subse-
quently, they decided to look up the paper themselves. Once convinced about our identities and 
status as academic researchers, they became friendlier, and gave us directions to Raju Anna’s 
house, that lay about half a kilometer walk from the village center. I asked, but still do not know 
for sure, if these four men were police, state intelligence, or Maoists. My research assistant, a 
native of the neighboring Nalgonda district, was convinced that these were annalu (literally, el-
der brothers, used locally to refer to the Maoist cadre).  
  When Raju Anna asked me about the journey to his house, I told him that the South has 
remarkably smooth roads and a cheap, fast, reliable bus service. I have travelled to far-flung dis-
tricts and villages in Andhra Pradesh on these roads, a feat quite impossible in my other field-
work areas in Jharkhand and West Bengal. The roads are integral to the fabled Andhra Model of 
counterinsurgency, often praised in New Delhi, for its judicious mix of policing and develop-
ment that stifles insurgency. A road-sign on National Highway (NH) 7 in Anantpur district, an-
other Maoist hotbed in the recent past, reads “Roads Indicate the Culture of the Nation”.77 To 
many these shiny pitch-black roads bear testimony to the state’s newfound culture of moderniza-
tion, urbanization, and relentless pursuit of an “India Shining,” where radical agrarian uprisings 
are merely bad memories best forgotten.78  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	   I	   encountered	   some	   other	   interesting	   sign	   boards	   on	   NH7	   which	   read,	   “Are	   you	   in	   trable?”	   followed	   a	  kilometer	  later	  by,	  “Are	  you	  in	  troble?”	  then	  by	  “Are	  you	  in	  truble?”	  and	  finally	  by	  “Are	  you	  in	  trouble?”	  In	  case	  the	  answer	  to	  these	  questions	  was	  a	  ‘yes,’	  there	  were	  telephone	  numbers	  provided	  that	  you	  were	  expected	  to	  call	   for	   help.	   Incidentally	   none	   of	   the	   phone	   numbers	   worked	   when	   I	   called,	   just	   like	   many	   other	   phone	  numbers	  of	  ministers	  and	  bureaucrats	  on	  their	  websites	  that	  take	  you	  to	  an	  automated	  message	  that	  the	  line	  has	  been	  disconnected.	  	  
78	  TDP,	  the	  major	  regional	  party,	  fought	  and	  lost	  the	  2004	  Assembly	  elections	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  development	  called	   India	   Shining,	   which	   highlighted	   roads,	   infrastructure,	   and	   information	   technology	   as	   development	  indicators.	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As Raju Anna served us tea-latte made from milk from goats in his family, I shared with-
in him a conversation with a high-ranking bureaucrat in New Delhi, who had told me that while 
the latter was posted in the Maoist-affected districts along the Andhra-Odisha border (where 
Raju Anna also worked as an insurgent) the only way he knew he was on the Andhra side of the 
border was by the quality of the roads. He posited that the elaborate, well-maintained road net-
work had a key role in overcoming the ‘remoteness’ in rural Andhra, by encircling the Maoist 
hideouts, and, in effect, eradicating the insurgency.79  
Raju Anna, the shy, soft-spoken former guerrilla, who never looked me in the eye, as a 
customary sign of respect in some parts of rural India, and addressed me as didi (literally, elder 
sister), however, rejected unequivocally that the Andhra model of counter-insurgency, and in 
particular extensive road building, was responsible for compelling the Maoists in Andhra Pra-
desh to surrender. During his twenty-five year tenure in the movement, he rose through the ranks 
to become District Committee Secretary and was among the chosen few sent to the neighboring 
state of Chhattisgarh to build the movement there. He explained that roads lull people into a false 
sense of progress, but ordinary villagers simply bypass those pucca (black-topped) roads and 
continue to walk in diagonal paths reminiscent of dirt roads. Roads have allowed police to move 
faster. But roads also have taken the element of surprise out of police movement and made it eas-
ier for Maoists to plan IED (improvised explosive device) attacks on police and paramilitary 
convoys.  
Post-retirement, Raju Anna lived with his parents and his brother’s family in their ances-
tral home in the village. Over several rounds of tea-latte and a homemade lunch, he explained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	   From	  author’s	   interview	  with	  R.	   Vineel	  Krishna,	   IAS,	   principal	   secretary	   to	   the	  union	   rural	   development	  minister	   in	  Krishi	  Bhavan,	  New	  Delhi	  on	   July	  14,	  2013.	  Krishna,	  originally	   from	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  was	  once	  abducted	  by	  the	  Maoists	  during	  his	  tenure	  as	  district	  collector	  in	  Malkangiri,	  Orissa.	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that Maoist guerrillas are trained ideologically and militarily to persist, improvise, retreat, and 
resurge. Shiny roads, ruthless policing, new schools, or token land reforms do not persuade sea-
soned rebels, who are hardened by decades of surviving in hostile conditions and hardship, to 
quit. Between tours of his Bt (GMO) cotton farms, he gave me a year-by-year account of the al-
ternating cycle of state repression and accommodation in Andhra Pradesh since the 1970s. He 
also described the hunger, disease, torture, betrayal, and deaths he endured since he joined the 
ranked Maoists, following the death of his younger brother in the Giraipalli massacre.80Through 
the conversation, and during subsequent chats, Raju Anna repeatedly affirmed his unshakable 
faith in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (MLM) thought as the correct political path. And yet he quit.  
He went through formal channels in the Party, informing his immediate supervisor who 
spread the word. He had long debates with his comrades who tried to persuade him to reconsider 
his decision. Finally he was required to put his rationale for quitting in a letter in order to receive 
formal approval. In return, the party expected him not to divulge secrets that would jeopardize 
his comrades. The newspaper reports of his surrender state that Raju Anna had to quit due to ill-
ness, which made it difficult for him to live in inhospitable conditions in the forests of Chhattis-
garh. It took me several meetings with a few retired rebels to realize that “illness” was in fact the 
Party-approved reason for surrender that rebels inevitably cited when they had to elaborate on 
the reasons of quitting. 
Far more intriguing than the rationale for retiring (i.e., why rebels quit) was the process 
of rebel retirement itself.  I was curious to know more when Raju Anna mentioned that after he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  In	  1975	  four	  young	  student	  activists	  of	  the	  Radical	  Students	  Union	  (RSU)	  	  were	  taken	  to	  the	  Giraipalli	  for-­‐ests	  and	  shot	  dead	  by	  the	  police.	  They	  are	  remembered	  by	  Andhra	  Maoists	  as	  Giraipalli	  Martyrs.	  Raju	  Anna	  joined	  the	  Maoists	   immediately	  afterward	  and	  moved	  to	  Dandakaranya	   in	  1981.	  He	  shared	  many	  stories	  of	  Dandakaranya,	   including	  his	  meeting	  with	  Arundhati	  Roy,	   the	  Booker	  Prize	  winning	  author	  who	  wrote	  her	  lyrical	  essay,	  “Walking	  with	  the	  Comrades,”	  based	  on	  her	  stay	  with	  Maoists	  in	  the	  forests	  of	  Chhattisgarh.	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received Party approval, it took him over three years to finally surrender to the police. While de-
ciding to surrender, Raju Anna’s primary concern was that his former enemies would target him 
and his family as soon as he disarmed and returned to his village. Nothing in the government sur-
render policy package of a job, cash, land, and vocational training, even if it was actually imple-
mented, could persuade him to take that risk. Life before livelihood, he said.  
First he had to reach out to other retired Maoists, who activated an exit network made up 
of elected politicians, police, journalists, and activists, down to the village level. This multilevel 
network, made up of some people personally known to him and others not, worked assiduously 
to ensure that scions of former Reddy landlords that he had attacked during his insurgent career 
as part of the PWG political program did not assassinate him as soon as he disarmed. A member of 
the legislative assembly (MLA), a former classmate of the top Maoist leader in the region, and a 
Superintendent of Police, whose brother died as a Maoist, played key roles in persuading the en-
raged landlord family to accept a highly coveted petrol pump license alongside an important new 
highway, considered a lucrative business proposition, in exchange for promising not to attempt a 
vengeance against Raju Anna. Such negotiations and deal-making did not work in isolation but 
alongside trusting relations forged at the local village level to make it credible. 
At the village level, Raju Anna’s brother persuaded the local Dalit leader to gather to-
gether local families as well as the sister of the landlord, who Raju Anna killed,  to have long-
drawn community dialogues highlighting the need of forgiveness, not altruistically but in self-
interest. These meetings revolved around painful memories of gruesome deaths, police brutality, 
and the destruction of standing crops in the eighties and nineties, which eventually led to a con-
sensus on the need to build peace locally through amnesty and reintegration of former rebels. 
Local Dalit activists were instrumental in driving these village-level discussions, which im-
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pressed upon the villagers, particularly from rich Reddy peasant families who considered the 
Maoists their enemies. These meetings also highlighted that if they gunned down returning rebels 
in hatred, anger, and retribution, it would create a reputation that would deter others from return-
ing. The meetings often took place in the village library, built in the name of the well-known Da-
lit leader and primary architect of the Indian constitution, Dr. Ambedkar. The Dalit uprising in 
the village started with the Maoists, but eventually found roots within democracy by abandoning 
Marx-Lenin-Mao and instead adopting Dr. Ambedkar as their ideological fountainhead. Villag-
ers belonging to different castes, with brothers, sisters, husbands, or sons in the movement, coa-
lesced around the local forgiveness project in hopes of facilitating more rebel retirement and re-
integration. Interestingly enough, these horizontal trust and forgiveness networks evolved across 
caste divisions, with Reddy women commiserating with Dalit women, reinforcing side payments 
offered from above.  
It took three years before Raju Anna was convinced that he could quit his twenty-five 
year rebel career and return to his village. He surrendered in Warangal at the height of CPI 
(Maoist) success in Andhra Pradesh in 2006. He was offered a monetary award of INR 250,000 
(about USD 5000) for his surrender, which he had to accept, as doing that would be considered 
as a sign of continued allegiance to the Party. However, he did not receive any land or vocational 
training as part of the surrender package. He decided to pursue agriculture as the family owned a 
cotton farm. . During subsequent interviews with police officers, it became clear to me that state 
surrender policies assumed that rebels would give up arms and accept the cash award, in order be 
considered as officially “surrendered” and have the cases against them to be considered as 
“closed.”  
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As I spoke to many other retired rebels in Andhra Pradesh, both men and women, from 
foot soldiers to central committee members, returning rebels reiterated the fear of reprisal from 
former landlords and moneylenders as the biggest deterrence from surrendering. Soon it became 
clear that there are a few, intentional safety nets for retiring rebels that have been put in place to 
safeguard the lives and livelihoods of Maoists who want to quit. These district-level safety nets 
facilitate rebel retirement and reintegration by harmonic cooperation of an overarching layer of 
police, politicians, activists, and professionals connected to local inhabitants in various village-
clusters in the district. During my fieldwork, it was no coincidence that these harmonic exit net-
works were most robust in the Warangal and Khammam districts, which explains why surrender 
events are disproportionately concentrated in these districts. 	  
4.4	  Macro	  (Environmental)	  Factors:	  Social	  Conditions	  of	  Maoist	  Insurgency	  	  
	  
This section of the chapter analyzes the social conditions that brought about the emer-
gence of harmonic exit networks in Telangana. I demonstrate how fundamental social divisions 
determined the organizational structure, recruitment, and mobilization patterns of the Maoists 
and ultimately the informal exit networks that worked to push rebels to retire. This section is di-
vided into three parts: the first part highlights the underlying caste divisions in rural Telangana; 
the second part analyzes how the Maoists constructed a successful discourse of class politics po-
larizing these caste divisions; the third part analyzes the socioeconomic and political factors that 
restricted the militancy of Reddy landlords, enabling successful militant grassroots mobilization 
by the Maoists. 
4.4.1 Battle Lines in Rural Telangana: Underlying Caste Divisions 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the upper castes (Brahmins) had already exited rural Telanga-
na by the 1940s, following anti-Brahmin movements in South India. The land-rich cultivator-
peasants who took their place in the village status/power hierarchy were from the Reddy/Kamma 
forward castes, inferior to Brahmins but superior to backward castes and Dalits. The college-
educated and urbanized Reddys rose to leadership positions in the undivided Communist Party of 
India (CPI) in the forties and fifties. The CPI mobilized all rural agrarian classes, including the 
Dalits, against one common enemy, the feudal landlords (Deshmukhs) who owned hundreds of 
acres of land. Three simple statistics demonstrate how much the rich Reddy peasants supported 
the communist-led agrarian uprising in Telangana in the 1940s. Of the 45 communist prisoners 
whose names were listed in the Indian government’s arrest warrants, 28 belonged to Reddy 
caste; of the 12 communist rebels killed in the uprising and subsequent state action, 8 were Red-
dys; and of the 29 leaders that remained at large, 14 were Reddys. (Elliot 1970).  
The Reddys were able to forge a broad alliance of middle castes (forward castes), back-
ward castes, and Dalits, despite deep social divisions within them. Exogenous political forces, 
particularly the growth of nationalism, united all castes against domination of the Muslim royal 
family that ruled Telangana (Zagoria 1971; Alavi 1965; Moore 1966). Contextual factors like 
severe repression by the Nizam (meaning Islamic ruler) and acute food shortage in the post-
World War II economy created an insurrectionary moment in rural Telangana. As the Nizam 
misinterpreted the communist uprising as a power grab by the Hindu Reddy opposition and un-
leashed of the Razakars (Islamic militia loyal to Nizam) to suppress it,  the rural poor turned to 
communists for resistance and to learn how to organize themselves into village self-defense 
committees. The local feudal lords who were Hindus, became targets of both the communists and 
Razakars, had to simply desert their rural bases to avoid confrontation on both fronts.  
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The Reddy communists were uniquely equipped to lead because they enjoyed the benefit 
of both western education as well as deep and wide kinship ties (Thirumali 2003; Thirumali 
1992). The Reddy youth ,who went to colleges, established by the British rulers of India, hud-
dled together in the hostels, where they were the predominant caste, thus strengthening both their 
kinship ties as well as a deep resentment against feudal domination by the Deshmukhs (Elliott 
1974). Eventually in these Reddy dominated hostels sprouted the educated Reddy radicals, who 
tool leadership positions in the communism inspired organization called the Andhra Mahasabha 
and eventually the Communist Party of India (CPI) (Sundarayya 2006; J. G. Leonard 1967).81  
Even though the Telangana uprising was abruptly withdrawn, the Reddy communists successful-
ly subjugated some big landlords by forcefully redistributing their lands, subsequently aided by 
government initiated land-ceiling legislation. The land reforms in the early fifties broke the pow-
er of the traditional elite (Appu 1975; Khusro 1958; Pavier 1974). But the seized land went pri-
marily to Reddy peasants, who became the new face of rural oppression over the next two dec-
ades. This led to the embourgeoisement of Reddy communists, the classic conundrum in left 
agrarian mobilization whereby transferring land to the agrarian underclasses through successful 
land reform conservatizes precisely those classes which form the tactical roots of mobilization 
(Herring 1997).  
When the Maoists spread into the villages of Telangana in the early seventies, the Reddy 
peasants, who were the erstwhile supporters of the early communist uprising, became the new 
class enemy of landless and land-poor people belonging to the backward and scheduled castes. 
As they set out to re-launch the rebellion in the Telangana region against the new enemy that was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Andhra	  Mahasabha	  was	  a	  cultural	  organization	  of	  Telugu	  speaking	  people	  in	  the	  erstwhile	  Hyderabad	  state	  of	  India.	  Started	  as	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  Indian	  National	  Congress,	  the	  major	  faction	  of	  it	  later	  joined	  hands	  with	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  India.	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the erstwhile friend, the Maoists focused on fortifying their mass base even if it required long-
winded, painstaking grassroots mobilization & politicization of their support base, without any 
sight of a revolution in their lifetime.82 It is among this new rural proletariat made up of Dalit 
sharecroppers and landless laborers that the southern Maoists, primarily the People’s War Group 
(PWG), built their formidable organization in rural Telangana (Mao 1961).  
4.4.2 Class Polarization of Castes: Insurgent Grassroots Organization in Telangana 
 
In the social science literature on agrarian revolution, Eric Wolf and James Scott argue 
that the peasants most prone to revolution are village-dwellers who possess landed property. In 
contrast, Jeffrey Paige argues that smallholding peasants are normally conservative and quies-
cent, whereas property-less laborers or sharecropper-cultivators who earn income from wages 
not land are more likely to become revolutionary (Paige 1975; J. C. Scott 1976; Wolf 1969; J. 
Scott 1977). PWG followed the classic Marxist-Leninist-Maoist framework, which is closer to 
Paige’s line of thinking than that of Wolf and Scott: This line of thinking assumed that anyone 
who earned their livelihood from land cultivation was a ‘peasant,’ a category that excluded ab-
sentee landlords and rentiers, who constituted the rural aristocracy. Peasants in Telangana were 
not a homogenous social category, and PWG was mindful of these internal differentiations, con-
tradictions, and conflicting interests among peasants in developing their mass mobilization strat-
egy. Accordingly peasants were categorized into three agrarian classes – rich, middle, and poor 
peasants in addition to landless agricultural laborers who were at the very bottom of the rural hi-
erarchy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  PWG,	  which	  was	  the	  only	  Andhra	  faction	  that	  supported	  Charu	  Majumdar,	  never-­‐theless	  revised	  Majumder’s	  emphasis	  on	  a	  recipe	  for	  quick	  revolution	   in	   five	  years	  through	  secret	  annihila-­‐tion	  of	  class	  enemies	  and	  creation	  of	  red	  zones.	  	  
 	  
	  
130	  
The Maoists noticed that in semi-feudal Telangana of the 1970s and 1980s, the remaining 
landlords (dora) and rich peasants had identities and interests that were sharply juxtaposed to 
those of the rural poor. I argue how this very sharp polarization of identities and interests be-
tween castes created fertile ground for radical communists to unleash an unprecedented and po-
tent combination of grassroots activities and militant resistance in Telangana beginning in the 
1970s.  
Caste has always been an axis of mobilization by the Maoists in India, in the name of 
class politics. One of the strongest weapons in anti-feudal struggle has always been what Maoists 
call “social boycott.” As per tradition, the upper caste Hindus in Telangana, primarily the Vela-
mas, and to a lesser extent the Reddys in Telangana, abhorred manual labor. “Social boycott” 
was the first rebellious tactic employed in most villages and was often sufficient to bring the 
landlords to their knees. As part of this tactic, the backward castes, like Bayalu, Bestalu, and 
Chakali, refused to be palanquin bearers for the upper castes. The palanquins, locally called as 
pallakis or menas were chariots which were carried by men on their shoulders, and were popular 
means of long distance travel by the feudal aristocracy. The lower caste palanquin bearers re-
fused to run alongside the carts, and later the motorcars, of landlord families, as their path clear-
ers and escorts. Toddy-tappers refused to set aside five to 10 toddy trees daily for alcohol pro-
duction exclusively for the landlords’ families. Weavers refused to supply clothes to the land-
lords. Carpenters and blacksmiths refused to supply free agricultural implements to the landlords 
and provide free repairs. Washermen refused to wash clothes and cooking vessels, pound turmer-
ic and chilies, and cook in the houses of the Deshmukhs and village officials (Simhadri and Rao 
1997; K. G. Kannabiran 1992; K. Balagopal 1990). The Maoists re-invented the concept of so-
cial boycott used in India in Gandhian anti-colonial struggles. While doing so, the Maoists high-
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lighted the prevailing caste inequality and its inherent injustice which motivated the younger 
generation of backward castes and some of the progressive thinkers amongst the upper castes to 
rally in support of the Maoists.  
To the poor, low caste villagers, the social boycott was their revolution. They had learned 
to accept a hundred shoe-floggings if they as much as held their heads up in the presence of up-
per caste landowners. By challenging the entrenched social norms of upper caste domination, the 
Maoists enlisted the loyalty of the majority of backward caste and Dalit villagers. In addition to 
being an anti-feudal struggle, as the Maoist polemics portrayed the boycott as a strike by the 
productive workers struggling against “capital”. However, in reality the accumulated anger, frus-
tration of the lower castes against the misery & exploitation by the upper & middle castes was 
the driving force behind the spectacular success of the tactic of “social boycott”.   
Another remarkable phenomenon in this period of early mobilization in rural Telangana 
was revolutionizing the institution of “Panchayat.” As I have previously discussed in Chapter 2, 
Panchayat is a traditional village institution in the Telangana region, where any petty dispute is 
publicly adjudicated - with the landlord presiding, and, of course, passing judgment. With the 
emergence of the Maoists, panchayats were usurped, and Reddy landlords were unseated and put 
on public trial. Once the landlords were displaced, revolutionary peasants took over and put the 
landlords on trial. Shaken by the strength of the movement, a lot of landlords fled to the cities 
(Balagopal 2006).  
Another potent movement was also built around the abolition of unpaid forced labor ex-
tracted by upper castes from the lower, professional castes. The peasants, the dhobi (washer-
men), the shepherd, the barber, the toddy-tapper, and men, women, and children had to provide 
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unpaid services on customarily specified occasions. In addition, landlords routinely sexually 
abused the toiling class women. Lower caste men were not allowed to wear a shirt or shoes in the 
presence of the upper caste landlord. As a retired rebel confessed to me, it was unprecedented 
that a Madiga (the dominant untouchable caste in Telangana) could even look a Reddy in the 
eye. The customary punishment for such infringement of caste lines could entail anything from 
flogging to burning down houses and raping their women.  
Although the Maoists employed the class-based rhetoric, as in understood by Marxists,  
in all of their mobilization efforts, deeply entrenched caste divisions bonded the rural proletariat. 
Maoist campaigns like social boycott, overthrow of panchayats, and abolition of unpaid labor 
were instrumental in cementing grassroots organizations in rural Telangana. They were success-
ful insofar as they excited caste-based anger within the proletariat, and unified them against the 
common forward caste enemy class.  
4.4.3 Low Militancy of Reddy Landlords: Grassroots Mobilization of Maoists 
 
In this section I argue that the Maoists were able to consolidate mass organizations in 
Telangana because the rural elite was neither able nor willing to match Maoist military domina-
tion and area control. Whether peasants become revolutionary or not depends as much on the in-
terests and capacities of their class opponents as it does on the interests and capacities of the 
peasants themselves (Wolf 1969). Given their political clout and economic diversification (de-
layed Green Revolution), the adversarial class of Reddy landlords was unwilling to get trapped 
in violence and bloodshed to maintain their rural domination. Instead they preferred to migrate to 
urban areas and invest agricultural income in profitable enterprise in entertainment, education, 
and real estate (Prasad 2015; Simhadri and Rao 1997).  
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The rich elite in Telangana was divided, both socially and politically. The Do-
ra/Deshmukh (landlords) within the Reddy caste were opposed to the communists within the 
Reddys. The rural Hindus, who spoke Telugu and earned their incomes predominantly as land-
owners, had no history of cooperation with the rich Muslims, who spoke Urdu and earned their 
income and influence as notables in the court of Nizam in Hyderabad. The urban Hindus (Mul-
kis) and the rural Hindus (Reddys), both rich and upper caste, never sought to unite forces, de-
spite their common agitation against Nizam’s administrative reforms (Leonard and Weller 1980).  
Even when the Nizam threatened to overrun the Hindu estate of Gadwal, a symbolic patron of 
Hindu culture in the region, the rich Hindus could not unite. This was because urban rich Hindus 
disliked the feudal ways of Reddy rural notables as much as they despised the Muslim ruling 
class. The rural Reddys, in turn, historically maintained their distance from Hyderabad.  
  By the mid-1980s a class of rich capitalist farmers emerged in Telangana, mostly within 
the Reddy caste. This was influenced by the Green Revolution within Andhra Pradesh, and Tel-
angana actually trailed the Coastal Andhra region in reaping the benefit of this economic up-
swing. The abovementioned rich Reddy farmers dominated all kinds of agricultural transactions 
related to commissions, inputs, credit, and marketing of agricultural products. They also diversi-
fied their portfolio by investing in highways, road contracts, ports, airports, irrigation contracts, 
real estate, and SEZs (Special Economic Zones). They channeled huge surpluses into new agro-
based industries of aquaculture, large coconut farms, rice milling, and petty investments (for ex-
ample, in cinema halls, hotels, and restaurants) in semi-urban and urban towns in the region (K. 
Balagopal 1990). This class also reinvested its surplus in Hyderabad in various “new economy” 
enterprises (for example, shares in Information Technology and Pharmaceutical enterprises). 
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There was also significant investment in education (engineering and medical colleges) and health 
(private clinics and hospitals). 
Thus the rich peasant class found increasing opportunities for accumulation outside agri-
culture. In the literature on agrarian mobilization it has been argued that unless the upper-class 
non-cultivators derive their income exclusively from land they are unlikely to get locked in a ze-
ro-sum game in an agrarian conflict (Paige 1975). As the upper-class in the South was willing 
and able to plug themselves into capitalism, anti-Maoist resistance here, unlike that in the North, 
did not escalate into battles of life and death over economic control and political power over 
land. One important consequence of this was the increase in absentee landownership, higher ten-
ancy, and increased land rents, which have all complicated class–caste relations. 
In addition to fortified economic clout, the political clout of Reddy landlords also enabled 
them to earn considerable income by turning into brokers in various government development 
projects. Yet they did not act as ordinary brokers working for a share of profit, but instead the 
Reddy landlords reinvented themselves as “village elders” who negotiated with government and 
international development agencies on behalf of the villagers and graciously accepted “expens-
es” in return for their services (K. Balagopal 2007; K. Balagopal 1990). Thus the rich peasant 
class found increasing opportunities of accumulation outside of agriculture.  
Summing up, this section highlights two things: first, the Maoists established deep roots 
in the South by articulating class interests of the oppressed caste population, who they organized 
in defiant resistance against historically entrenched norms of oppression. The emergent pattern 
of Maoist mobilization in the South was contingent on social bases. Specifically a preceding an-
ti-Brahmin movement and a subsequent communist agrarian movement pushed the highest castes 
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(Brahmins) and the richest feudal lords out of rural Telangana by the fifties. This allowed PWG 
and other Maoist factions organizing in villages since the seventies to sharply polarize villages 
into anti-Maoist Reddy landowning peasants versus pro-Maoist Dalit landless peasants. Thus the 
Maoists created a cohesive insurgent organization united by shared anti-Reddy, anti-landlord 
identity and interests. Mindful of these underlying caste divisions, the southern Maoists whipped 
up moral outrage against deeply entrenched norms of caste oppression and socio-economic hier-
archies through campaigns like social boycott and the abolition of forced labor and public trials. 
They harped on the underlying economic logic of caste exploitation, inserting a vocabulary of 
class politics that was able to gloss over differences among various lower castes that comprised 
the rural proletariat. They built solid ties with and recruited heavily from the low caste/class ma-
jority in villages and formed a cohesive organization that combined mass mobilization with mili-
tarization. 
Second, this section also analyzed why the rural elites in the South, unlike their counter-
parts in the North, did not escalate militarily against the Maoists. I argue that faced with low mil-
itancy of landed opponents the Maoists were able to build insurgents’ social ties and power. Giv-
en the sharp polarization of the rural population along caste identity and class interests, as well as 
the established superiority of Maoist military tactic of area domination over the local elites, the 
Maoists in the South emerged victorious. However, the Maoist hegemony in the South cannot be 
understood without reference to the strong vertical and horizontal ties that they forged both local-
ly and beyond, which energized grassroots politics in the democracy-insurgency interface. The 
next section underlines the conditions under which a popular but banned insurgency paved the 
way for intensified civic participation within democracy. I show how everyday people in the 
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South lived one foot in democracy and one foot in a banned movement, carving out a Gray area 
where a robust and harmonic exit network facilitated high rebel retirement and reintegration.  
4.5	  Meso	  (Organizational)	  Factors:	  Horizontal	  and	  Vertical	  Ties	  	  
	  
As insurgent organizations navigate pre-existing social forces, they proactively forge ver-
tical and horizontal ties (Staniland 2014). The relative strength of these ties interacts variously 
with the social bases to produce different outcomes for insurgent organizations in their socio-
political contexts. Horizontal ties link rebel leaders, organizers, and the intellectual support base 
across space, embedded in formal organizations, informal relationships, or often in an overlap of 
the two. Below this firmament of horizontal ties are the local communities, neighborhoods, and 
villages where recruitment and retirement of rebels actually happen. Vertical ties refer to linkag-
es that the insurgent organization forges with these local communities. Unlike horizontal ties that 
travel across space, vertical ties are geographically rooted.  
In this section, I argue that the Maoists in the South built strong horizontal as well as ver-
tical ties. Unlike the Maoist groups in the North, the Maoists in the South , led by the PWG, did 
not consider mass fronts as revisionist, reformist, economistic, or counter revolutionar. I argue 
that when both horizontal and vertical ties are strong, insurgent organizations enjoy political cen-
tralization and organizational decentralization. In other words, though vertical ties give organiza-
tions an adequate mass base, horizontal ties balance the local emphasis, keep the organization 
autonomous from local divisions, and allow insurgent organizations to mobilize for broader 
goals. Thus vertical ties are the social anchors of the Maoist movement while horizontal ties are 
the sail that steered the organization to solicit local action even on non-local goals. The strong 
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vertical ties of the Maoist movement galvanized civic participation in democracy, thereby creat-
ing conditions favorable for the creation of harmonic exit networks.  
4.5.1 Strong Vertical Ties: Energizing Grassroots Democratic Politics  
 
Vertical ties are bonds of trust, information, and belief that link organizers to local com-
munities (Staniland 2012). The Maoists in the South built strong vertical ties by mobilizing on 
local issues and recruiting locally from the Dalit community. Although local leadership in Tel-
angana enjoyed autonomy in day-to-day mobilization and recruitment, the central committee and 
politburo of the Maoists had considerable control over the political agenda.  
Strong vertical ties mattered most crucially during the early stages of mobilization, when 
Maoists were most vulnerable and their enemies strong. In the villages, ordinary people either 
personally knew the local Maoist organizer or knew someone else in their social networks who 
personally knew them. Further, local insurgent leaders often belonged to the same or similarly 
placed caste group, which engendered trust. In other words, strong vertical ties provided the so-
cial basis for Maoist collective action, not only on local issues but also on non-local ones. They 
did so by using grassroots politics as a route to armed revolution.  
Grassroots politics was organized through two layers of mass fronts. The secret mass or-
ganizations were armed and were created to propagate revolutionary goals and recruit rebels. In 
contrast, the open mass organizations were unarmed and built pressure on the state through legal-
constitutional struggles on progressive issues. The latter offered a fertile recruiting ground for a 
large number of students, agricultural laborers, mineworkers, tendu leaf collectors, writers, intel-
lectuals, and teachers to join the movement and gave rise to the second generation of Maoist 
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leadership that currently leads the movement. PWG formed mass organizations in the South 
across every profession, from medical doctors, college professors, school teachers, artists, writ-
ers, journalists, students, mine workers, factor workers, construction workers, farm workers, and 
so on. 
Open mass organizations aligned to the PWG were eventually banned by the Indian state. 
But as the members of these fronts began to be targeted by the state, they abandoned those and 
started organizing under newer mass organizations. It is to be noted that none of the open mass 
organizations were armed or engaged in illegal activities. These organizations, however, as one 
Maoist leader put it to me, were their “ears on the ground,” which allowed them to adopt unique, 
locally suited strategies of mobilization that further reinforced vertical ties. 
Maoist recruitment policies reinforced vertical ties in the South. The Dalam members and 
commanders, even the area commanders, were all local. The district and state committee secre-
taries rose through extensive training in combat and in villages before they were promoted to 
leadership positions.  
4.5.2	  Strong	  Horizontal	  Ties:	  Supporting	  Networks	  Across	  the	  Rural-­‐Urban	  Divide	  
	  
Horizontal ties link people across space and connect different geographic and social sites. 
They link mobile individuals, who are drawn from diverse social and geographical locations and 
who are not pinned to a particular community but operate beyond them. Horizontal ties can be 
strong or weak, depending on the flow of information, bonds of normative obligations, shared 
political preferences, and capacity for collective action. Students, activists, government officials, 
politicians, and business elites, are generally enmeshed in horizontal ties. Strong horizontal ties 
help a movement get off the ground: they bolster communication, coordination, and cooperation 
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on movement issues, generate publicity, create a narrative of (in)justice around popular discon-
tent, give legitimacy to anti-state uprisings, and drastically undermine the ability of  the demo-
cratic state to crackdown on local rebellions.  
The Maoists forged connections among their various open front organizations. The mass 
upsurge of students in the Telangana region in the late 1970s rallied the South around various 
issues from rape in police custody, workers’ strikes, and the boycott of elections to protesting the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The student-youth teams of the Radical Students Union (RSU) 
in urban areas recruited the Radical Youth League (RYL) activists in rural areas. RSU-RYL ac-
tivists helped mobilize workers for the first State Conference of the, SIKASA (Singareni Karmi-
ka Samakhya), the union of the miners of the Singareni coalfields. Together with rural/peasants 
and urban/students, the Maoists integrated tens of thousands of miners in their working class 
movement.  
In addition to basic issues like a wage increase for agricultural laborers, safety standards 
for miners, abolition of unpaid labor, and the occupation of waste land and government land by 
landlords, the Maoists also mobilized on larger issues like police reform, human rights viola-
tions, (un)democratic culture, caste-based reservation, patriarchy, secularism, freedom of expres-
sion and assembly. In this way, they connected their local movements to broad issues of demo-
cratic privileges and constitutional rights of citizens.  
Since the early 1970s, the Indian state started responding to mass uprisings with police 
action that included extremes of torture and incarceration, unlawful detention, destruction of 
houses, despoliation of drinking water wells, vandalism and burning of crops, and framing rebels 
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for serious crime. “Encounter” killings83 by police were no longer exceptions; they were the 
norm (Venugopal 2007; K. Balagopal 1981). The Maoists did not retaliate in a similar fashion 
for a decade and a half, but once they executed a kidnapped policeman for the first time they 
could not take it back. The strongest horizontal ties were forged by the Maoists in opposition to 
police oppression. The Maoists’ urban auxiliary support bases, including democratic associa-
tions, critiqued the police excesses.  
One of the earliest and strongest organizations of civic participation in the state, the An-
dhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC), was born in 1973. Lawyers and professors in 
the organization primarily advocated for the rebels.84 The civil liberties organizations, APCLC 
among them, documented and publicized the excesses of the Indian state in conflict zones, at 
great personal risk to the activists responsible for this work. Although they mobilized legally, the 
civil rights activists were frequently arrested for confronting law enforcement. But they were al-
so immediately acquitted because prominent lawyers in the civil liberties organizations repre-
sented them. Many of the activists were themselves lawyers, who represented ordinary people 
when they were arrested for participating in protest marches or in suspected anti-state activities.  
The urban activists sympathetic to Maoist causes worked within the limits of legality. 
They networked with journalists, editors, filmmakers, poets, academics, bureaucrats, and demo-
cratic politicians, which garnered considerable visibility, sympathy, and support for the Maoist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Encounter	  killing	  refers	  to	  the	  extrajudicial	  execution	  style	  killing	  of	  an	  arrested	  person	  by	  the	  police	  and	  security	  forces,	  and	  staging	  it	  as	  the	  consequence	  of	  an	  armed	  confrontation.	  This	  is	  done	  to	  avoid	  the	  lengthy	  trials	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law,	  where	  the	  accused	  may	  walk	  away	  free	  or	  with	  a	  lesser	  sentence	  than	  the	  state	  would	  like.	  
84	  Various	  Maoist	   factions	   in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  formed	  their	  own	  respective	  Civil	  Liberties	  organizations.	  For	  example,	   the	   United	   Civil	   Liberties	   Organization	   was	   sponsored	   by	   the	   UCCRI-­‐ML,	   COC-­‐CPI(ML)	   and	   the	  APRCP.	  The	  UCCRI-­‐ML	  faction	  later	  floated	  its	  own	  civil	  liberties	  organization	  called	  the	  Organization	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Democratic	  Rights	   (OPDR).	   The	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  Civil	   Liberties	   Commission	   (APCLC)	   and	   the	  OPDR	  broadly	  represented	  the	  two	  different	  factions	  of	  the	  CPI(ML)	  	  in	  the	  state	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cause. These multi-pronged network players also recruited more approval for Maoist activities in 
their respective professional, caste, and religious organizations across Telangana. Thus through 
the eighties it became increasingly difficult for law enforcement in the South to wrongfully arrest 
or persecute the activists without attracting unfavorable media coverage and political sanctions.  
This extensive horizontal network sympathetic to Maoist politics also included prominent 
democratic actors, civil liberty activists who were always in the gray zone between democracy 
and insurgency, and insurgent leaders. Bureaucrats personally knew and admired the courage of 
some of the better known rebel leaders.85Journalists and editors were former guerrillas.86 Guerril-
las had family members in the ministry and state secretariat. Many prominent leaders in the cur-
rent Telangana state government, particularly those who came from the Joint Action Committee 
that was at the forefront of the movement for a separate Telangana, started their political careers 
in PWG or CP Reddy factions of the Maoists.87 The Maoists in Telangana also raised a new crop 
of women leaders, who left the movement to run well-known NGOs, join academia, become 
award-winning poets and writers, or become homemakers. It is fairly common in Telangana that 
the local MLA and Maoist leader went to school together. The Maoist leaders, articulately and 
consistently, publicized their political arguments in invited columns in popular vernacular news-
papers and magazines. Since the last five decades, the Economic and Political Weekly, the wide-
ly circulated and arguably the most respected academic journal on contemporary politics in In-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  For	  example,	  S.	  R.	  Sankaran,	  an	  IAS	  officer	  and	  former	  Principal	  Secretary	  of	  Social	  Welfare	  in	  Andhra	  Pra-­‐desh	  and	  Secretary	  to	  Union	  Ministry	  of	  Rural	  Development,	  was	  known	  to	  be	  widely	  respected	  by	  Maoists.	  Sankaran	  was	  instrumental	  in	  abolishing	  bonded	  labor	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh	  and	  was	  very	  close	  to	  the	  civil	  lib-­‐erty	   activists	   in	   the	   state.	   See,	   http://www.thehindu.com/todays-­‐paper/tp-­‐national/tp-­‐andhrapradesh/peoples-­‐ias-­‐officer-­‐sr-­‐sankaran-­‐no-­‐more/article818981.ece	  	  
86	  Allam	  Narayana,	  the	  editor	  of	  the	  largest	  vernacular	  newspaper,	  was	  a	  former	  PWG	  guerrilla.	  	  
87	   This	   is	   common	  knowledge	   to	   the	   local	  population.	   In	  my	   interviews	  with	   them,	  well	   known	   journalists,	  editors,	   professors,	   and	   politicians	   all	   acknowledged	   that	   they	   started	   their	   political	   careers	   in	   radical	   left	  politics.	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dia, regularly carries articles on Maoists which have been written by commentators sympathetic 
to the movement.  
Countless other civil society organizations targeting specific social justice issues operated 
in Telangana. The Revolutionary Writers Association, popularly known as Virasam from its Tel-
ugu acronym, is among the most well-known democratic platforms (K. Balagopal 1982).88 In-
spired by the Naxalbari and Srikakulam uprisings in the late 1960s, poets and writers like Sri Sri, 
Kutumba Rao, Varavara Rao, and Ramana Redely formed Virasam on July 4, 1970 (Venugopal 
2005). Virasam is an immensely influential organizational umbrella for intellectuals and academ-
ics in the state who assert that the very purpose of literature is liberation of the masses from ex-
ploitation. The Virasam poets, novelists, and academics created a popular and powerful com-
mentary in support of the Maoist struggle. Varavara Rao, a poet and professor, the figurehead of 
Virasam, is the current unofficial Maoist spokesperson in Telangana. He speaks regularly in in-
vited events at premier universities in New Delhi and elsewhere on various contemporary social 
and political issues. 
Another unique cultural organization in Telangana was Jana Natya Mandali (JNM) the 
Peoples’ Theatre Group). While Virasam spread the revolutionary message to urban, educated 
elites, JNM spread the tales of Maoists’ bravery and sacrifice to rural areas through folk songs 
and tales. JNM recruited high school and college students who used songs, dance, music, and 
plays as weapons to resist dominance and to liberate the masses from oppressive social relation-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Although	  started	  by	  Digambara	  poets	  who	  were	  opposed	  to	  all	  organized	  politics,	  Virasam	  is	  far	  from	  indif-­‐ferent	  to	  Maoist	  politics.	  The	  Progressive	  Writers	  Association	  (known	  as	  Abhyudaya	  Rachayitala	  Sangham,	  in	  short,	  Arasamin	  Telugu),	   formed	   in	  1943,	  was	   the	   intellectual	   predecessor	   of	  Virasam.	   	   This	   literary	   space	  emerged	  out	  of	  the	  anti-­‐feudal,	  anti-­‐colonial,	  and	  anti-­‐fascist	  struggles	  of	  the	  first	  Telangana	  peasant	  struggle	  of	  1946-­‐51.	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ships (Kumar 2010). Gummadi Vittal Rao, famous as “Gaddar,”89 is a cultural icon in Telangana. 
He is a balladeer, whose inimitable, folksy rendition of songs spread the message of social jus-
tice, revolution, struggle, and sacrifice to the illiterate and semi-literate population unreachable 
by print media.90  
Another example of a unique and influential organization in Telangana that has operated 
legally in democracy with strong ties to the Maoist movement is Amara Veerula Bandhumitrula 
Sangham (Committee for Martyrs’ Friends and Relatives, or CMAS). This pro-rebel organiza-
tion was created to recover and claim dead bodies of rebels killed by police. It works to compel 
the state to follow its own laws. The current state secretary of CMAS, who works in a state gov-
ernment department, negotiates with police that she described as both the perpetrator of atrocities 
and a harbinger of hope. A former Central Committee member of PWG was the honorary presi-
dent of the organization. 
Among many other prominent civil liberties and rights organizations in the Telangana re-
gion are the Human Rights Forum, the Civil Liberties Committee, and the Organization for Pro-
tection of Democratic Rights (OPDR), all of which are members of the Coordination for Demo-
cratic Rights Organizations (CDRO), a union of twenty civil liberties and democratic rights asso-
ciations in India. CDRO was formed to resist state repression of citizens’ resistance in 2007, and 
its members (in 14 states) meet four times annually. These organizations grew around the Maoist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  For	  Gaddar’s	  interview	  with	  NPR	  see	  http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5412138	  	  
90	  Through	  my	  interviews	  with	  JNM	  activists,	   I	   learned	  that	  they	  are	  talented	  one-­‐person	  troupes	  who	  sing,	  dance,	  and	  play	  instruments,	  and	  stitch	  every	  presentation	  with	  a	  narrative.	  They	  have	  revived	  ancient	  folk	  traditions,	   combined	   contemporary	   and	   extinct	  musical	   instruments.	   In	   the	   face	   of	   arrests,	   assassinations,	  and	  torture,	  these	  activists	  remained	  mostly	  unarmed,	  only	  wearing	  a	  toy	  wooden	  gun	  in	  defiance	  of	  law	  en-­‐forcement.	  Dapli	  Ramesh,	  a	  JNM	  activist	  I	  met	  with,	  described	  the	  martyrdom	  of	  his	  colleague,	  Sudarshan,	  in	  a	  song.	  Presented	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  martyr’s	  mother,	  the	  song	  touched	  upon	  her	  son’s	  academic	  bril-­‐liance,	  his	  selfless	  sacrifice	  of	  everything	  including	  his	   life	  for	  social	   justice,	  police	  atrocities,	  the	  betrayal	  of	  upper	  castes,	  and	  a	  call	   for	  people	  to	  resist	  and	  protest.	   JNM	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  effective	  recruitment	  and	  mobilization	  instruments	  of	  the	  Maoists	  in	  Telangana.	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movement and created a high degree of civic participation within the confines of democracy. 
One umbrella platform, the Committee for Concerned Citizens (CCC), brought together bureau-
crats, activists, academics, and politicians to organize the first and only peace talks between the 
state and Maoists in Andhra Pradesh in 2004. Thus the Maoists forged extensive horizontal and 
deep vertical ties with the community around it, which combined to create conditions favorable 
for a thriving associational culture. It is not exceptional that in their attempts to topple regimes, 
insurgents normally build more than just an army. It is also not uncommon that insurgent move-
ments engage in extensive construction of networks, alliances, and constituencies, with different 
organizational and governance arrangements tying together multiple groups and individuals.  
The Maoists, in turn, also extended issue-based support to democratic struggles of vari-
ous grassroots movements among women’s, professional, and caste organizations, with an aim to 
recruit and cultivate a section of leadership and opinion-makers within these movements who 
could push the agenda leftwards, create a crisis, and precipitate a confrontation that would ex-
pose state brutality. Thus were generated embedded horizontal networks of citizens within de-
mocracy who supported the extra-democratic endeavor of Maoists while simultaneously working 
in their respective capacities to demand greater political and administrative accountability91. 
Maoists also took sides, made statements, and nurtured sympathetic leadership on many locally 
salient issues within democratic politics, ranging from treatment of political prisoners, commer-
cialization of education, the women’s movement against illicit liquor, caste based reservation, 
etc. Within democracy, Maoist endorsements of individuals and associations became social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  As	  an	  example,	  in	  1983,	  soon	  after	  he	  won	  the	  elections	  to	  lead	  the	  first	  non-­‐Congress	  state	  government	  in	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  N.	  T.	  Rama	  Rao	  (NTR),	  the	  charismatic	  film	  star	  turned	  politician,	  reduced’	  the	  age	  of	  retire-­‐ment	  of	  government	  employees	  from	  58	  to	  55.	  This	  was	  a	  highly	  controversial,	  unpopular	  measure	  taken	  in	  the	  name	  of	  creating	  new	  employment	  opportunities	  for	  the	  youth	  and	  fighting	  institutionalized	  petty	  corrup-­‐tion	  by	  lower-­‐division	  clerks	  (K.	  Balagopal	  2011).	  As	  the	  powerful	  non-­‐gazetted	  officers	  association	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  protest,	  the	  Maoists	  openly	  supported	  and	  rallied	  with	  them.	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recognition of their personal integrity, progressive politics, and commitment to a more participa-
tory, accountable democracy.  
4.6	  Gray	  Areas	  in	  the	  Insurgency-­‐Democracy	  Interface:	  Civic	  Associations	  and	  
Informal	  Exit	  Networks	  
This section brings out how everyday interaction between insurgency and democracy in 
the South eventually carved out a Gray area between the legitimate and the illegitimate, where 
actors and issues comfortably straddled both realms, gradually dissolving the barriers between 
the two.  
 
Figure	  24	  
Gray Area in the Insurgency-Democracy Interface 
I illustrate the process of the emergence of informal exit networks in these Gray areas in 
the crucible of civic participation and grassroots democracy in Telangana. Born within radical 
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left politics in the region, both the Dalit and civil liberties movements migrated to democratic 
platforms. By focusing on the microdynamics of this protracted process of insurgent democratic 
transition of two major political movements in the South, I shed light on the ever-present but ob-
scure gray areas between banned insurgency and legitimate state politics. The processes of dem-
ocratic transition of insurgent issues, ideas, and individuals created enthusiasm at the grassroots 
level and strengthened democratic politics. These processes also fortified the fluid, porous, spon-
gy gray zone that encroached into democratic institutions and encompassed citizens, from ordi-
nary voters to elected representatives, and activists to law enforcement officials. It is in this 
leaky, spongy gray zone that harmonic exit networks flourished.	   
4.6.1	  Dalit	  Movement	  in	  the	  South:	  Carving	  out	  a	  Gray	  Zone	  in	  the	  Insurgency-­‐Democracy	  In-­‐
terface	  
	  
Although the Maoists’ mass base in Telangana was comprised mostly of Dalit landless 
laborers and mine workers, their strategy was not articulated explicitly in caste terms. However, 
the Maoists’ contribution in raising the political consciousness of Dalits has been recognized by 
all prominent Dalit leaders and activists in the state.92 In this section I trace the close proximity 
of Dalit and Maoist politics through the 1970s and 1980s and their eventual separation starting in 
the 1990s tracing it to the two landmark incidents of caste violence in the state: the Karamchedu 
Massacre in 1985 and the Chundur Massacre (also known as Chunduru and Tsunduru) in 1991.   
No account of contemporary politics in the South can skip reference to the Karamchedu 
Massacre in 1985. Karamchedu is a prosperous village in the Prakasham district in Coastal An-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  During	  my	  conversation	  with	  Dalit	  members	  of	  Jana	  Natya	  Mandali	  (JNM),	  they	  shared	  personal	  experienc-­‐es	  of	  how	  PWG	  in	  Telangana	  energized	  Dalits	  in	  their	  areas	  of	  influence	  and	  gave	  them	  the	  confidence	  to	  face	  their	  century-­‐old	  oppressors.	  Bojja	  Tarakam,	  founding	  member	  of	  Dalit	  Maha	  Sabha,	  acknowledged	  the	  Dalit	  movement;	  writings	  and	   lectures	  of	  Kathi	  Padma	  Rao	  and	  K.	  G.	  Sathyamurthy,	   two	  other	  Dalit	   leaders,	  also	  refer	  to	  the	  role	  of	  Maoists.	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dhra, rich from cotton and tobacco cultivation. It was, in fact, a bastion of mainstream left poli-
tics in the 1950s when the cultivator-landowners aligned with the early communists against the 
feudal landlords. The cultivator-landowners, in three decades, amassed enough land and wealth 
to attack the landless Dalit population, who were primarily of the Madiga caste, in the village, 
killing six men, raping three women, and seriously injuring many more. Terrified by the savage-
ry of this attack by men they knew through everyday interactions, the Dalits, with their blood 
splattered clothes still on, carrying their dead and injured with them, fled the village and flooded 
the nearby towns to seek sanctuary in a nearby church.93  
Karamchedu left an indelible mark on Dalit politics, although it was neither the first, nor 
the last Dalit massacre in the state. Eventually the Shibiram (refugee camp) where the Karam-
chedu victims built their temporary refuge camps became sites of consolidation of Dalit identity 
and its related movement in the South (Gudavarthy 2005). The primary goal of this new mobili-
zation was to assert autonomy of Dalit politics, from both mainstream political parties and Mao-
ist groups. 
Two Dalit leaders, one a government lawyer and the other a rationalist scholar, led the 
autonomous Dalit movement. Both of them had radical left, rationalist heritage, schooled in vari-
ous Maoist frontal organizations.94 But this new leadership raised slogans denouncing Maoist 
depiction of the Karamchedu massacre as another instance of class hostility of landlords against 
laborers. Based on reports of caste-based insults and abuses hurled on the Dalits during and after 
the attack, even by the relatively poor among the upper castes, they insisted on articulating the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  For	  details	  on	  events	   leading	  to	   this	  massacre	  of	  Dalits,	  see	   the	  APCLC	  report	  on	  the	   incident	   titled,	   “The	  Karamchedu	  Massacre:	  A	  Report”	  available	  at	  	  	  	  https://www.google.com/search?q=karmachedu+APCLC+1985&ie=utf-­‐8&oe=utf-­‐8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-­‐US:official&client=firefox-­‐a&channel=sb#	  accessed	  on	  October	  10,	  2014.	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caste dimension of brutality in unambiguous terms. Thus the new-found identity asserted by the 
Dalits challenged the Maoists’ rhetoric of class mobilization.95  
There were some concrete indicators of consolidation of Dalit leadership outside the in-
fluence of Maoist politics. In protest meetings, upper caste speakers of Maoist lineage, despite 
their supportive, pro-Dalit position, were not allowed to take the stage. Dalit leaders justified the 
move as an attempt to energize the base and engender a new “Dalit organic intelligentsia.”96 A 
new term was coined: “Dalit communists.” They used new slogans for the “New Dalit Demo-
cratic Revolution” both as a continuation of the Maoists’ goal of “New Democratic Revolution” 
and as a challenge to its exclusive focus on class character. Dalit leaders refused to remain mere 
flag bearers (jhanda mochetollu) of the Maoists. They raised the most publicized, damning criti-
cism of Maoists: They posited that Dalits were the cannon fodder in the Maoist movement; they 
faced hardships, torture, and death for the movement, but they were never offered leadership 
roles in the Party.  
Yet the Dalits’ association with the Maoists remained fraternal and strong. The All India 
Dalit Coordination Committee on Karamchedu included representatives from Maoist organiza-
tions. Gaddar, who was a popular Dalit balladeer and a prominent member of PWG, inaugurated 
the newly formed Dalit organization, Dalit Maha Sabha (DMS). DMS conducted statewide road-
blocks, silent marches, bandhs (general strikes), and rail roko (railroad obstructions) with active 
participation and support of PWG. DMS and PWG worked in symbiotic unison. When DMS at-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Dalits	  within	  PWG	  started	  asserting	  the	  need	  of	  a	  caste-­‐class	  reading	  of	  Karamchedu	  because	  it	  was	  a	  fact	  that	  poor	  kammas	  also	  joined	  the	  assault	  army.	  An	  APCLC	  report	  details	  how	  the	  kammas	  organizing	  the	  at-­‐tack	  insisted	  that	  anyone	  born	  to	  kammas	  must	  join	  if	  they	  wanted	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  village	  as	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  curb	  the	  growing	  insubordination	  and	  assertions	  of	  the	  lowly	  madigas.	  	  
96	  When	  PWG	  sent	  Gaddar	  and	  V.	  V.	  Rao	  as	   its	  representatives	   to	   the	  Shibiram,	  Dalit	  Maha	  Sabha	  (DMS)	  al-­‐lowed	  only	  Gaddar,	  a	  Dalit	  himself,	   to	  sit	  on	  dias;	  V.	  V.,	  a	  Brahmin,	  was	  not	  allowed.	  For	   further	  details	  see	  (Ilaiah	  1995).	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tempted but could not win the long drawn legal battles to seek conviction of the prime perpetra-
tors accused of the Karamchedu massacre, PWG killed the upper caste mastermind of the massa-
cre.97 This infused new life into the exhausted and previously unsuccessful Dalit activism.98  
Maoist influence was also apparent in the first manifesto of DMS. It defined “Dalits” not 
only as formerly untouchable castes but as all people subjected to various forms of structural vio-
lence, in continuation of the consciousness built by the southern Maoists. Like Maoists, DMS, in 
its early days, also stayed away from electoral politics. Instead they focused on building strength 
at the grassroots level and on legal constitutional struggles. Inspired by the Maoist model of  de-
veloping mass organizations, DMS created exclusively Dalit cultural platforms bringing together 
exclusively Dalit writers, singers, journalists, and poets to infuse the political ideology of Dr. 
Ambedkar, the Father of the Indian Constitution and the Dalit icon, among the masses.99 DMS 
also launched an influential journal, Nalupu (literally meaning, “The Black”), in 1991, with 
many Maoist intellectuals and civil liberties activists on the editorial board. During this time a 
Dalit revolutionary poet, K. G. Sathyamurthy, an erstwhile General Secretary and a founding 
leader of PWG resigned from the party and joined the Dalit movement. He formed the Marxist 
Leninist Center (MLC) and launched a journal called Edureetha (Swimming Against the Tide). 
Edureetha, described by editors as a journal of revolutionary politics, aimed at synthesizing 
Ambedkarism and Marxism and set the tone and tenor of the Dalit movement. It became a plat-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Court	  cases	  against	  Chenchu	  Ramaiah,	  the	  kamma	  landlord	  and	  chief	  accused	  of	  Karamchedu,	  dragged	  on.	  The	  government-­‐appointed	   judicial	   inquiry	   commission	  could	  not	   find	  a	   clear	   reason	  behind	   the	  massacre.	  The	  chief	  witness	  of	  Karamchedu,	  a	  woman	  named	  Alisamma,	  was	  murdered.	  	  
98	  After	  Karamchedu,	  the	  impunity	  of	  the	  kamma	  landlords	  demoralized	  Dalits.	   	  Kammas	  were	  protected	  by	  political	  connections	  to	  the	  ruling	  TDP,	  known	  statewide	  as	  a	  kamma	  party.	  Assertive	  Dalits	  were	  threatened	  with	  similar	  massacres	  as	  Karamchedu	  unless	  they	  backed	  down.	  With	  PWG	  killing	  Chenchu	  Ramaiah,	  Dalits	  were	  able	  to	  predict	  dire	  consequences	  for	  assaults	  against	  them.	  	  
99	  Bhimrao	  Ramji	  Ambedkar	  was	  an	  Indian	  jurist,	  economist,	  politician	  and	  social	  reformer	  who	  inspired	  the	  Dalit	   Buddhist	   movement	   and	   campaigned	   against	   social	   discrimination	   against	   Untouchables	   (Dalits).	   He	  was	  Independent	  India's	  first	  law	  minister	  and	  the	  principal	  architect	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  India.	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form for all progressive forces to critique the inability of revolutionary groups to integrate 
emerging caste and gender perspectives within their struggles. It also critiqued the Dalit move-
ment itself for neglecting land struggles and focusing solely on seeking concessions from the 
same upper caste state that perpetuates caste discrimination in the first place. These journals bear 
ample testimony to the thriving gray area between democracy and insurgency in Telangana, 
where rebel leaders, democratic rights activists, poets, and bureaucrats freely exchanged ideas 
for greater social justice and democratic accountability.  
Meanwhile, PWG was uncomfortable with the idea of merging the ideologies of 
Ambedkar and Mao. They were keen to co-opt the DMS as one of the Maoists’ mass move-
ments, metaphorically referred to as ‘a stream that flows back into the ocean.’ (Gudavarthy 
2013). When that did not happen, the Maoists attacked DMS for its reformist, petty-bourgeois 
leadership and ideology.100 By the early 1990s, however, some Dalit leaders started arguing that 
political power for Dalits and active state intervention in their favor was necessary to fight the 
specific forms of oppression that they faced. Maoists insisted that the Dalit movement stay away 
from electoral politics, which they did until the Chundur massacre in 1991 in Guntur district 
where the Reddys, both rich and small peasants, slaughtered Dalits in a planned assault of ex-
treme brutality.  
Post-Chundur, the forward castes aggressively defended the massacre as self-defense 
against the Dalits. During this time, the central government in New Delhi was trying to imple-
ment increased reservation for Dalits and Backward castes in government jobs and public uni-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  They	  were	  particularly	  wary	  that	  a	  Dalit	  autonomous	  struggle	  exaggerating	  caste	  differences	  would	  split	  PWG	   just	   like	   it	  did	  rival	  Maoist	  group	   Janashakti	   into	  groups	   like	  CPI(ML)	   Janashakti	   (Rajanna),	  CPI	   	   (ML)	  Janashakti	  	  (Veeranna)	  and	  the	  May	  17th	  	  Group.	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versities.101 As various Dalit castes organized towards a common cause, the Reddys also led the 
formation of an upper caste coalition, calling it “Sarvajanabhyudaya Porata Samiti” (Struggle 
Committee for the Advancement of All People), countering the affirmative concessions granted 
to the Dalits and the OBCs. They organized sit-ins, strikes, processions, and road-blocks to pub-
licize the “injustice” done to them.102 The DMS and Maoists, both in favor of affirmative action 
for the Dalits, were depicted as violent and casteist.  
With the Mandal Commission and upper caste counter-mobilization, DMS leaders felt 
compelled to seek legitimacy within democracy by distancing themselves from the banned Mao-
ists. Platforms like Edureetha abandoned their initial attempts at Ambedkar-Mao synergy and 
demanded that leadership positions in Maoist parties be surrendered to Dalits immediately. There 
were demands for affirmative action within the Maoist party itself. Dalit leaders openly doubted 
the intent and politics of PWG as long as its leadership remained urban, upper-caste, educated, 
and male who joined the movement from elite colleges.103 Incidentally, it took PWG 13 years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  The	  Mandal	  Commission	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1978	  to	  identify	  the	  socially	  or	  educationally	  backward	  classes	  to	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  seat	  reservations	  and	  quotas	  for	  people	  to	  redress	  caste	  discrimination.	  The	  commis-­‐sion	  submitted	  the	  report	  to	  the	  president	  on	  December	  30,	  1980.	   In	  1989,	  New	  Delhi’s	  V.	  P.	  Singh	  govern-­‐ment	  set	  out	  to	  implement	  its	  recommendation	  of	  a	  27%	  reservation	  quota	  for	  OBC	  resulting	  in	  a	  total	  quota	  of	  49.5%	  in	  government	  jobs	  and	  public	  universities.	  This	  led	  to	  frenzied	  protests	  with	  instances	  of	  open	  self-­‐immolation.	  	  
102	  They	  raised	  slogans	  like	  'long	  live	  unity	  of	  the	  forward	  castes',	  'those	  who	  beg	  every	  morsel	  of	  food	  should	  not	  be	  arrogant,'	  'beggars	  should	  behave	  beggar-­‐like,’	  etc.,	  slogans	  which	  are	  the	  staple	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Dalit	  mobi-­‐lization	  post-­‐Chundur.	  They	  talked	  about	  the	  oppression	  suffered	  by	  forward	  castes	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Dalits	  in	  the	  villages.	  
103	  The	  Naxal	  groups	  staunchly	  rejected	  the	  demand	  initially,	  arguing	  that	  this	  call	   for	  representation	  in	  the	  Maoist	   leadership	  was	   planned	   sabotage	   launched	   by	   ambitious,	   educated	  urban	  Dalits,	   also	   known	   as	   the	  “creamy	  layer,”	  who	  had	  struck	  a	  deal	  with	  feudal	  classes	  to	  sell	  out	  the	  rural,	  poor	  Dalits.	  Eventually	  the	  PWG	  relented	  and	  decided	  that	  should	  there	  be	  an	  opening	  within	  the	  party	  for	  a	  leadership	  position	  and	  the	  con-­‐tenders	  were	  a	  Dalit,	  a	  woman,	  or	  an	  upper-­‐caste	  individual,	  preference	  would	  be	  given	  to	  Dalits	  and	  women.	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after Karamchedu to sanction a mass organization (Kula Nirmulana Porata Samithi, or KNPS) 
that explicitly recognized “annihilation of caste” as its goal.104  
In 1993 a backward caste and Dalit party alliance of Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan 
Samaj Party (BSP) in the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh raised hopes among Dalit forces in 
the South.105 In 1994 the autonomous Dalit movement in the South entered electoral politics as 
well (Srinivasulu 2002).106 They wanted to remedy the powerlessness they encountered during 
the crucial 1989 State Assembly elections and 1991 Lok Sabha elections, in which DMS, despite 
their immense popularity among the majority of the population, was excluded from any agenda 
setting in local politics. In the 1994 Assembly elections, DMS struck an electoral alliance with 
the BSP and promised new pro-Dalit policies. 
However, BSP could not win a single seat in the South during the 1994 Assembly elec-
tions, though it contested in 218 constituencies.107 The post-1994 despondency saw many 
schisms in the Dalit movement and a new phase of intra-Dalit rivalry (Balagopal 2000; 
Haragopal and Balagopal 1998).108 The Dalit movement in Andhra Pradesh reached its nadir in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  PWG,	  as	  can	  be	  expected,	  refused	  to	  treat	  Dalit	  issues	  as	  unique	  and	  autonomous	  from	  other	  inequalities	  and	  discrimination	   against	   impoverished	   sections	  of	   society.	   Thus	   annihilation	  of	   caste	  was	   included	   in	   its	  agenda	  against	  privatization,	  welfare	  cuts,	  delay	  in	  court	  cases	  on	  atrocities	  against	  Dalits	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  
105	  The	  DMS	  leader,	  Bojja	  Tarakam,	  proposed	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  BSP.	  The	  public	  meetings	  held	  by	  the	  BSP	  in	  Hyderabad,	  Vishakapatnam,	  and	  Nalgonda	  in	  the	  early	  months	  of	  1994	  witnessed	  huge	  popularity	  among	  Da-­‐lits.	  All	  prominent	  Dalit	  leaders	  of	  Andhra	  Pradesh,	  including	  Kathi	  Padma	  Rao	  and	  K.G	  Satyamurthy,	  attend-­‐ed	  BSP	  chief	  Kansi	  Ram’s	  public	  address.	  
106	   The	   formation	  of	  PPP,	   announced	  by	  Padma	  Rao	  without	   any	   consultation	  with	   the	   rank	  and	   file	   of	   the	  DMS,	   attracted	   resentment	   from	   the	  DMS	   cadre.	   It	   also,	   as	  DMS	   activists	   narrate,	   led	   to	   an	   intense	   debate	  among	  them	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  was	  an	  opportune	  moment	  to	  take	  such	  a	  step.	  	  
107	   In	   fact,	   all	   except	   one	   candidate	   lost	   their	   deposits.	  Only	   12	   candidates	   secured	  more	   than	  5,000	   votes.	  What	  contributed	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  BSP	  to	  take	  off	  in	  state	  politics	  were	  the	  internal	  differences,	  the	  inabil-­‐ity	  of	  Kanshi	  Ram	  to	  coordinate	  and	  evolve	  an	  appropriate	  strategy,	  and,	  more	  significantly,	  the	  failure	  to	  cut	  into	  the	  hegemonic	  politics	  of	  the	  dominant	  parties	  in	  the	  state.	  
108	  The	  Malas	  were	  concentrated	   in	   the	  coastal	  districts	  and	   the	  Madigas	  were	  a	  numerical	  majority	   in	  Tel-­‐angana.	  Due	   to	   Christian	  missionary	   efforts,	   exposure	   to	   the	   process	   of	  modernization	   in	   the	  British-­‐ruled	  Madras	  Presidency,	  and	  overall	  development	  in	  coastal	  Andhra,	  the	  Malas	  have	  historically	  been	  ahead	  of	  the	  Madigas.	  As	  a	  result	   they	  could	  benefit	   from	  the	  special	  provisions	  provided	  for	  the	  SCs	  and	  gained	  greater	  presence	  in	  education,	  employment,	  and	  politics.	  This	  situation	  has	  been	  presented	  by	  the	  MRPS	  as	  the	  result	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(year).109 In subsequent years Dalit politics within democracy moved more and more towards 
assertion of cultural identity, demands for dignity, recognition, and representation. This was an 
acceptable, legitimate, and even privileged rhetoric within democracy. 
As the Dalit movement gained ascendancy within legitimate democratic politics, it legit-
imized former Maoists. In its gradual transition from insurgent to democratic politics between 
1985 and 1994, the Dalit movement in the South carved out an expansive, porous Gray zone be-
tween insurgency and democracy. Dalit activists, while contesting elections, broadcast their sup-
port of Maoists openly. Maoists wrote in popular magazines and newspapers about their com-
mitment to revolutionary goals and violent means. During these ten years, insurgency was nor-
malized as politics by other means. Many Dalit cadres of PWG transitioned into legitimate poli-
tics and activism with their commitment to insurgency intact. The next section highlights how 
the civil liberties movement also cut its umbilical cord to Maoist movement and asserted its au-
tonomous status within democracy, further energizing and legitimizing the democracy-
insurgency interface in the South.   
4.6.2 Civil Liberties Movement in the South: Fortifying the Gray Zone  
 
The history of civil liberties in Telangana is complex and widely debated (Shah 2013; 
Sundar 2013; Gudavarthy 2008; Singh 2005), particularly the issue of its convergence with left 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  of	   the	  Malas	  cornering	   the	  benefits	  of	  SC	  reservations,	   in	  disproportion	   to	   the	  size	  of	   their	  population;	   this	  was	  projected	  to	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  Madigas’	  deprivation.	  The	  MRPS	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  legitimate	  and	  pro-­‐portionate	  share	  for	  the	  Madigas.	  
109	  The	  1994	  Assembly	  elections	  also	  witnessed	  the	  poaching	  of	  another	  core	  area	  of	  ML	  groups	  by	  the	  unlike-­‐ly	  competitor,	  TDP.	  TDP,	  the	  party	  of	  Kamma	  privilege,	  in	  sheer	  twist	  of	  irony,	  pursued	  a	  strategy	  of	  class	  mo-­‐bilization	  against	   the	  BSP-­‐DMS	  caste	   strategy.	  TDP	   strategy	  promised	  prohibition,	  Rs2	  per	  kilo	  of	   rice,	   and	  subsidization	  of	  the	  power	  supply	  to	  farmers.	  The	  anti-­‐liquor	  movement	  by	  women,	  which	  gained	  state-­‐wide	  prominence,	  originated	  from	  within	  ML	  tradition	  and	  subsidization	  of	  rice	  and	  power	  was	  particularly	  attrac-­‐tive	  to	  the	  poor,	  both	  urban	  and	  rural.	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radical politics and commitment to constitutional guarantees in India. However, there is one 
overarching consensus: there was a two-way flow of activists from the civil liberties organiza-
tions into Maoist groups and vice-versa in the 1970s and 1980s. Some activists in the civil liber-
ties movement decided to work within confines of constitutional methods, like filing motions in 
courts, petitioning the human rights commission, and talking extensively about it in popular me-
dia, while the more radical ones found common cause with the Maoists. 
The civil liberties movement and Maoist politics in the South matured hand in hand 
through the 1970s and 1980s.110 The Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC) was 
created to organize fact-finding committees on “encounter deaths,” lock-up deaths, custody rape, 
and caste atrocities, and to provide legal assistance to arrested Maoist activists. Leading APCLC 
members have written extensively and eloquently on topics like police excesses, use of torture in 
prison, domestic violence, rape, molestation, dowry deaths, and other atrocities; abolition of 
child and bonded labor; suppression of worker’s rights such as denial of minimum wages; caste 
discrimination and people’s right to resistance.  
APCLC actively and successfully projected the Maoist mobilization of people’s struggles 
into the theatre of legitimate democratic politics. APCLC had an organizational set-up in all 23 
districts of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh, although it was most active in the Telangana region. By 
exposing caste discriminations and feudal exploitation, and fake encounter and custody deaths, 
which violated professed democratic ideals, APCLC helped expose the brutal, extra-legal ex-
cesses of police, the delays and denials of justice in courts, the upper-caste, elitist membership of 
the mainstream political parties, the developmental imbalances among different regions, abys-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  In	  its	  second	  state	  level	  convention,	  held	  in	  Warangal	  on	  in	  May	  1980,	  the	  APCLC	  	  manifesto	  	  declared	  	  that	  its	  primary	  purpose	  was	  to	  struggle	  for	  	  the	  protection	  	  of	  	  democratic	  	  rights,	  strengthen	  	  peoples'	  	  right	  	  to	  	  struggle	  against	  feudal	  	  landlords,	  capitalists	  	  and	  	  state	  	  machinery,	  	  and	  condemn	  	  police	  	  excesses	  	  and	  	  vio-­‐lations,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  in	  synergy	  with	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  Naxal	  movement	  (Gudavarthy	  2013).	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mally low minimum wages, the landlord-moneylender feudal exploitation, all of which lend 
credibility to the militant mobilization of Maoists. All of these attracted the wrath of the estab-
lishment (Thomas 2014; Sundar 2013). But it also won them a seat in the table in any discussion 
on tackling the spread of Maoist movement. 
However, after the Karamchedu massacre in 1985, human rights organizations became 
discredited when they failed to bring the upper-caste perpetrators to justice through legal and 
constitutional means. It was during this time in the mid-1980s, that the Maoists began militariz-
ing, much to the discomfort of leading civil liberties activists who found it difficult to accept 
Maoists’ violation of the right to life and dignity, acting with the same impunity as the state111.  
APCLC intervened on two other issues of conflict with the Maoists. First, Dalit leaders 
sought their intervention when Maoists started killing villagers, almost all members of Dalit and 
backward communities, as suspected “police informers.” Hundreds of Dalits quit the Maoist 
movement after Karamchedu in 1985. They became vulnerable to police intimidation in villages. 
Unlike the urban educated leaders who could promptly reintegrate into the mainstream by taking 
up respectable positions in academia, media, and social movements, rural Dalits were left unpro-
tected. Second, women’s rights activists raised issues of discrimination and abuse against women 
within Maoist groups. Individual accounts of sexual harassment of women comrades within the 
Maoist Party caused furor among the urban support base of the movement. Prominent activists 
demanded fact-finding missions by civil liberty activists who, so far, have only looked into cases 
of violation of women and Dalits by the democratic state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  As	  an	  example,	  in	  January	  1993,	  PWG	  kidnapped	  a	  tribal	  elected	  legislator	  and	  the	  APCLC	  declared	  in	  a	  formal	  statement	  that	  kidnapping	  democratically	  elected	  leaders	  as	  means	  of	  struggle	  was	  no	  different	  from	  illegal	  detention;	  they	  condemned	  both	  (Kannabiran	  1993).	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As the criticism came from within sympathetic camps, and as Maoists pushed back 
against such investigations claiming that such issues were an internal matter of their party, the 
rift between the Maoists and civil liberty activists widened.112 With increasing militarization of 
the Maoist struggle in the 1990s, many prominent civil liberties activists found the violence by 
rebels problematic, indefensible, and indistinguishable from state violence. Both bled the com-
mon people dry (Haragopal and Balagopal 1998).113   
Finally influential members of APCLC quit and formed the Human Rights Forum (HRF) 
in October 1998. This group reserved the right to mobilize public opinion against every “viola-
tion or denial of rights [that] arises in all situations of structured oppression and inequality.”114 
HRF refused to treat rebel violence as exceptional or distinct from state, or dominant caste, vio-
lence. The Maoists lost the uncritical support of prominent activists in a widely publicized split 
from the civil liberty movement in the South. These activists, who always straddled between the 
state and rebel movements, by critiquing the rebels and asserting their autonomy, gained greater 
credibility with diverse actors within the state. However, the tie between the Maoists and civil 
liberty activists was not entirely broken.  
As HRF executed a very public break-up from the Maoist movement, the Committee for 
Concerned Citizens (CCC) entered the scene around the same time. In 1997 “a group of citizens 
of undisputed high moral standing” formed CCC with the aim to mediate peace talks between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  I	  met	  several	  women	  activists	  who	  narrated	  their	  own	  experiences,	  or	  those	  of	  their	  mothers,	  sisters,	  and	  other	  family	  members	  within	  ML	  groups,	  notably	  PWG.	  They	  confided	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  abuse	  by	  top	  lead-­‐ers.	  In	  addition,	  traditional	  gender	  roles	  were	  enforced	  even	  in	  forests,	  where	  women	  guerrilla,	  not	  men,	  were	  expected	  to	  cook	  and	  care	  for	  the	  wounded.	  Women	  were	  also	  routinely	  required	  to	  undergo	  risky	  surgeries	  to	   prevent	   the	   possibility	   of	   having	   children.	   I	   also	  met	   a	   journalist,	   whose	  mother,	   a	  well-­‐known	  woman	  guerrilla,	  had	  to	  abandon	  her	  as	  a	  newborn	  child	  (father	  was	  a	  respected	  leader	  in	  the	  Srikakulam	  uprising).	  The	  party	  took	  the	  newborn,	  and	  gave	  her	  to	  an	  unknown	  childless	  couple	  in	  an	  area	  of	  struggle,	  without	  tell-­‐ing	  the	  parents	  who	  had	  their	  child.	  	  	  	  
113	  Another	  problem	  pointed	  out	  with	  systematic	  violence	  used	  as	  a	  method	  of	  struggle	  was	  that	  it	  created	  a	  gap	  between	  the	  leaders	  and	  the	  led,	  with	  the	  led	  losing	  all	  say	  in	  crucial	  decision	  making.	  
114	  See	  http://humanrightsforum.org/	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Andhra Pradesh state government and Maoists (Mander 2004). The CCC was convened by S. R. 
Sankaran, a retired Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officer who was respected for his con-
tributions towards social justice for marginalized people, his personal integrity, humanity, and 
the austerity of his lifestyle. The committee included prominent lawyers, academics, and journal-
ists with years of experience in civil liberty activism and high name recognition in Telangana.115  
Top leaders from PWG, and the other dominant Maoist faction, Janashakthi, attended the 
meetings convened by the CCC The then home minister of Andhra Pradesh led the peace talks 
between the state and the Maoists116 It took six years for CCC to finally convince both state and 
Maoist representatives to agree to a cease-fire and sit across the table for the first time. The peace 
talks broke down in 2005. However, the CCC peace talks further fortified the gray area in the 
insurgency-democracy interface in Telangana. By asserting its independence from both the state 
and Maoist rebels, while enjoying access to both, CCC established a new trend of active citizen 
mediation between rebels and the state. CCC was able to bring warring sides to the table and 
generate an enormous landslide of public support for their endeavor, most visibly demonstrated 
in thousands of letters to editors of local newspapers. The letters to the editor not only lauded the 
CCC members’ considerable reputation, but also its open commitment to hold the rebels and the 
state equally accountable to the same democratic and moral principles in evaluating acts of vio-
lence (Sankaran 2002). Thus CCC virtually sealed the identity of impartial interlocutors, sympa-
thetic to rebels and committed to democracy, critical of failings on both sides. This went a long 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115	  Other	  members	  of	  CCC	  included	  K.	  G.	  Kannabiran,	  the	  National	  President	  of	  the	  People's	  Union	  of	  Civil	  Lib-­‐erties	  and	  a	  well-­‐known	   lawyer,	  G.	  S.	  Hargopal,	   a	  political	   science	  professor	  and	  active	   in	   the	  civil	   liberties	  community,	  D.	  Narasimha	  Reddy,	  an	  economics	  professor,	  Venkateswara	  Rao,	  veteran	  journalist	  editor,	  and	  K.	  Jayashankar,	  a	  former	  vice-­‐chancellor.	  In	  its	  early	  years,	  the	  committee	  was	  assisted	  by	  another	  journalist,	  Anatakrishna.	  
116	  Home	  Minister	  K.	  Jana	  Reddy	  led	  the	  official	  delegation,	  which	  included	  three	  more	  ministers	  -­‐-­‐	  Dharmana	  Prasada	  Rao,	  D.	  S.	  Redya	  Naik,	  and	  Koneru	  Ranga	  Rao.	  Others	  on	  the	  official	  team	  were:	  Paladugu	  Venkat	  Rao,	  T.	  Purushottama	  Rao,	  K.	  Keshav	  Rao,	  and	  Marri	  Sashidhar	  Reddy	  (all	  former	  ministers),	  and	  the	  Tirupati	  Ur-­‐ban	  Development	  Authority	  chairman,	  K.	  Karunakar	  Reddy.	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way in encouraging ordinary people at the grassroots level, who straddled both worlds of rebel 
and democratic politics to come out in the open. As a consequence, elected representatives 
agreed to sit with the representatives of the banned rebel groups without a precondition to sur-
render arms. The Indian government lifted a 12 year ban on Maoists and both sides implemented 
cessation of hostilities. CCC encouraged ordinary people to seize the initiative by doing the same 
at the grassroots level. Thus, the CCC established that ordinary people could be patriotic citizens 
while also recognizing the Maoist contribution to social justice and democratic accountability. 
CCC also communicated to Maoists that criticism and disagreement with the rebels did not war-
rant targeted assassination as enemies of revolution. The organization made a broad-based effort 
to move the debate away from violence-counter violence to democratic aspirations of the people, 
validating the need of a thriving gray zone, where people can offer unyielding criticism of police 
excesses while also condemning the insurgents for relentless violence against common people.  
CCC initiatives did not take root in a vacuum. The thriving associational life, comprising 
multiple rights, kinship, and professional organizations, backed it. The Maoist movement pene-
trated social and political life in the South so completely that there was not one voluntary organi-
zation, NGO, political movement, media house, academic institution, village, town, or adminis-
trative department that did not have individuals who consider themselves former Maoist, Maoist 
sympathizer, or know a close family member or friend who was one.117  
Finally, I argue that democratic and extra-democratic actors collaborated seamlessly in 
the South in the physical space created by legal civic associations, the sprouting of which were 
largely influenced by the Maoist politics. Further, in the South, the Maoists established a dedi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Several	  people	  I	  met	  in	  Telangana,	  from	  Dalits	  in	  villages	  to	  intellectuals	  and	  bureaucrats,	  asserted	  this	  in	  various	  ways.	  In	  my	  own	  assessment,	  there	  is	  not	  one	  women’s	  organization,	  single-­‐issue	  political	  movement,	  NGO,	  media	  house,	  cultural	  organization,	  professional	  organization,	  university	  campus	  that	  does	  not	  have	  any	  Maoist	  connection.	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cated following among poor landless Dalits/backward castes and maintained military superiority 
over the private militia of the landlords of the upper castes. In their formidable network of hori-
zontal and vertical ties, multiple actors collaborated in an amalgam of roles and alliances to carve 
out, fortify, and expand a flourishing Gray zone between insurgency and democracy.  
Summing up, this section argues that the Maoist movement energized the grassroots level 
in the South by nurturing many voluntary associations within democracy. Many of these organi-
zations served as their fronts, advocating progressive politics, pursuing legal/constitutional 
struggle on movement issues, and keeping Maoist issues alive within democratic politics. The 
Maoists also took a stand on significant issues in local politics, and their approval/opposition on 
issues like the separate Telangana movement, commercialization of education, etc. had consider-
able impact on the final outcome of these issues within democracy. In other words, the extra-
democratic political clout of Maoists always played an important role in setting preferences and 
determining outcomes within democratic politics in Telangana. Successive generations of politi-
cians in national and regional parties sought Maoist approval for electoral victory.  
4.7	  Harmonic	  Exit	  Network	  in	  Telangana:	  Actors	  and	  Processes	  
	  
In this section, I demonstrate how a “harmonic” exit network in the South weaved to-
gether multiple stakeholders in an amalgam of roles and alliances, who worked in sync to build 
momentum for exit and managed myriad uncertainties of reintegration. These stakeholders, con-
nected in a web of cross-cutting networks of identity and interests, are made up of two kinds of 
actors: Reintegration Stewards at the lower/local level and the Movement Entrepreneurs at the 
upper/state level.   
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Movement Entrepreneurs (ME) are highly visible, geographically and socially mobile 
opinion makers, who share political preferences and normative commitments, control the flow of 
information and coordinate collective action in conflict zones. They maintain one foot in democ-
racy and one foot in the banned resistance movement and claim limited autonomy from both. 
Civil liberty activists, poets, balladeers, bureaucrats, professors, and lawyers in conflict zones, 
those whose public reputation is tied to their position vis-à-vis the Maoist movement, qualify as 
MEs. Through the leaky walls the state erects around rebels, political actors on both sides are 
tied to the MEs. They may share pre-war social ties with both rebel leaders and democratic poli-
ticians/bureaucrats; for example, they might have grown up together in the same village, trained 
together in college, or belonged to the same caste group/extended family. The ties may grow out 
of personal acquaintance, through shared political vision. MEs emerge as influential middle 
grounds or voices of conscience between the state and rebels. On the one hand, they nurture a 
nascent movement and drum up support for rebel causes. On the other hand, they also critique 
rebel excesses and concurrently nudge the frontiers of democracy bit by bit. Eventually (and in-
advertently) MEs generate a whirlwind of debates and critiques around resistance that sucks core 
constituents out of rebel movements into democratic platforms.  
As they generate a powerful impetus for exit within rebel organizations, Reintegration 
Stewards (RS) resolve crucial last-mile problems in the process of rebel retirement. RS emerge 
from the local social base of the insurgency, and they are geographically embedded. Employed in 
diverse occupations like law enforcement, district courts, coal mines, village administration, 
primary school, political party, local mafia, or rural health centers, these everyday people weave 
a bulwark of all local stakeholders in rebel return through an informal but effective system. RS 
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compensate for the institutional lack of credible commitment locally by ensuring that retired re-
bels are not killed.   
The pro-social cooperation between RS and ME that dominates harmonic exit networks 
did not develop overnight. As described above, through the evolution of Dalit and civil liberties 
movement, a popular rebel movement and a strong grassroots democracy co-evolved to produce 
a robust Gray area in their interface. As various civic associations based on gender, caste, and 
professional identities sprouted out of the radical left camp, everyday people in these associa-
tions had democratic credentials as well as insurgent connections required to guarantee safe pas-
sage for returning rebels. Thus social networks in civic associations offered the crucible for the 
working of an informal exit network made of everyday people. Locally, they compensated for 
the lack of credible commitment in democratic institutions, ensuring that returning rebels were 
not killed as soon as they disarmed. The civic associations provided the physical space and or-
ganizational resources, and the leadership that built the trust and allowed disbursement of side 
payments, both of which are crucial ingredients for the smooth functioning of harmonic exit 
network.  
4.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explains the emergence of harmonic exit networks in the South. It builds a 
historicized understanding of a popular insurgency that takes into account how pre-war social 
bases determine the strength of insurgent vertical and horizontal ties, and how these ties set the 
context for rebel retirement and reintegration. The example of migration of Dalit and of civil lib-
erties movement actors out of the insurgent into democratic platforms shows how a popular rebel 
movement, inadvertently perhaps, strengthens grassroots civic participation within a democracy. 
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That such migration did not obfuscate their insurgent origin is a testimony to the vigor and ro-
bustness of Maoist mass mobilization. As people and popular issues migrated out of rebel poli-
tics in the South, they legitimized the insurgency and further bonded the realms of rebel and 
state. It is in these realms of state/insurgent convergence, that harmonic exit networks thrive 
through communication and collaboration among everyday people. High rebel retirement in the 
South is contingent on these informal exit networks.  
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Chapter	  5:	  Rebel	  Retirement	  in	  the	  North:	  Emergence	  of	  a	  Discordant	  Ex-­‐
it	  Network	  	  
5.1	  Introduction	  
 
Rebel retirement is very low in the North, and their reintegration into the mainstream is se-
verely restricted too. The total number of rebel surrender cases in the North, including in the 
states of Jharkhand and West Bengal, between 2005 and 2014 is about one-sixth of that in the 
southern state of Andhra Pradesh.118 Moreover, former rebels in the South have reintegrated 
into various roles from farmers, bus drivers, and homemakers to journalists, insurance agents 
and professors both in the rural and urban areas. In contrast, the only post-retirement career op-
tion for former rebels in the North is electoral politics, either as candidates or as strong-arms 
hired by political parties to manipulate electoral outcomes. Between national, state and local 
elections, they also leverage their fearsome guerrilla past to coax communities to vote for a cer-
tain candidate and not others, or even broker real estate deals in exchange for hefty side pay-
ments.  
While post-retirement livelihood of northern Maoists is often contingent on instilling fear into 
ordinary people, they also live in fear themselves. The Maoist party in the North has often circu-
lated death warrants if the rebels decided to quit. On the other hand, the state governments have 
also announced hefty bounties on Maoists if they did not quit. 119 Some have been brutally 
killed, by the Maoists, police, and by the mafia that has a strong hold over the coalfields and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  According	  to	  the	  2011	  census,	  Jharkhand	  (literally	  meaning,	  bush	  land)	  is	  recorded	  as	  74677	  sq.	  kilometers	  
(28833	  sq.	  miles)	  and	  it	  has	  a	  population	  of	  about	  32.9	  million.	  	  
119	   For	   example,	   see	   http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-­‐states/maoists-­‐declare-­‐three-­‐former-­‐
comrades-­‐traitors/article5156826.ece	   and	   http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Jharkhand-­‐announces-­‐Rs-­‐8-­‐
69-­‐crore-­‐bounty-­‐on-­‐73-­‐Maoists/articleshow/48157666.cms	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mining areas in the North. In response, some former Maoists in the North have hired a small ar-
my of private security companies to protect themselves from potential attackers. Thus the pro-
cess and outcome of rebel retirement in the North are very different from those in the South 
where former Maoists are reintegrated as respectable members of society across rural and urban 
areas.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the context by situating the history and 
geography of North and laying out the locations and strategy of my fieldwork. Section 3 presents 
ethnographic evidence of the process of rebel retirement in the North. The rest of the chapter 
focuses on (a) pre-war social bases of Maoist insurgency (b) horizontal and vertical ties by 
the Maoist organization and (c) emergence of discordant exit network in the insurgency-
democracy interface in the gray zone between them. In sharp contrast to the South, the combi-
nation of these three factors constrains intersection between insurgent grassroots politics and 
democratic civic participation. In fact, the endemic violence and corruption in the insurgency-
democracy interface increasingly encumbers their ability to build horizontal ties with progressive 
politics within democracy, which, in turn, reinforces the vicious cycle of their further isolation 
and militarization.  
Section 4 highlights how underlying social bases, specifically the incongruity of caste 
identities and class interests escalated into full-blown caste wars in the North, causing an un-
precedented bloodbath, encompassing both democratic and extra-democratic politics as well as 
their interface. I show how the vicissitudes of caste/class contentions permanently damaged 
organizational cohesiveness by sparking a  crisis of leadership and loyalty along caste lines 
and eventually breaking the party down into warring caste factions. As the rural North became 
sucked into frequent caste wars, arms race and a pernicious insecurity dilemma, the northern 
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Maoists recruited gangsters, swindlers, petty criminals, mafia who helped them fight pitched bat-
tles with upper caste militia. Section 5 shows how the daily bloodbath of caste wars reached a 
feverish pitch that permanently damaged the capacity of the insurgent organization to build hori-
zontal ties with the larger community of urban activist network, who shifted allegiance to alter-
nate democratic, socialist and identity parties. The Maoists, who reject electoral politics, could 
not join these competing mainstream identity and socialist parties within democracy without 
ceasing to be ‘Maoist’.120 But their local cadres and supporters did.  
Section 6 describes how an  insurgent organization, entrenched in sectarian divisions, 
devoid of a  broad support base and caught in a bloody arms race, further intensified the polit-
ical criminality that saturated the democracy-insurgency interface in the North. This led to the 
emergence of a discordant exit network in the North that severely restricted prospects of rebel 
retirement and reintegration. Thus, like in the South, the dynamics of Maoist insurgency deter-
mines the kind of informal exit network that emerges in the region. Unlike in the South, the dis-
cordant exit network further exacerbates the fear and insecurities of retiring rebel, restricting 
rebel retirement and undercutting the lure of democracy in the North. Section 7 concludes.  
5.2 Maoist Pockets in the North: Setting the Context 
	  
In November 2000, the southern part of the state of Bihar was carved out to create the 28th 
state of India, named Jharkhand.1 It has 24 districts, which are further subdivided into 38 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  Up	  until	   the1990s,	   it	  was	  an	  open	  secret	   that	   local	  youths	  would	  be	   Jharkhandis	  by	   the	  day,	  and	  Maoists	  by	  
night.	  But	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  two	  movements	  had	  conflicting	  political	  ideology	  and	  did	  not	  share	  their	  support-­‐
ing	  horizontal	  networks.	  Shibu	  Soren,	  the	  leader	  of	  Jharkhand	  movement	  had	  strong	  connections	  with	  Marxist	  Co-­‐
ordination	  Committee	   and	   its	   charismatic	   leader,	   A.	   K	   Roy,	  who	   ran	   Janwadi	   Kisan	   Sangram	  Samiti	   (Democratic	  
Peasants	  Struggle	  Association)	  in	  the	  Dhanbad	  coal	  mines.	  Roy	  trained	  Soren	  to	  lead	  a	  radical	  tribal	  uprising	  in	  the	  
countryside	  while	  he	   led	   the	  workers’	  movement	   in	  urban	  areas.	  Roy	  had	  deep	   ideological	  differences	  with	   the	  
Maoists,	   and	   Soren	   carefully	   avoided	   any	  broad	   linkage	  with	  Maoists	   even	   though	   the	  Maoists	  wanted	   to	   offer	  
their	  political	  support.	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subdivisions, 262 blocks and 32620 villages. This section is divided into two main parts: 
the first part gives a snapshot of economic, demographic conditions of South Bihar, which 
eventually became known as Jharkhand, also highlighting the distribution of Maoist groups 
and surrender events in the region.121 The second part describes my fieldwork locations and 
strategies in the region. This section shows that the history, politics, and economy of this 
new state, and as such evolution of Maoist insurgency and retirement from it in Jharkhand, 
cannot be understood independent of those processes in Bihar, and to a lesser extent, in West 
Bengal. 
 
Jharkhand shares common boundary with West Bengal (east), Chhattisgarh (west), Bi-
har (North), Uttar Pradesh (North-west) and Odisha (South). Jharkhand has 29% forest cover, 
one of the highest in the country. The state is primarily rural with rich mineral deposits. 
The capital of Jharkhand is Ranchi. This new state was created following a lingering indige-
nous people’s movement, which, since the 1920s, sought independence for the tribal ma-
jority districts as a federal state within the Indian Union (Munda and Mullick 2003; Deval-
le 1992). The shaded portion in map below shows the districts of South Bihar that eventu-
ally became Jharkhand. It also shows the physical proximity of Jharkhand to Patna (the 
capital of Bihar) and Kolkata (the capital of West Bengal), which underscores a long history 
of cultural domination, economic exploitation and political marginalization of Jharkhand re-
gion exercised from these two power centers in eastern India (Corbridge 1987). 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  Historically,	  Bihar	  has	  been	  	  divided	  into	  three	  regions:	  North	  Bihar;	  Central	  Bihar	  and	  South	  Bihar	  (today’s	  Jhar-­‐
khand).	   Central	   Bihar,	  made	   up	   of	   14	   districts	   Patna,	   Gaya,	   Nalanda,	   Jahanabad,	   Aurangabad,	   Nawada,	   Rohtas,	  
Bhabhua,	  Bhojpur,	  Buxar,	  Munger,	  Jamui,	  Shaikhpura	  and	  Lakhisarai.	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Figure	  25	  
Map	  Showing	  Jharkhand	  as	  South	  Bihar	  
5.2.1	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Jharkhand:	  Poverty	  and	  Mineral	  Resources	  
	  
Jharkhand is one of the poorest states of India. Its parent state Bihar ranked 
among the slowest growing regions of India with a GDP growth of merely 2.69 per cent per 
annum from 1991-92 to 1997-98, compared to about 6 per cent for all the major states of the 
country (Kohli 2006; Ahluwalia 2002; Ahluwalia 2013). Bihar, and consequently Jharkhand 
too, is the least urbanized state of India with only 10% living in urban areas.  
As shown in the map below, the economy of Jharkhand is concentrated in its 
eastern districts, in key urban areas Jamshedpur (Tata Steel and Tata Motor plants), 
Bokaro (thermal and steel plants), Dhanbad (coal mining), Ghatsila (copper mining). The 
state is known for its rich mineral deposits, specifically coal (32% of national deposits), 
iron-ore (30% of national deposits), copper (25% of national deposits), uranium, mica, 
bauxite, granite, gold, silver, graphite, magnetite, dolomite, fireclay, quartz, & felspar. This 
chapter shows how these rich mineral deposits determined the trajectory of both insurgency 
and democracy in the North.   
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Between 1980s and 1990s, India saw an overall decline of population growth rate from 
23.9% to 21.3%. However, during the same time period, Bihar saw a sharp increase in popu-
lation growth rate from 23.4% to 28.4%. The 2011 census shows that the population density of 
Bihar is phenomenally high at 880, compared to the national average of 234.  
The demographic situation, coupled with slow growth, has almost crippled Bihar’s 
economy. In 1960 it was the fifth poorest of India's major states, but by 1990 it had the high-
est population share below the poverty line of any state (Datt and Ravallion 1998; Ravallion 
and Datt 2002). 75% of the population of Jharkhand depended on agriculture as primary means 
livelihood, although agriculture contributes only about 20% of the state GDP. The per capi-
ta agricultural income of Bihar is about half that of India as a whole and about one- fifth that 
of Punjab. The per capita income for the state declined steadily from 60% of national average 
during the early 1960s, to about 40% in 1993-94 and further to 34 % in 1997-98. Bihar was 
also India's only state to see per capita income decline in the 1990s (Sachs, Bajpai, and Rami-
ah 2002; Thakur 2000).  Forty thousand government employees in Bihar had not been paid sala-
ries for at least ten years since the early 1990s (Thakur 2002). Concomitantly, Bihar has India' 
lowest state literacy rate, with only 47 percent of its population able to read and write (Naik, 
2001). Thus Jharkhand started its career as a new state on a very weak macro economic founda-
tion. 
5.2.2	  Demography	  of	  Jharkhand:	  Anti-­‐Migrant	  Tribal	  Agitation	  	  
	  
Although the state derives its name from the separatist “Jharkhandi” movement led 
primarily by the tribal population, only 28 p e r c e n t  of population of the state as it is 
constituted now comprises adivasis (means original inhabitants, refers to tribal population). 
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Half of the remaining 72 percent include backward and other castes settled in the state for 
centuries, known as 'moolvasis' (meaning, those who have migrated into the region long 
back and have now grown roots in the region). The other half of non- tribal population, 
about 35% of state population were identified by Jharkhand movement as ‘diku’ meaning 
outsiders/exploiters who came to the mineral-rich areas of Jharkhand in search of jobs and 
opportunities from districts of Arrah, Balliah and Chapra, of neighboring Bihar and from dif-
ferent parts of West Bengal. Roughly 60% of population of Jharkhand is upper & middle 
caste Hindus. Hindi is the predominant language, Santhali and Mundari are tribal languages 
popular within adivasis, Urdu is spoken in the Muslim neighborhoods, and Bengali and 
Oriya are popular in Ranchi, the state capital, and in some industrial pockets bordering areas 
with West Bengal and Odisha respectively. (Munda and Mullick 2003) 
The key tribal groups in Jharkhand are Santhal, Oraon, Munda, Kharian, and Ho, who 
were at the forefront of the Jharkhandi movement for a separate tribal state. The tribal solidarity 
across state boundaries, built in opposition to these outsiders, gave rise to the separatist ‘sons-
of-the-soil’ movement in Bihar, West Bengal and Jharkhand. Central to this ethno-regional 
movement was the internal colonialism theory, which implied that the outsiders from other 
parts of India continued a neo-colonial exploitation of extraordinarily rich mineral deposits of 
tribal areas for fueling economic development and industrialization that deliberately excluded 
‘original inhabitants’ from its benefits. Tribal poor were kept out of newly minted jobs and ed-
ucational institutions. Their way of life tied to jal-jameen-jangal (water-land-forest) was re-
peatedly undermined by outsiders who plundered their wealth, raped their women and en-
slaved/emasculated their men. These outsiders were primarily poor workers in mines and fac-
tories who migrated from the neighboring state of West Bengal and from northern Bihar. (Minz 
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1968; Rothermund and Wadhwa 1978; Rothermund, Kropp, and Dienemann 1980; Jones 
1978).  
Later scholars have contested the ‘internal colonialism’ thesis, but it played a significant 
role in consolidating the popular mobilization for carving a separate tribal state of Jharkhand 
out of South Bihar, western districts of West Bengal, primarily the Jangalmahal area made up 
of parts of Purulia, Bankura, Birbhum and West Midnapore districts, and parts of Odisha 
(Corbridge 1987; Corbridge1986; Roy 2000; Sengupta 1980; Sengupta 1979; Sengupta 
1988).122 There are deep historical and cultural ties that unite tribal population in Jharkhand 
with those in of West Bengal. However, the traditional tribal majority districts in West Ben-
gal that were originally part of the greater Jharkhand project were never included in the 
new state of Jharkhand. The tribal groups were reduced to a minority in the new state that, as a 
gesture of reconciliation, merely took the name of the separatist movement preceding it.  
	  
5.2.3	  Maoist	  Pockets	  in	  Jharkhand:	  Conflict	  and	  Co-­‐operation	  with	  Democratic	  
Tribal	  Agitation	  	  
	  
There are three pockets of Maoist influence in Jharkhand123: (a) Northern Jharkhand districts 
of Chhatra, Palamu, Latehar, Gumla, contiguous with the traditional Maoist strongholds in 
Gaya, Aurangabad, Jehanabad districts of South Bihar; (b) Eastern industrial districts of Bo-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Three	  primary	  arguments	  against	  internal	  colonialism	  thesis	  are	  as	  follows:	  (1)	  there	  is	  significant	  tribal	  repre-­‐
sentation	  in	  the	  mining	  and	  industrial	  labor	  forces	  of	  Jharkhand;	  (2)	  there	  are	  "permanent"	  tribal	  workers	  receiving	  
wages	   sufficient	   for	   savings	   and	   capital	   accumulation;	   and	   (3)	   there	   are	   class	   divisions,	   economic	   and	   political,	  
within	   the	   tribal	   communities.	   This	   evidence	   is	   used	   to	   fashion	   an	   alternative	   account	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   Jhar-­‐
khandi	  politics,	  and	  to	  explain	  the	  fracturing	  of	  the	  tribal	  block	  vote.	  
123	  Since	  2007,	  Ministry	  of	  Home	  Affairs	  (MHA)	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  India	  listed	  10	  out	  of	  24	   districts	  in	  
Jharkhand	  (Bokaro,	  Chatra,	  Garhwa,	  Gumla,	  Hazaribagh,	  Latehar,	  Lohardaga,	  East	   Singhbhum,	  Palamu	  and	  
West	  Singhbhum)	  among	  the	  33	  worst	  affected	  districts	  across	  India.	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karo, Dhandad , Jamtara, Dumka, Deoghar and Giridih contiguous with Maoist dominated 
Jangalmahal area of West Bengal; (c) South Western districts of West Singhbhum and Sim-
dega surrounded by the Maoist affected districts  of neighboring Odisha. The MCC, largely 
dominated northern and southern Jharkhand and while Party Unity dominated eastern Jhar-
khand. Despite Maoist concentration in North, South and east Jharkhand, Maoist retirement 
is concentrated mostly in capital Ranchi and the neighboring Khunti district (dark green are-
as in the map below). Even though many of Maoist rebels were born in Palamu or Latehar in 
northern Jharkhand, they mostly surrendered in the police headquarters in Ranchi. 
The Maoists in Jharkhand are divided by ideology and a long history of bloody turf 
wars. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, the three dominant factions in Jharkhand, the 
MCC (Maoist Coordination Committee), Party Unity and CPI(ML)Liberation, have very dis-
tinct origin and ideological priorities (Bandyopadhyay 2006; Misra 1987; Jaoul 2011; F. R. 
Frankel 1989; Sahay 2008). This chapter shows how the fratricidal conflict among Maoist fac-
tions became detrimental to rebel retirement and reintegration in the North. 
The Maoist movement in the North had to constantly negotiate and renegotiate its re-
lationship with both other communists in the region and the tribal agitation movement. The 
other communists, who did not belong the Maoist factions but worked on building labor un-
ions in coalmines of Dhanbad, also actively reoriented Jharkhand movement against casting 
migrant Bihari working class poor as enemy/outsider. (Roy 2000; Munda and Mullick 
2003)These communists envisaged a working class revolution uniting the migrant workers as 
well as the tribal poor into a class coalition, and resisted the anti-migrant worker rhetoric. The 
Maoists were also sympathetic to the Jharkhandi project of creating a separate state out of trib-
al areas in West Bengal and South Bihar (now Jharkhand) as a contiguous unit, which are dis-
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tinct in cultural history, geography and demography from mainland Bengal and Bihar respec-
tively. Tribals have also supported Maoists selectively, often offering their loyalty to Jhar-
khand movement. But the anti-migrant rhetoric of insider-outsider was problematic, particular-
ly because the top leadership of Maoist movement in the North has been non-tribal migrants 
from West Bengal. These were college-educated, upper-caste/upper-class revolutionaries who 
considered Bihar as the underdeveloped, feudal hinterland that offered more opportunities for 
armed agrarian uprising than communist-ruled West Bengal. The Maoists had longstanding 
deep distrust of the other communists working in the region. The communists, Jharkhandis and 
the Maoists had an uneasy relationship of overlap and confrontation, and this chapter discusses 
how their mutual hostility played an important part in the failure of Northern Maoists to forge 
horizontal ties. 
Despite Maoist concentration in North, South and east Jharkhand, Maoist retirement 
is concentrated mostly in capital Ranchi and the neighboring Khunti district (dark green are-
as in the map below). Even though many of Maoist rebels were born in Palamu or Latehar in 
northern Jharkhand, they mostly surrendered in the police headquarters in Ranchi. 
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Figure	  26	  
District	  Level	  Distribution	  of	  Maoist	  Surrender	  in	  the	  North	  
Further every surrender incident in Jharkhand in the last ten years occurred after the re-
bels were apprehended and put in jail, and subsequently persuaded to take a surrender package 
in return for their confession that they did not want to return to the Maoists.124 Defying common 
sense, Jharkhand police actually offered incentives to already apprehended Maoists, with many 
criminal cases and murder charges against them, to take a considerable sum of money to walk 
out of prison. 
5.2.4	  Fieldwork:	  Locations	  and	  Strategy	  
	  
Compared to Telangana, retired rebels are scarce and difficult to find in Jharkhand. It is 
not entirely surprising given that the total number of surrendered rebels in Jharkhand was less 
than 10 percent of that in the South.  However, it was surprising that there were quite a few poli-
ticians among the retired rebels in the North, some very high profile politicians, working as 
elected representatives or prominent members of different political parties. Some surrendered 
rebels were still in jail. Many had been killed. Significantly enough there were few low level ca-
dres in the list of retired rebels that Jharkhand police shared with me. In fact, most of them were 
area commanders, who were middle ranking military men in the Maoist army with control over 
and knowledge of certain blocks and districts. Eventually I found that the low-level cadres found 
it impossible to quit in the North because they were not offered the protection of the discordant 
exit network that emerges in the North.  
The police headquarters in Ranchi handed me a list of names and addresses of all 37 sur-
rendered Maoists in the state; among them 14 were alive and out of jail on bail. I met all of them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  This	  is	  based	  on	  the	  author’s	  interview	  with	  in	  the	  Police	  Headquarters	  in	  Ranchi,	  Jharkhand	  in	  October	  2013.	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between October-December of 2013. I have also interviewed police and paramilitary officers in 
anti-Naxal divisions deputed from out of state to deal specifically with the Maoist insurgency. I 
have spoken to high and mid-level bureaucrats in the home ministry of Jharkhand, local journal-
ists working in both national and vernacular newspapers, civil rights activists, cultural activists 
of Maoist groups, academics, elected representatives from Maoist affected districts as well as 
ordinary villagers in five districts of Jharkhand. I also met members of a rival Maoist splinter 
group called the Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC). TPC members are technically former Mao-
ists, who allegedly quit the CPI(Maoist) party over caste feud with Maoist leaders. TPC has stat-
ed on record that they consider the CPI(Maoist) their primary enemy and offer to collaborate 
with the state to destroy their main enemy.125  
 Unlike Telangana, the two districts with highest surrender events in Jharkhand were not 
among the 12 Maoist-affected districts in the state. In addition to capital Ranchi, adjacent rural 
areas and Khunti districts where Maoist surrender is highest and where surrendered Maoists live, 
I distributed my fieldwork in the three Maoist pockets in North, east and South Jharkhand.126 In 
Giridih (in the east, contiguous with West Bengal), Palamu district (in the North, contiguous 
with Bihar) and West Singhbhum district127 (in South-east, contiguous with Orissa), shown in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  TPC	  allegedly	  helps	   Jharkhand	  police	   to	  nab	  Maoists,	   although	   the	  police	  and	  MHA	  denied	   it.	   Extortion	   from	  
development	  projects	  and	  contractors	   constitute	   the	  major	   source	  of	   income	   for	   the	  TPC.	  The	  outfit	   specifically	  
targets	  coal	  traders	   in	  districts	   including	  Latehar	  for	  extortion.	  My	  meetings	  with	  a	  few	  TPC	  members,	  set	  off	  an	  
alarm	  with	  state	  and	  national	  intelligence	  agencies,	  who	  interrogated	  me	  for	  several	  hours,	  checked	  my	  notes,	  and	  
credentials	  and	  warned	  me	  against	  meeting	  ‘dangerous	  elements.’	  	  
126	  I	  had	  offers	  from	  two	  competing	  activist	  networks	  and	  from	  the	  police	  to	  visit	  rural	  areas	  of	  Jharkhand.	  It	  is	  im-­‐
possible	  to	  work	  in	  rural	  Jharkhand	  without	  an	  adequate	  network	  of	  protection.	  I	  picked	  an	  activist	  network,	  affili-­‐
ated	  with	   the	   Indian	   Institute	  of	  Management	   (IIM),	  Ranchi.	  This	  choice	  was	  deliberate,	  and,	   in	  hindsight,	  might	  
have	  restricted	  access	  to	  certain	  areas	  and	  persons.	  In	  Palamau,	  I	  had	  personal	  connections	  with	  retired	  Maoists,	  
which	  helped	  me	  step	  out	  of	  this	  network.	  	  
127	   Rural	   Development	  Ministry	   of	   India	   launched	   Saranda	   Action	   Program	   in	   56	   villages	   of	   Saranda	   in	   January	  
2012,	  and	  comprised	  the	  first	  ever	  concerted	  use	  of	  security	  forces	  and	  civil	  administration	  in	  tandem	  in	  a	  Maoist	  
zone.	   As	   part	   of	   “all-­‐round	   development”	   of	   Saranda,	   10	   integrated	   development	   centers	   (IDCs),	   13	   roads,	   21	  
camps	  for	  security	  forces	  and	  10	  residential	  schools	  were	  planned,	  besides	  a	  series	  of	  programs	  for	  livelihood,	  irri-­‐
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medium green in the map above, movement intensity is high and surrender is moderately high. In 
Dhanbad district, movement intensity is high, but surrender is very low. Contiguous with East 
Singhbhum district is West Midnapore district (Jangalmahal) of West Bengal, where I met sur-
rendered Maoists in Binpur I & II  and in Gopiballabhpur I & II subdivisions.128  
 
Figure	  27	  
Fieldwork Areas in the North 
5.3 From the Rebel’s Perspective: Retirement through Discordant Exit Network  
 
Ranjan Yadav is a former Maoist area commander.129 He was arrested in Ranchi in 2003 while 
visiting his family.130 Yadav was in jail for six years before he had a change of heart. While in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
gation	  and	  watershed	  management,	  and	  Indira	  Awas	  Yojana	  homes.	  Almost	  every	  village	  in	  Saranda	  seemed	  full	  of	  
Maoist	  sympathizers.	  
128	  These	  areas	  saw	  the	  Lalgarh	  uprising	  (described	  in	  chapter	  2	  as	  the	  most	  recent	  Maoist-­‐led	  agrarian	  uprising	  in	  
India)	   Since	  2011,	   the	  dominant	   regional	   party	   (Trinamool	  Congress,	   roughly	   translated	  as	  Grassroots	  Congress)	  
came	  to	  power	  ending	  over	  three	  decades	  of	  Left	  rule	  in	  the	  state.	  Journalists	  and	  activists,	  and	  eventually	  villagers	  
themselves	  often	  quoted	  a	   local	   saying	  about	  people	   in	   	   region	   :	  Din	  eTrinamooli,	   raat	  e	  maovadi	   (TMC	  by	  day,	  
Maoist	  by	  night)	  	  
	  
129	   Ranjan	   Yadav	   has	   been	   interviewed	   by	   many	   journalists	   over	   the	   years.	   See	  
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-­‐states/with-­‐aap-­‐comes-­‐hope-­‐for-­‐honest-­‐politics-­‐says-­‐exmaoist-­‐
leader/article5566685.ece	  ,	  for	  example.	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jail, he surrendered to the police in 2009  and decided to contest the parliamentary elections that 
same year, which he lost. 131 In October 2013, I was in Ranchi trying to organize my fieldtrip to 
Palamau district in North Jharkhand. A journalist-cum-activist who worked for the local news-
paper, Prabhat Khabar, informed me that Yadav was in town, apparently to lobby with the for-
mer chief minister of Bihar, held in Hotwar jail outside Ranchi, for a Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
nomination from Chhatra constituency. However, he eventually contested the 2014 elections on 
Samajwadi Party tickets and lost again. He had switched his allegiance between 4 parties in 5 
years.  
 Yadav, a former Maoist military commander in dense forests of Palamau, looked 
like an average politician. He was dressed in starched white cotton kurta-pajama and shiny white 
shoes, the usual couture of choice of Indian politicians. What was unusual, however, was that 
private army of ten bodyguards, faces half-covered and rifles hanging from their shoulders, 
flanked him at all time, even in the broad daylight in the heart of state capital, including in the 
premises of state legislative assembly. Yadav quipped that these bodyguards, who never spoke to 
me, were his trusted lieutenants from Latehar. They were loyal to him and came to visit the capi-
tal city Ranchi. Later he confessed that his former comrades in Maoist party have issued a six-
page statement against him, identifying him as a traitor and awarding a death sentence to him. He 
feared for his life.  
When I met him in the premises of Jharkhand Vidhan Sabha (state legislative assembly) 
in Ranchi, Yadav greeted many RJD politicians. Some of them inquired about his political aspi-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	   In	   interviews	  with	  other	   locals	  familiar	  with	  his	  story,	   it	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  this	  arrest	  was	  pre-­‐arranged	  
with	  police.	  He	  wanted	  to	  be	  apprehended.	  	  
131	  Yadav	  contested	  from	  Chatra	  constituency	  that	  includes	  Chatra	  and	  Latehar	  districts.	  As	  a	  Maoist	  commander,	  
Yadav	  was	  well	  known	  in	  these	  districts.	  He	  fought	  2009	  elections	  from	  jail.	  It	  has	  been	  reported	  that	  Yadav	  had	  a	  
change	  of	  heart	  and	  vowed	  to	  eschew	  violence	  following	  an	  Art	  of	  Living	  workshop.	  However,	  He	  never	  mentioned	  
it	  to	  me	  during	  our	  meetings.	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rations and assured him of their support. Yadav explained that he knew some of these RJD poli-
ticians since his insurgent days. He joked that most of them were corrupt and never did anything 
for their constituency. He complained that it is politicians like these who made an armed insur-
gency the last resort. But the insurgents were hounded by the state like criminals and the politi-
cians were respected as patriots.  
 Yadav joined Party Unity (PU) in the late 1980s. He affirmed that PU was the only pro-
poor party in Chatra-Latehar area of then South Bihar. He was inspired by the PU activists, spe-
cifically Dr. Vinayan, who worked in the villages of South Bihar for a popular PU mass organi-
zation (Mazdoor Kranti Sangram Samiti, literally Workers Revolutionary Struggle Group, popu-
larly known as Samiti). Samiti activists organized the Dalit and poor backward caste agricultural 
workers in villages against caste-based exploitation by rich, upper-caste landowners.  
Yadav reminisced how the Samiti activists, upper caste, urban and educated, would drink 
water in untouchable ‘Dalit’ houses. In the hierarchical, caste divided rural Latehar district, that 
was a ‘revolution’ in itself. He was particularly drawn to Samiti’s meetings where, for the first 
time in his life, he learned that caste inequality is neither given or inevitable; it is, in fact, fabri-
cated by the rich, upper castes, to extract free or cheap labor. Yadav contrasted this political 
message with those of the national parties. Although his parents went to vote, no one in his vil-
lage ever met their elected representative.  
Yadav joined Samiti because he was convinced that caste exploitation was unjust. During 
several meetings with him, Yadav explained how he gradually gathered courage to join Samiti 
meetings and rallies, distributing pamphlets and raising slogans against feudalism, inequality, 
and exploitation. The earliest Samiti activities Yadav joined was opposition against child mar-
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riage, dowry, and domestic violence. Eventually he fled his village, left his family and joined the 
local Maoist army (known as Dasta).  In his two decades of insurgent life, he was most proud of 
inaugurating an ‘English medium’ school outside his village, where a dreamy, college-educated 
revolutionary taught free of cost. Yadav confessed that it was his biggest regret that he could not 
read the english books of the revolution that his party leaders read.  
Yadav even managed to get free stationary supplies for his school. The successive district 
magistrates applauded his efforts and attended annual handicraft fairs that he organized in his 
school. It was surprising to me that an area commander of a banned insurgent group maintained 
regular contact with the top echelons of law enforcement and civil administration. Yadav con-
vinced the people in his area that they should vote for one political party and not another. In re-
turn, political parties offered him cash, and other non-monetary rewards including contracts in 
government road building, dam construction projects. Yadav explained unapologetically that he 
leveraged his political and administrative connections to get more employment-generating pro-
jects for his area, secure resource and respectability for his school, build a hospital near his vil-
lage and so on.  
The retired rebel was reluctant to talk about his role in the caste massacres that happened 
in the area during his insurgent career. But he was bitterly critical of how the Maoist party began 
working like other political parties, particularly regarding corruption of its leadership that cost 
ordinary cadres their lives. He named commanders who stole party funds to build palatial houses 
and send their children to study abroad, often laundering money through their wives and family 
members. He described protection rackets, where different Maoist factions took hefty monthly 
payoffs from big landowners in return for protecting them from rival Maoist factions. Thus the 
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most notorious of landlords would continue their feudal exploitation of villagers if they were 
plugged into one of these protection rackets.  
Yadav did not surrender. He was arrested. In jail, like other retired rebels in the North, he 
had a change of heart. Yadav was blunt: he said if he had to be a corrupt politician, it was better 
to join a mainstream political party. He met CPI (ML) Liberation leaders and cadres in jail. Other 
political leaders also approached him in jail to exhort him to join their parties. Liberation was a 
rival insurgent faction that fought the bloody caste wars in the plains of central Bihar. Since mid-
1990s, Liberation quit armed insurgency and joined electoral politics in mid-nineties. Yadav de-
cided to surrender and contest parliamentary elections on Liberation ticket. The paltry surrender 
cash was not enough for funding his electoral bid. He was not offered any land or vocational 
training. 
During our meetings, Yadav insisted that he had complete faith in the ideological under-
pinning of the armed movement that he joined and served for over two decades. He never once 
swerved from the assertion that no other political party seriously mobilized the Dalit and Back-
ward Castes in Bihar on issues that mattered on the ground. However, the pro-poor party gradu-
ally became militarized and corrupt like other political parties. Yadav did not consider any other 
post-retirement careers other than that of a politician. He was certain that he would be killed if he 
quit. As an insurgent, he had spent years watching others contesting elections. Yadav was confi-
dent that since he had delivered big chunks of votes from his area to other candidates enabling 
their victory he could do the same for himself. He also knew that unless he had the ‘protection’ 
of some other political party he would be targeted and killed by his former comrades, the police 
or the former landlords that he had attacked in his insurgent career.  
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Yadav underestimated the role of party machine in electioneering. Despite popularity, 
Yadav lost the election because his chosen party (Liberation) did not have the financial resources 
or the ground game to win elections. From 2006-2016 Yadav hobnobbed with many different 
political parties, including the right-wing BJP and the regional ethnic parties. To stay alive in the 
face of violent threats from his former comrades, who consider his retirement a betrayal, Yadav 
considers politics his only safe haven. Political clout, he argued, was the only countervailing fac-
tor against Maoist death warrants. Regardless of ideological bent and policy priorities, the hunted 
former rebel, who still has criminal cases against him pending in the courts, seeks protection 
from the insurgency in democratic politics. Yadav lamented that the landlords and politicians 
that once sought protection from him did not ‘respect’ him anymore. In his own words, when he 
was ‘illegal’, armed and ‘dangerous’ he was a much sought after political operative that many 
bureaucrats, police and politicians fear and revered. Retirement has left him disarmed, isolated 
and vulnerable. But he was confident that he knew enough about the corrupt and crooked ways 
of electoral politics to eventually achieve success.  
5.4 Macro (Environmental) Factors: Social Bases of Maoist Insurgency  
 
The process and outcome of rebel retirement in the North is defined by the limitations of 
the informal exit networks in the region, which, in turn, evolved contingent on the underlying 
social bases of insurgency. This section is divided into two parts: In the first part I identify the 
underlying social divisions in rural Jharkhand on which the Maoists attempted to superimpose a 
discourse of class politics. I argue that they were far more pervasive and resilient in the North 
due to confluence of three socioeconomic and political factors that deepened caste cleavages and 
intensified caste violence in the North.  
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First, the dynamic connection between land ownership, caste status, and political net-
works in the North is ubiquitous enough to affect the everyday life of ordinary people in the vil-
lages, including subsistence. I argue that agricultural class relations in the North was embedded 
in caste divisions because land ownership that determined class position was, in turn, determined 
by caste identity.  
Second, the Maoists neither had the political and economic resources nor the incentives 
and motivation to undercut the “master cleavage” of caste. On the flip side, democratic politics 
in the North, particularly through dense caste-based patron-client relationships, made caste iden-
tities the most obvious way of categorizing citizens.  
Third, as the passion of caste-based mobilization reached a feverish pitch within democ-
racy, the multi-caste Maoist organization could not remain immune to it. In the South, the Dalit 
platform quit the insurgent movement and migrated en masse to democracy. In the North, how-
ever, caste-based factionalism disrupted the cohesiveness of the insurgent organization. But the 
Dalits were not welcome into a democracy, particularly because of stiff resistance of the back-
ward castes who were newly accommodated into democratic representation and participation.  
In the second part of this section I show how intense social hostilities in a feudal setting 
intensified the fear, reach and intensity of upper caste violence, culminating in the creation of 
private caste militias, known as senas (means armies) that attacked the Dalit landless farmers 
with unprecedented brutality. Mostly Maoist supporters, the Dalits in the North eventually fought 
back with the active help of Maoist cadres. This unleashed a spiral of violence and arms race in 
the villages. This discussion also sheds light on the collusion between state forces and upper 
caste militias in fighting the Maoist “menace”.  
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Despite frequent clashes and bloodbath, the northern Maoists could not establish military 
superiority. As a result a persistent security dilemma stifled Maoist strategy of militant mass mo-
bilization. The everyday bloodbath altered Maoist recruitment policies, with a growing prefer-
ence for unprincipled gang members, mafia and petty criminals who could kill with impunity 
matching the deadly ferocity of landlord militias. Thus the Maoist organization in the North be-
came a dreaded refuge of bandits and delinquents, which made it unattractive to ordinary villag-
ers, urban working class, intelligentsia, and activists.   
5.4.1	  Battle	  lines	  in	  Rural	  Jharkhand:	  Resilience	  of	  Caste	  Divisions	  	  
Over 80 percent of population in Maoist affected districts in the North lived in rural are-
as, of which 90 percent depend on agriculture as their primary livelihood.132 In this setting, to 
own land is the highest indicator of prosperity and social status. Lack of land, on the other hand, 
is not only economic subordination; it also condemns the poor to a life of manual labor, which 
automatically bestows low social prestige. Historically, the double jeopardy of land poverty and 
low caste nullified the prospect of voice and visibility of rural poor in the North. (Murdia 1975; 
Chaudhry 1988) 
It is no coincidence that land ownership (and livestock possession) is embedded in caste 
hierarchy. In the 1980s, when the Maoists were struggling to establish their foothold in villages 
around central and South Bihar, the upper castes that constituted about 13% of rural population 
owned over 80% of the land. The lowest castes, the Dalits, who constituted 14% of population, 
on the other hand, due to their landlessness and lack of education, were historically powerless in 
local affairs and invisible in state politics and administration. Agrarian class relations depend on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  According	  to	  2001	  Census,	  still	  including	  Jharkhand	  as	  part	  of	  Bihar,	  95%	  of	  population	  was	  rural.	  	  The	  2011	  cen-­‐
sus	  shows	  that	  76%	  percent	  of	  Jharkhand	  population	  is	  rural.	  But	  in	  Maoist	  affected	  districts	  over	  80%	  of	  popula-­‐
tion	  is	  rural.	  For	  example,	  91.4	  %	  of	  population	  in	  Giridih,	  88.3	  %	  of	  population	  in	  Palamu,	  85.4	  %	  of	  population	  in	  
West	  Singhbhum.	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ownership of land, and I argue that land ownership in the North was embedded in caste. Class 
almost exclusively conditioned whether a person was land-rich, land-poor or landless. In other 
words, higher caste automatically implied larger landholding and higher-class status and lower 
caste led to land-poverty and hence lower class status (Habib 1995).  
5.4.1.1	  Caste	  is	  Class:	  Why	  Hierarchy	  Matters	  in	  the	  Rural	  North	  
	  
A Sudra must never collect wealth, even though he is able (to do it). A Sudra who has acquired wealth is 
a pain to Brahmanas.  
-The Laws of Manu(1964) ch. X, verse 129, p. 430 
 
 
 
In the villages of North, the ancient Hindu legal text cited above (Manu Smriti) regulated ideas of 
duties, virtue, rights, justice and sin to crystallize a way of life that served the rich upper castes at the ex-
pense of the poor lower castes (Bühler 1964). In fact, even in the 1970s and 80s when the Maoists were 
trying to gain foothold in the rural North, the Sudras or the low serving castes in the villages surrendered 
to the widespread custom that they deserved to be treated with contempt and prejudice because of their 
sins in the past life, that allegedly ranged from laziness and alcohol consumption to animal cruelty and 
atheism. In other words, caste inequality was not only a mode of exploitation from above, the fatalism 
and “other-worldliness” was deeply ingrained among the lower castes as well as means of justifying and 
reconciling them to grotesque inequalities. (Kolenda 1964)  
Faced with organized political and military challenges from the Maoist supporters among the 
lower castes (sudras), the upper castes in the North franticly activated and fortified their kinship networks 
to act not only as barricades against social changes but also with militias committed to kill and die to pro-
tect their traditional way of life. It is true that economic anxiety of the feudal upper castes, threated by 
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leftwing attack on highly profitable traditional modes of surplus extraction, intensified upper caste re-
sistance. But, as discussed later in this chapter, battle calls were invariably articulated in terms of primor-
dial identities in ways that reinforced horizontal kinship networks and weakened class solidarity.  
Although broader comparative scholarship on cleavage-based party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 
1967; Bartolini and Mair 2007; Mair 1994; Burstein and Linton 2003) and India-specific literatures on 
caste politics (Kothari 1964; Weiner and Kothari 1965; Kothari 2004; F. Frankel 1988) have offered theo-
retical reasons to expect similar political behavior from communities with shared social profiles, recent 
researchers have also argued that lower caste voters do not necessarily act as a cohesive bloc at the na-
tional level, often taking divergent stances on issues ranging from economic liberalization to public 
spending priorities (Thachil and Herring 2008). However, the process of consolidation of caste identity 
analyzed in this chapter transpired at the local level, and the incentives for ethnic (in this case, caste) de-
fection (Stathis N. Kalyvas 2008) were much lower than they are at the level of national electoral politics, 
where competing parties offer a matrix of choices to poor voters, some appealing to their class positions 
and others stoking subnational, religious or caste identities. 
Caste as a religiously sanctioned system of untouchability and resource transfer is in decline, but 
caste organization and identity are important forms of social or symbolic capital for rural elites (Jeffrey 
2001). The caste basis of class factors become evident in the fact that the upper castes , despite internal 
economic stratification, were land-owning peasants and the Dalits, lowest in the Hindu caste hierarchy, 
were almost exclusively landless and the poorest (Chakravarti 2001). This is in sharp contrast to the vil-
lages in the South, where the upper castes, including Brahmin, were not land-rich and not tied to rural 
agrarian economy. Class position was not entirely tied to the caste identity. The college-educated, left-
leaning rich Reddys in the South, for example, were reluctant to intermarry in poor rural Reddy families 
due to mismatch in economic status. The rural North was largely insulated from waves of urbanization, 
industrialization and western education that threatened upper caste solidarity in the South. A rich Bhumi-
har (upper caste) family in the North would habitually marry into poor Bhumihar families.  
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Similarly despite comparable class positions poor backward castes avoided social interaction with 
equally poor Dalits because their caste identities determined their differential social status. In fact the ma-
jority of poor peasantry belonged to backward castes. Despite their daily struggles for subsistence, they 
distinguished themselves from lower castes by their refusal to work as agricultural labor. They hired Dalit 
labor for their farming. 92.64% of Dalits worked as landless laborer. In contrast, less than 1% of upper 
caste population identified themselves as landless peasants (Kunnath 2006).133 This is not an old oriental-
ist argument of essentializing caste. As elaborated below, caste had an instrumental value in perpetuating 
and justifying blatant injustices and inequalities, power and control.   
Unlike their Southern counterpart, who pursued urban careers and business opportunities in non-
agrarian sectors, the Brahmins in the North were firmly feudal, tied to land and ensconced in dual social-
economic dominance, with concentration of wealth, social status and political power in their hands. When 
the Maoists entered into villages to fight for the landless poor, they united in fierce determination to pre-
serve their rural predominance.   
Another mechanism that aided the all-pervasive reach of caste system in the North is that caste 
networks compensated for the lack of incomplete or completely nonexistent social safety nets in the rural 
North. Kinship networks are especially in poor countries, where households must cope with an unforgiv-
ing environment of severe poverty and shocks to economic and physical well-being due to violence and 
governmental neglect. Autonomy of caste networks was not a likely option for a household struggling to 
make ends meet in the face of looming disasters such as drought, flooding, pestilence, infectious disease 
and a looming insurgency  – especially against a backdrop of inadequate formal credit and insurance mar-
kets and a thinly stretched welfare state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  Different	  scholars	  have	  worked	  out	  different	  agrarian	  class	  combinations.	  Harriss	   (1977)	  called	  used	  capitalist	  
farmer,	   rich	  peasant,	   independent	  middle	  peasants,	  poor	  peasants	   classification.	   	  Beteille	  used	   landlord,	  owner-­‐
cultivator,	  tenant,	  sharecropper,	  laborer	  classification.	  I	  use	  Dhanagare	  (1983)	  and	  Prasad	  (1994)	  classification.	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There is a large literature documenting the exchange of services and the provision of public goods 
between households of same castes in informal, non-market ways. (e.g.Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig 
and Stark, 1989; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006). In rural North kinship 
networks also work as risk sharing mechanisms. If a farmer is ill and cannot complete a critical harvest on 
time, for example, the work of a whole season may be lost. Labor pooling enables farmers to seek assis-
tance from their neighbors. In their discussion of labor pooling groups in rural India, authors point out the 
role that caste plays in facilitating the formation of these groups (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006).  
5.4.	  1.	  2	  Crystallization	  of	  Caste	  as	  a	  Master	  Cleavage:	  The	  Role	  of	  Democratic	  Politics	  	  
	  
I argue that the all-pervasive penetration of caste into social, political and economic lives 
of ordinary people in the North crystallized it into the “master cleavage” through active aid of 
electoral politics. The patron-client relations are based on caste alliances.  Development out-
comes have usually flown through these caste-based vertical linkages. In addition, any under-
standing of dynamics and implications of democracy in Bihar has to engage with the ways in 
which electoral practices are embedded in local caste relations of dominance and subordination 
(Witsoe2009).  
The 1990s witnessed an upsurge in the number of members of backward caste representa-
tives in state legislative assemblies and the national parliament. By the mid-1990s, backward 
caste politicians dominated the state assemblies in North India, also referred to as Hindi belt. 
Comparative studies have shown that nowhere else in India have backward castes experienced a 
more sharp, meteoric rise than in Bihar. (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2012)  
In the fifty years between 1952 and 2002 the proportion of backward caste members in 
state legislative assembly more than doubled from 20 percent to 42 percent, whereas the percent-
age of upper caste members halved from 46 to 26 percent (still twice their share of population, 
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13. 6 percent). This upsurge in visibility and impact of backward caste on electoral competition 
since the late 1980s has been described as the ‘second democratic upsurge’ and even a ‘silent 
revolution’ (Yadav 1999; Jaffrelot 2003). As upper caste leaders started courting the backward 
caste ‘vote bank’ in elections, the backward castes, in turn,  started driving a hard bargain, some-
times seeking ascendancy in electoral politics vis-à-vis upper castes, through forming own ethnic 
parties(Chandra 2005). 
Since mid 1990s, a regional party, formed predominantly on Yadav caste identity 
(Rashtriya Janata Dal, RJD), dominated state legislative assemblies and formed successive state 
governments in Bihar. (Chaitanya 1991; Jeffrey Witsoe 2012; Jeffrey Witsoe 2011; Robin 2004) 
Faced with stringent criticism of his economic policies, which did not improve any indicators of 
backward caste status, his most significant slogans were ones about giving voice and dignity to 
the backward castes (‘swarg nehi, swar diya’, meaning ‘may be not heaven, but I gave them 
voice’). By asserting representation and dignity of backward castes as inherently valuable 
achievements (for example, vikas nahin, samman diya, meaning ‘May be not development, but I 
gave them dignity’) more important than concrete development indicators the caste relations of 
domination and subjugation and the memories of exclusion and inequality became inextricable 
from politics in the North. The competing backward caste party, led by another charismatic lead-
er from another backward caste (Kurmi) party dominated the next ten years of Bihar politics. He 
added efficiency to RJD rhetoric dignity and social justice. In the last two decades, none of the 
chief ministerial candidates and minsters in prominent portfolios is from the upper castes. 
(Ashutosh Kumar 2013) 
One hardly comes across a work on politics in Bihar that does not mention caste back-
grounds of chief ministers, caste-wise distribution of ministerial berths, and the changing caste 
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composition of the members of legislative assembly. Thus, a decline in the percentage of upper 
castes in the cabinet would be interpreted as their declining political power. Likewise, an in-
crease in the percentage of a given caste (say Yadavs) in the Legislative Assembly would be 
considered as symptomatic of the political ascendancy of that caste. And since no caste can de-
cide on its own the political fortunes at the state level, the relative ascendancy/decline of a politi-
cal formation would be explained in terms of various permutations and combinations of the ma-
jor caste groups (Blair 1972; Chaudhary and Shrikant 2001).  
In the colonial history of the North, too, caste networks and associations were the chan-
nels through which political movements were launched and recast. For example, the movement 
for the creation of a separate Bihar province in the colonial period is seen as the outcome of the 
organizational efforts of the upper castes (Kayasthas). 134 The continual uses of these identities 
impart substance to the existing or manufactured caste unities and distinctions and thus helps for-
tify, maintain and perpetuate caste differences among voters in otherwise similar socio-economic 
circumstances.  
The symbolic significance of this rise of the backward caste was enormous, particularly 
in the villages. This assertion of caste identity by the backward castes (particularly the Yadavs 
and the Kurmis) within democratic politics sounded similar to Maoists in rhetoric of dignity, 
voice and promise of redistribution. They did it legally within democracy, with police and ad-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	   Like	   elsewhere,	   Bihar	   has	   had	   its	   fair	   share	   of	   caste	   associations	   and	   sabhas,	   the	   latter	   including	   for	   in-­‐
stance,Bihar	  Kayastha	  Provincial	  Sabha(1889),	  Bhumihar	  Brahman	  Sabha,	  All	  India	  Kurmi	  Mahasabha	  (1894),	  Gopa-­‐
jatiya	  Sabha	  (1909).	  Most	  of	  them	  were	  geared	  towards	  the	  organization	  of	  cognate	  sub-­‐castes	  and	  focused	  on	  a	  
set	  of	  issues	  that	  combined	  the	  zeal	  for	  social	  reforms	  with	  efforts	  towards	  accessing	  public	  employment.	  Bhumi-­‐
hars	   (Saraswati	   1952)	   and	   Kayasthas(Carroll	   1978)expended	   significant	   resources	   and	   energy	   in	   raising	   their	   re-­‐
spective	   caste	   statuses	   in	   subsequent	   enumerations	   of	   the	   census	   of	   India,	   for	   they	   had	   been	   included	   in	   the	  
Vaishya	  Varna	  in	  the	  1901	  census.	  Likewise,	  Kurmis	  put	  in	  great	  efforts	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  caste	  is	  removed	  from	  
the	  list	  of	  criminal	  castes.	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ministration aiding rather than apprehending them. Democracy made legitimate power accessible 
to the backward castes. But this realization of their numerical preponderance as crucial electoral 
resource is hardly confined to the political field alone. In a village, the political, ritual and social 
have always been fused. The control of the state is the control of the village and vice versa.  
The backward caste rise in democratic politics not only dried up their support for Maoists 
in the villages of the North. But more importantly, it set the stage for overzealous, violent push 
back by the backward castes, blocking the rise of the Dalits who were below them in caste hier-
archy. Dalits, who were more severely impoverished and exploited by the upper castes than the 
backward castes, now faced backward caste armies joining hands with upper castes to hunt them 
down. In other words, once they got a taste of power, the backward castes used their kinship 
networks to crush Dalit competition with a severity no less intimidating than upper caste domina-
tion of them. Thus rise of the backward castes in democratic politics becomes as much a mecha-
nism for reproducing caste dominance, as they were to challenge the existing upper caste domi-
nance. Although the upper castes fought the rise of the backward castes in electoral politics, the 
two joined forces to violent crush the extra-democratic Maoist mobilization by Dalits.135  
5.4.1.	  3	  Fractured	  Class	  Coalitions:	  	  Internal	  Cohesiveness	  of	  Insurgent	  Organization	  	   
 
True to Marxist theory of mobilization, the Maoists hoped to mobilize the landless/land-
poor against the rich landowners. But they found to their dismay that even the poor among the 
upper castes (Brahmins, Bhumihars, Rajputs and Kayastha) and Backward castes (Bania, Yadav, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	   This	   is	   not	   entirely	   unprecedented	   in	   the	   history	   of	   Bihar.	   It	   is	   generally	   believed	   that	   the	   three	   upper	  
castes(Bhumihars,	  Rajputs	  and	  Kayasthas)	  closed	  ranks	  in	  1962	  to	  support	  K.	  B.	  Sahay	  as	  the	  Chief	  Minister	  against	  
Bir	  Chand	  Patel,	  a	  Kurmi	  leader	  supported	  by	  Maithil	  Brahmins	  led	  by	  Binodanand	  Jha.	  The	  fraternal	  wars	  between	  
Bhumihars	  and	  Yadavsduring	  the	  RJD	  rule	  (1990-­‐2005)	  has	  had	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  secular	  interests	  as	  the	  former’s	  
indignation	  at	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  latter	  as	  the	  ruling	  group.	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Kurmi and Koeri castes) mostly chose to join their caste and kinship networks over class based 
networks. The upper caste-backward caste unity against Maoists/Dalits was often predicated on 
economic logic that superseded social distance. For example, Bhumihars in North India are as-
piring Brahmins who wear sacred thread. Historically, the Brahmins have considered the agricul-
tural vocation of Bhumihars inferior to their intellectual prowess. Despite social barriers, Brah-
mans and Bhumihars united in opposition to Maoists/Dalits because of shared economic interests 
as landowning communities. The Bhumihar as well as the backward caste small landholders also 
aligned themselves against Maoists/Dalits because they had vested interests in keeping the Dalit 
subjugated and their cheap labor available. They blamed the Maoists for raising daily wages and 
making Dalit hired labor unaffordable. Thus aside from caste identity, class interests of small and 
large landowners, in fact, aligned in wage suppression. The upper castes banded together, closing 
ranks, not only among the richer landowners, but also embracing every rung of the social ladder, 
down to the poorest of their caste-men (Kunnath 2006). This is the classic conundrum of left 
agrarian politics, where small landowning peasants unite with large landowning peasants, despite 
shared interests with landless agrarian classes, oppose their resistance movements.   
On the other hand, the entire phalanx of rural Dalit was deemed Maoists. As other castes 
gravitated towards their caste network, the Dalit foot soldiers in the insurgent organization began 
raising suspicions against their upper caste leadership, and refused to trust them with their lives. 
The early leadership of Maoist movement in Jharkhand in 1970s was mostly upper caste, educat-
ed left radicals who migrated from the neighboring state of West Bengal. This elite caste/class 
committed to ‘de-classing’ themselves, signifying conscious detachment from the privileges of 
high birth, through great personal sacrifices. They formed dastas (armed guerilla squads), killed 
notorious landlords and moneylenders, set up krantikari (revolutionary) committees, occupied 
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their land and planted red flags on them. They set up peoples’ court to have the farmers publicly 
try their landlords, impose fines or award death sentences. They overturned feudal domination; 
changed entrenched power relationships in villages that let the rural poor rediscover their collec-
tive self (widely referred to as Izzat, or self respect) and reassert their rights.  
These achievements harken back to the old Marxian concept of class formation—the 
transformation from class in itself to class for itself (Marx 1963). However, the relationship be-
tween the middle class ideological ‘vanguard’ and the illiterate, poor peasantry had always been 
fraught with tensions between symbiosis and dissonance. The rural poor in Bihar was hardly 
oblivious of how the Bengali ‘babus’ came from a culture that historically looked down upon 
them as culturally inferior race. This divide between leadership and masses became more salient 
once the ‘sons-of-the-soil’ movement for separate Jharkhand state (discussed in next section) 
gathered momentum, and in the reigning “us versus them” politics, the migrant leadership of the 
Northern Maoists became the proverbial ‘them’.  
 The second-generation leadership in Maoist organizations in South Bihar came from 
backward castes, primarily Yadavs, Kurmis. By the mid 1990s, the democratic political scenario 
of Bihar was so saturated with casteist politics and politicized caste (Kothari 2004) that the rhet-
oric and caste rivalry inevitably spilled over onto the extra-democratic Maoist politics. In the 
next decade, several small caste-based splinter Maoist groups came up in the North. For exam-
ple, Dalit, specifically dominant Ghanju cadres in North Jharkhand districts of Chhatra and 
Latehar accused that the Yadav leadership of Maoist party discriminated against Dalit cadres, 
reviving memories of feudal domination and violating the overwhelming rhetoric of equality 
within democratic politics. In the words of a former Dalit Maoist cadre, he would not take up 
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arms and risk his life to live in the same discriminatory casteist environment that he resisted in 
his village.  
This disrupted organizational cohesiveness of Maoists. Research on conventional militar-
ies has already recognized the potentially positive or damaging effects of strong pre-existing so-
cial divides on military cohesion and outcome. (MacCoun, Kier, and Belkin 2006; Ben-Shalom, 
Lehrer, and Ben-Ari 2005; Griffith 2007) Insurgent military organizations should be no different. 
In the next section, I show how the state counterinsurgency colluded with the upper and back-
ward caste resistance against Maoists/Dalits, facilitating rise of caste-based militias that con-
fronted northern Maoists and resisted establishment of Maoist military superiority in the villages 
of the North.  
5.4.2	  Upper	  Caste	  Counter-­‐Mobilization:	  Collusion	  of	  the	  Democratic	  State	  
 
The landowning classes in the North, including both the upper and backward castes, op-
posed the Dalit/Maoist insurgency by mobilizing their private militias that murdered with impu-
nity, often with active support of the state.  I show how the anti-Maoist coalition worked through 
caste and kinship networks that penetrated all levels of law enforcement and administration. I 
argue that frequent confrontation between Maoists and these caste militias in the North intensely 
militarized the struggle at village level, creating an atmosphere of fear, insecurity and panic 
among common people, and causing a complete breakdown of law and order.  
In the Hindi belt of North India affluent landowning families have always maintained 
their private squads of assailants, dreaded for their brutal illegal activities that included plunder, 
rape and extortion. (Gayer and Jaffrelot 2009)Faced with Dalit/Maoist upheaval, every cluster of 
10-15 adjacent villages in a district consolidated its own upper caste army. These caste militias 
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could not have operated with total impunity without active support of powerful caste-based pat-
ronage networks pervading political, administrative and law enforcement circles in Bihar. For 
example, Bhumihar landlords in Congress party primarily propped up Brahmarshi Sena.136 Raj-
puts in Congress party backed the Kunwar Sena. Kurmi landlords in Congress party backed 
Bhoomi Sena. 137Yadavs in the mainstream Left (CPI) backed Lorik Sena.138 Sunlight Sena in 
South Bihar had active support of two-time chief minister of Bihar and of former Governors, 
MLAs and MPs, who all belonged to landholding Rajput caste. 139 Former Prime Minister, de-
fense and home ministers of India belonging to the rightwing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were 
among the patrons of the Ranveer Sena, later declared a terrorist group (Sinha and Sinha 2001; 
Chandran and Gupta 2002).140 Politicians could ill-afford to ignore the wealthy landowners who 
financed the political campaigns of their caste brethrens and deliver votes through complex caste 
alliances in various parts of Bihar. In this charged environment, neutrality was not an option for 
ordinary civilians (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  It	  had	  the	  blessings	  of	  ‘King’	  Mahendra,	  former	  MP,	  MLA’s	  like	  Abhiram	  Sharma,	  Sardar	  Krishna	  Singh	  of	  Arwal,	  
Jagdish	  Sharma	  and	  others,	  with	  the	  present	  Congress	  Legislative	  Party	   leader,	  Ramashraya	  Prasad	  Singh,	  then	  a	  
powerful	  Minster,	  backing	  them	  in	  Patna.	  
137	  Bhoomi	  sena,	  authors	  of	  the	  Belchi	  massacre,	  set	  up	  the	  Bhoomi	  Sena.	  ,	  led	  by	  the	  Congress	  MLA	  from	  the	  Ma-­‐
saurhi	  area,	  and	  later	  led	  by	  his	  wife,	  Poonam	  Devi,	  also	  an	  MLA.	  
138	  CPI	  leader	  and	  Member	  of	  Parliament,	  Ramashraya	  Singh	  Yadav	  had,	  in	  the	  meanwhile,	  set	  up	  the	  Lorik	  Sena,	  
exploiting	  the	  linkages	  between	  the	  Yadav	  landowners	  and	  the	  contractor-­‐caste	  criminal	  combine,	  to	  take	  on	  the	  
left	  squads.	  	  
139	   Prominent	  political	   personalities	   in	   support	  of	   Sunlight	   Sena	   included	  Ram	  Naresh	   Singh,	  MLA	  and	   later	  MP,	  
who	  was	  close	  to	  Satyendra	  Narain	  Sinha,	  former	  two-­‐term	  Chief	  Minister	  of	  Bihar,	  and	  belonged	  to	  the	  princely	  
Deo	  family	  of	  Aurangabad.	  Among	  other	  well-­‐known	  patrons	  of	  Sunlight	  Sena	  were	  Bhisma	  Narain	  Singh,	  of	  Mana-­‐
tu	  family	  of	  Palamu,	  former	  Governor	  of	  Tamil	  Nadu	  and	  Tripura.	  Ram	  Naresh	  Singh	  was	  looked	  upon	  as	  a	  saviour	  
of	  the	  Rajput	  landowners	  of	  the	  erstwhile	  Palamau	  Paragana	  and	  Chatra	  regions..	  Ram	  Naresh	  Singh	  alias	  Lootan	  
Singh:	  ‘Lootan’	  means	  one	  who	  loots	  or	  grabs.	  He	  started	  his	  career	  as	  a	  wagon	  breaker,	  and	  later	  went	  on	  to	  be-­‐
come	  a	  contractor.	  
140	  In	  2015,	  evidence	  came	  to	  light	  that	  many	  BJP	  leaders,	  including	  Murli	  Manohar	  Joshi,	  C.	  P.	  Thakur,	  and	  former	  
PM	  Chandra	  Shekhar	  were	  complicit	   in	  the	  Bihar	  Dalit	  massacres	  committed	  by	  the	  Ranvir	  Sena,	  while	  the	  back-­‐
ward	  caste	  governments	  of	  Nitish	  Kumar,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  arch	  rivals,	  Lalu	  Prasad	  Yadav	  and	  Rabri	  Devi	  declined	  to	  
order	  investigations	  into	  the	  massacres	  despite	  knowledge	  of	  them.	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The Maoists did not back down in the face of escalation of violence, frenzied arms race 
and succession of devastating hate crimes in rural Bihar. MCC was the first to establish military 
domination over the Rajput-Pathhan landowners in 500 villages in South Bihar. But they did so 
by sponsoring the extraordinarily vicious Baghaura-Dalelchak massacre of 54 Rajputs in summer 
of 1987. This incident alarmed upper castes everywhere in Bihar and set off an avalanche of 
caste carnage across Bihar. (Jaoul 2011; Sahay 2008; Chandran and Gupta 2002; Louis 2000b) 
In a series of revenge attacks, the Ranveer Sena notched up a record of several incidents of 
bloodbaths, by killing Dalit men and boys, and inflicting unprecedented violence on Dalit wom-
en and girls that they identified as poisonous wombs breeding impertinent revolutionaries. In vil-
lages of central Bihar they gang raped pregnant women, cut open their wombs and paraded hu-
man fetus on sword tips.141 The spiral of violence and counter-violence in rural Bihar, death and 
losses in both camps, banished sane, neutral voices (Narula 1999).  
As upper caste landlords lost their families in Maoist attacks, they demanded that upper 
caste politicians channel state fund and resources into counterinsurgency against Maoists. By 
mid 1980s, there were police encampments, a majority of them manned by the paramilitary forc-
es, across villages of Bihar.  In addition, political largesse in terms of state developmental funds 
were passed on through caste and kinship networks. Whether it was funds for roads, new hospi-
tals, creation of jobs, or recruitment to the police, the ruling castes chose their upper caste breth-
ren as the favored beneficiaries. This preferential treatment was compounded by the fact that the-
se upper caste groups were largely educated and already in a better position to claim the benefits.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  When	  asked	  why	  the	  sena	  killed	  children	  and	  women,	  one	  sena	  member	  responded,	  "We	  kill	  children	  because	  
they	  will	  grow	  up	  to	  become	  Naxalites.	  We	  kill	  women	  because	  they	  will	  give	  birth	  to	  Naxalites."	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The biases worked in myriad ways. For example, since very little was spent on the de-
ployment of the police and paramilitary forces into rural areas, it was only seldom that a police 
post was actually created. Left to fend for themselves, the forces were sheltered in existing pucca 
structures. This, without exception, would be the palaces of upper caste landlords. The entire de-
ployment of forces thus took on a shape, perhaps inadvertent, that suggested that its purpose was 
to protect the land, wealth and life of particular caste groups, specifically the rich landowners. 
Inevitably, the police posts became objects of Maoist retaliation. The police force was constitut-
ed, on request of ministers and administrators, under officers of the same castes as the landown-
ers. Often the police and the caste militias would fight together against the Maoists. To add to 
this was a highly controversial decision by upper caste Chief Minister in 1986 to arm the land-
lords against the Naxalites. Thousands of licensed guns were issued to upper castes (Chaudhry 
1988; Chakravarti 2001). The enormous and growing arsenal of both licensed and illegal arms 
were eventually loaned out to the senas in their fight against Maoists. By 1990s, every village in 
Bihar was armed to the teeth.  
Simultaneously some Maoists started running protection markets, whereby they had 
started isolating individual landowners in specific regions, offering protection for hefty pay-
ments, or in exchange of some land or guns. Many of the landowners agreed. This tactic later 
took on the form of an extended protection racket, and the Party Unity and Liberation groups 
started clashing among themselves in turf wars, or over these protected landowners.142 As illegal 
firearms became freely available, private gangs of arms smugglers, drug dealers and traffickers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  This	  has	  become	  a	  norm	  in	  Bihar.	  See	  	  "Where	  blood	  is	  flowing	  along	  the	  Sone":	  HT/Patna,	  February	  28,1999.	  
"Exit	   Policy	   for	   landowners,"	   HT/Patna	   March	   12,1999.	   "Police	   tormenting	   them	   more	   than	   the	   Naxalites"	  
HT/Delhi,	  March	  1,1999.	  "PWG	  circulates	  hit	  list	  for	  selective	  killings",	  HT	  Patna,	  January	  30,	  1999.	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swamped Bihar. In fact, nowhere in India is the nexus between landlords, police, bureaucrats, 
Maoists and criminals as naked as in Bihar.  
Several roving rebel gangs of erstwhile peasants also developed in different parts of Bi-
har- particularly in Bhagalpur-Munger districts, hills and forests of Kaimur Range and the Hima-
layan (terai) terrain in West Champaran-often degenerating into gang warfare. Since 2000s caste-
based breakaway Maoist groups, like Tritiya Prastuti Committee, Jharkhand Liberation Tiger 
(JLT), Peoples’ Liberation Front of India (PLFI), for example, run competing businesses of kid-
nap and extortion. These apart, there are also numerous smaller gangs of dacoits operating 
throughout the state. Such was the extreme and all-encompassing reach of caste hatred that peo-
ple dropped their last names in a bid to hide their caste status in public schools and offices. In the 
next section, I show how crystallization of caste as the master-cleavage aided Maoists in forging 
deep, strong vertical ties but hurt their ability to expand the horizontal support network across 
class and rural/urban divides. High militarization of agrarian struggle, low organizational cohe-
siveness of Maoists, corruption and extreme caste hostility pervading democracy-insurgency in-
terface bred discordant exit networks in Jharkhand. 
5.5 Meso (Organizational) Factors: Strong Vertical and Weak Horizontal Ties  
 
 In this section I argue that Maoists in Jharkhand forged strong vertical ties with the rural 
proletariat by fighting their caste wars, which, as many ethnographic studies have shown, define 
identities and interests of ordinary people were rooted in Bihar (Witsoe 2013; Witsoe 2009; 
Singer 1997; Hauser and Singer 1986; Kantor 2016) But in order to fight these wars, the Maoists 
recruited the most bellicose, fierce and ruthless local youths who could take on the upper caste 
militias. These Maoist cadres had little regard for ideological training and principled commit-
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ment to social justice that originally motivated the party leadership. The unbridled militancy pur-
sued by local commanders attracted more gangs and mafia elements to Maoist arsenal of gun and 
money, and exposed the organization to more violence.  
The strong vertical ties with local Dalit communities weakened the capacity of northern 
Maoists to build horizontal ties across rural/urban and caste divides. First, the local Maoist mili-
tary commanders and urban intellectuals could not work together not only because of their diver-
gent goals, but also because of extensive caste barriers between them. Second, competing demo-
cratic movements, the Jharkhand movement and the socialist movement by J P Narayan, which, 
like Maoists, also mobilized on slogans of social justice, dignity, rights and equality and took the 
wind off Maoist sail. Third, intense factional rivalry among Maoist groups weakened Maoist re-
sistance. Fourth, electoral switch by dominant Maoist factions in Central Bihar further fractured 
the Maoist support base in North India. 
5.5.1 Strong Vertical Ties: Maoist Organization Entrenched in Local Conflicts 
 
 
The Maoist mass fronts in Bihar were gradually sidelined by the immediate imperative of rebels 
to militarize. For example, Mazdur Kisan Sangram Samiti (MKSS) was a front organization of 
the Party Unity launched in 1980 to represent agricultural laborers. The MKSS played a signifi-
cant role in mobilizing Dalit laborers, and most of the former Maoists from Palamau, Laterhar 
and Chhatra districts that I interviewed entered Maoist movement through MKSS. 143 By 1986, 
however, the popular mass leader of MKSS, Dr Vinayan, was suspended by PU for criticizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  In	  1980s,	  MKKS	  led	  many	  grassroots	  struggle	  against	  sharecropping	  (bataidari),	  bonded	  labor	  (begaar)	  and	  un-­‐
touchability.	  MKSS,	  popularly	  referred	  to	  as	  Sangathhan	  (meaning,	  organization)	  was	  led	  by	  Dr	  Vinayan,	  a	  medical	  
doctor	  from	  neighboring	  state	  of	  Uttar	  Pradesh.	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the “meaningless violence and undisciplined manner of peasant struggle” that hijacked mass mo-
bilization and exposed ordinary people to unnecessary police harassment and upper caste retalia-
tion.144 Intense militancy of landlord-police counter-violence as well as the ideological proclivi-
ties of northern Maoist groups against mass movement contributed to complete marginalization 
of Maoist-led mass movements in Bihar (Kunnath 2006).  
The selection process, induction, training of Maoist cadres in the North, unlike their 
southern counterparts, did not include methodical ideological training. The biggest challenge of 
Maoists in Bihar was that local leaders were slow to emerge, and consequently a constant strug-
gle to up the ante against entrenched ‘landlordism’ became the key element in identifying leader-
ship, and this cumulative raising of the stakes in the conflict created an endless spiral of violence. 
In a context where police refused to register complaints against their caste brethren and the Da-
lit/Maoist activists, including social workers and lawyers, were indiscriminately arrested for le-
gal political activities; Maoists depended on ruling by fear and hate. 145  
At the local level, in the rural North having a gun can make the person immensely power-
ful in his own eyes as well as in the eyes of others. By supplying guns and a license to kill, the 
Maoists in the North attracted mafia and gangs, who took control of Maoist arsenal and consid-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  MKSS	  split	  in	  1987,	  and	  the	  pro-­‐Vinayan	  followers	  were	  all	  forced	  to	  form	  a	  new	  organization,	  named	  Jana	  Muk-­‐
ti	  Andolan	  (Peoples’	  Liberation	  Movement)	  completely	  outside	  of	  Maoist	  platform.	  This	  tension	  became	  irreconcil-­‐
able	  due	   to	   the	  differing	  positions	   taken	  by	   two	  of	   the	   founding	  members	  of	   the	  MKSS,	  Dr.	  Vinayan	  and	  Arvind	  
Singh.	  Arvind	  Singh,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  wanted	  the	  MKSS	  to	  be	  working	  in	  close	  relation	  with	  the	  PU	  and	  its	  armed	  
squads.	   In	   consultation	   with	   the	   PU	   leaders,	   he	   expelled	   Vinayan	   from	   the	   MKSS.	   Singh	   then	   made	   the	   press	  
statement	  in	  Patna:	  ‘Samiti	  [MKSS]	  has	  dismissed	  its	  founding	  president	  Dr.	  Vinayan	  due	  to	  his	  anti-­‐party	  and	  re-­‐
formist	  activities’	  and	  for	  taking	  a	  ‘wrong	  class	  direction’.	  	  
145	  Investigations	  by	  India's	  National	  Commission	  for	  Scheduled	  Castes	  and	  Scheduled	  Tribes,	  the	  National	  Human	  
Rights	  Commission,	  the	  National	  Police	  Commission,	  and	  numerous	  local	  nongovernmental	  organizations	  all	  con-­‐
cur	  that	  even	  in	  few	  cases	  where	  police	  were	  not	  hostile	  to	  Dalits,	  they	  were	  generally	  not	  accessible:	  most	  police	  
camps	  are	  located	  in	  the	  upper-­‐caste	  section	  of	  the	  village	  and	  Dalits	  are	  simply	  unable	  to	  approach	  them	  for	  pro-­‐
tection.	   In	  many	   instances,	   police	   and	  district	   officials	   have	   ignored	   repeated	   calls	   for	   protection	  by	   threatened	  
Dalit	  communities.	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erable funds, and some eventually turned against the Maoist party. (e g, Jagnandan Yadav group 
in Bihar). 
A former rebel I met in Palamau district described the trend with an example:  A local 
Dalit youth, known for his temper, aggressive personality and intense hatred of Yadavs, joined 
the Party Unity peasant organization. He displayed great militancy and leadership, and eventual-
ly came to exercise a strong influence on the organization. In the middle of intense land struggle 
in the village, the party detained a villager, a suspected police agent, who was allegedly respon-
sible for the murder of three comrades, and demanded that the armed unit execute him. The 
commander of the armed unit refused and advised them to free suspected police informer and 
concentrate on land struggle. The local unit, however, condemned the commander as coward and 
with tacit approval of the local Dalit leader, they went on to assassinate that person. As it became 
evident that they mistakenly killed a poor peasant on unsubstantiated allegations, it terrified vil-
lagers, discredited the Maoists, brought a temporary setback to the cause of the land struggle. But 
the aggressive youth who organized this wrongful assassination rose in the organization and 
committed many other excesses during his long rebel career. This incident is indicative of the 
general trend of militarization and corruption of Maoist movement across Bihar. Often local 
commanders, empowered by guns and cash, went against central party leadership. But the lead-
ership failed to reign in their local agents because even though they instigated unprincipled hate 
crimes they also served the party by scaring landlords away, raising red flags and establishing 
control over upper caste arms, grains and land. 
Northern Maoist commanders ‘adopted’ local landlords and ran auctions to provide ‘pro-
tection’ to the highest bidders. They used caste and kinship networks to funnel off enormous 
amounts of money from various public works projects of building roads, dams, and schools into 
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their personal accounts. Maoists are routinely implicated in kidnap and extortion. They act as 
hired guns for politicians, big businesses and even police. It became apparent during my field-
work that there is no dearth of examples of Maoist commanders building palatial houses, sending 
of children to the most expensive private boarding schools, of having wives and brothers proxy 
in village elections to control government fund (Shah 2006; Witsoe 2012; Sanchez 2010; 
Mahadevan 2012). The unbridled violence affected the political culture of the movement, breed-
ing intense intolerance not only against mainstream political parties, but also towards other Mao-
ist factions.  
The Maoist Community Center (MCC), the most deadly among the Maoists, dominated 
the southern pockets of West Singhbhum district. The Party Unity, emerging out of the pro-mass 
movement tradition in Maoist politics, dominated the northern and eastern districts of Palamau, 
Latehar, Giridih. In central Bihar, Jehanabd, Gaya, Patna, CPI(ML)-liberation, locally known as 
Ma-Le (from ML standing for Marxist Leninist), was the dominant Maoist force. MCC, PU and 
Liberation fought deadly factional wars of area domination through the 1990s, killing many of 
their cadres and followers in what is now referred to as ‘black chapter’ in Maoist circles. They 
fought for area domination and killed each other incessantly until PU merged with PWG in 1998, 
and considerably increased its clout. Skirmishes, however, continued until the leadership of 
MCC and PU-PWG united into a single Maoist party in 2004.  
The CPI(ML)-Liberation, made an electoral switch by late 1990s. Contesting elections, in 
radical left camps, is the ultimate betrayal of revolution.  The two other factions, MCC and Party 
Unity, rushed in to poach its support base in the region, sparking off a new spree of assassina-
tions. The mistrust and rivalry Maoists of different shades severely limited the possibility of 
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building horizontal network of supporters. Under such circumstances of overriding fear, the only 
network that fawned around Maoists in Bihar was either corrupt or deeply sectarian. 
It is ironic that a movement that initially promised “liberation” actually ended up making 
people less free. Maoist leaders, plugged into police-landlord-mafia-politician-bureaucrat net-
work killed, raped and plundered with impunity in the villages of Bihar. Joining or supporting an 
anti-state movement makes people “target” of the state and ruling classes in various ways, rang-
ing from being implicated in legal cases through false charges to murder. But any proximity to 
Maoist movement in Bihar invited danger, death, destruction on oneself and one’s family from 
the Maoists themselves.  
5.5.2 Weak Horizontal Ties: Violence, Corruption and Competition 
 
As daily confrontations with landed castes militarized the struggle, local commanders rose rapid-
ly, and their organizational clout was contingent on violent suppression of every dissenting voice 
within the organization, including those from urban intellectuals and civil rights activists. As sa-
lience of caste identities and interests forged strong vertical ties, it gradually made principled 
commitments to social justice largely irrelevant within Maoist camps.  
 Caste rivalries penetrated circles of urban intellectuals, rights activists, academics in the 
state, who were also alienated by the intense rivalry among three most important Maoist factions. 
Evidence of Maoist-mafia-politician-bureaucrat-police collusion instilled fear among common 
people. Widely circulated stories of failing personal morality of Maoist commanders did not en-
dear them to the people either.  
 In addition, three competing grassroots movement within democracy – the socialist 
movement by J P Narayan, the sons-of-the-soil (Jharkhandi) movement for separate state and the 
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rise of backward caste parties - also hurt Maoists by poaching the support base on which they 
could build horizontal ties. Maoists recognized this as a problem. The MCC document, Lal 
Chingari (The Red Spark), dated September 1995, mentions its inability to find people to serve 
as political commissars. The Liberation group after disbanding its troops in December 1994 also 
consciously wooed the middle class because it found that leadership potential was limited among 
dispossessed groups (Dubey 1991).  
The sons-of-the-soil uprisings have a long history in the North (Sengupta 1980; Sengupta 
1988; Murdia 1975). Since the sixties, the resistance coalesced around opposition to labor migra-
tion from neighboring states to the coalmines and factories of South Bihar that marginalized the 
local ‘tribal’ population in South Bihar. These migrant workers, although mostly poor, exploited 
the poorer tribal population and interfered with their ways of life. The sons-of-the-soil (Jhar-
khand) movement began campaigning against these ‘outsiders’, who were essentially workers, 
petty bourgeois traders, moneylenders, management in mines and administrators. The anti-
migration activits formed a political party - the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM, literally Jhar-
khand Liberation Front) - in 1972.  (Corbridge 1987; Dhar 1980; Sengupta 1980; Munda and 
Mullick 2003) 
The Maoist ideologues recognized that classification of poor migrant workers, another op-
pressed class, as oppressor was problematic. But they also identified the permanent mining 
workers from ‘outside’ as ‘privileged’ and exhorted them to break caste/regional allegiance and 
rally behind the downtrodden Jharkhandis. But during the 1980s the JMM found followers 
amongst the big landowners and amongst the ‘mafia’. JMM took to electoral politics, and the 
extremist factions like its militant students unit broke away (Corbridge 1987). When Jharkhand 
became an independent state in 2000, the Maoists and Jharkhandis parted way. From 2002 on-
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wards the Jharkhand state started to mobilize paramilitary troops, and vigilante neighborhood 
watch committees (Nagrik Suraksha Samiti) against the Maoists in Jharkhand. Eventually JMM 
moved closer to the Hindu-nationalist party of BJP and took a substantial tribal support with 
them.  
In addition to the JMM, the Maoists also competed with the socialist movement by J P Nara-
yan (popularly referred to as JP) against rampant corruption, hereditary political families, nepo-
tism and other popular issues. One of the most well-publicized aspect of the JP movement was 
the Bhoodan movement (literally, donating land) that aimed at convincing big landlords to redis-
tribute land through peaceful consultation. In it emerged a peaceful alternative to Maoist policy 
of forceful redistribution of land. It undercut the central thesis of Maoist mobilization that land-
owners would never agree to reallocate wealth and land except at gunpoint. The Maoist camp 
identified peaceful land transfer and other similar measures by JP movement as “nothing but part 
of a wider counter-insurgency move to stamp out armed peasant struggle from the face of Bihar.” 
Former police officers have gone on the record that “putting in zealous and dedicated social re-
formers” like JP and his followers in civil liberties movement was as much a part of ‘the counter-
insurgency measures’ as ‘concentrated police operations or operations by the special task forces’ 
(The Searchlight, June 11-13, 1975).   
The youth platform of JP movement (Chhatra-Yuva SangharshVahini, literally Student-
Youth Struggle Front) attracted college-educated urban youths into its fold, drastically affecting 
the ability of Maoist groups to expand into urban intellectual circles that aided the proliferation 
of their southern comrads. JP called for ‘total revolution’ within the framework of democratic 
politics based on the Gandhian principle of fellowship, self- sufficiency, and decentralization. 
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Maoists have pointed out that JP movement relied on foreign funding and worked with the 
avowed aim of disrupting the peasant movement.  
The civil liberties movement has a complex history (Gudavarthy 2008). There are a variety 
of people amongst the civil liberties activists and they display a range of perspectives about the 
people on whose behalf they act. The simplest representation emanating from the civil liberties 
activists is that the ordinary rural villager is caught between the fires of the state and the Maoists, 
‘sandwiched’ in the middle. This goes against the fundamental Maoist propaganda that they have 
he willing, active support of the people (Alpa Shah 2013) The Peoples’ Union of Civil Liberties 
(PUCL), the powerful civil liberties movement in the North, critiques the random violence by the 
northern Maoists, specifically the use of detonators in passenger trains or the murder of party 
workers and supporters of other Marxist parties (Navlakha 2006). In the South there was a highly 
publicized break up of the civil liberties movement, with one group critiquing Maoist excesses 
while simultaneously exposing police brutalities and the other group organized a peace talk be-
tween the insurgents and the state. In contrast, the civil liberty activists in the North quietly dis-
tanced itself from the Maoists, sometimes critiquing the violent movement excesses. To the pub-
lic audience, it seemed that the urban activists lost faith in the Maoist resistance (Das 1986).  
5.6 Grey Areas in Insurgency-Democracy Interface: Rise of Discordant Exit Network 
 
The northern Maoists became implicated in extensive and brutal caste wars with upper caste mi-
litias, which, together with competing movements of social justice and tribal identity within elec-
toral democracy, undercut their popular support. Maoist squads became the preferred refuge of 
gangs and mining mafia. The North progressively looked more and more like India’s Wild West, 
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locally known as Jungle Raj, a violent, pre-modern, rural hinterland where power flows from the 
barrel of gun.  
Jungle Raj is useful shorthand to highlight political criminality in the North. Levels of 
violent crime in Jhakhand and Bihar have been significantly higher than the national average. 
Murder accounts for 4.73 percent of total reported crime in Jharkhand compared to a national 
average of 1.8 percent. Comparison of urban crime rates is even more staggering. The murder 
rate in Patna, the capital of Bihar, for example, is 23 times higher than that in Kolkata, the capital 
of the neighboring state of West Bengal.(Sanchez 2010) In feudal, criminalized politics and 
business in Bihar and Jharkhand, the Maoists who originally claimed to represent dissent and 
bottom-up anti-feudal resistance, as well as the regional tribal parties of Jharkhand movement 
have not been immune to criminalization. 
The landlord-police-politician-mafia network is a local institution in the North, which 
drew upon preexisting identities of caste and ethnicity to draw membership and affiliation 
(Witsoe 2011). As the Maoists set out to upset the stagnant social relations of the North, they 
adopted the same violent intimidation techniques as the police-politician-mafia did, which fur-
ther criminalized the politics of Bihar. In course of my fieldwork, interviews with former Mao-
ists, activists, politicians of backward castes became defensive about this counter-network of cor-
ruption and criminalization, advocating it as almost akin to a ‘weapon of the weak’, with its own 
ethical code of conduct.  
I argue that the corruption-criminalization complex in the democracy-insurgency inter-
face was more than a sum total of petty corruption of immoral individuals, primarily manifested 
as bribery (Gupta 1995; Parry 2000). Corruption in the grey areas of North is a systematized 
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practice of institutions and the state directed towards long-term interests of all participants. It 
resonates more closely Robert Wade’s work on agricultural irrigation corruption in South India 
(Wade 1982). Here institutions of democracy, capitalism, law enforcement, violence, and corrup-
tion routinely intersect in day-to-day life, so frequently and incessantly, that it is hardly noticed 
or considered an obstacle to the market or the state. ‘Corruption’ refers to something altogether 
more systemic and yet tangible. The corruption in question is the mutually beneficial relationship 
between political influence, violence and industrial capital visible yet obscured by popular dis-
courses.  
This continuity between insurgency and state in the North becomes visible in the argu-
ment that the northern Maoists, in selling protection, competed in a market previously controlled 
by the state (Shah 2006). For example, there was a pre-established mechanism of offering bribes 
to multiple stakeholders in winning government contracts for road or dam construction. Normal-
ly, the contractor ‘greases the palms’ of everyone from village headmen and lowest government 
clerk who moves the file up to the district magistrate and local politicians to win a contract for a 
construction project. As the Maoists established control over a particular area they decided to 
demand a share of this pie and entered as a new and powerful stakeholder into a pre-existing sys-
tem. Thus Maoist commanders, in their respective areas, were already plugged into the market 
for protection. In the North, the Maoist factions– like state representatives – sold protection to 
access the informal economy of the state, but also protection from the possibilities of its own ac-
tivities (for example, adopting landlords that they protected from Maoist attacks).  
Protection is, as Charles Tilly famously argues, an ambiguous commodity, calling up 
‘images of shelter against danger provided by a powerful friend’ or evoking ‘the racket in which 
a local strong man forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage - damage the strong 
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man himself threatens to deliver’(Tilly 1985). Short of depicting statesmen and politicians as 
thieves and bandits, Tilly nevertheless wanted to urge the value of that analogy. He argued that 
politicians are entrepreneurs selling protection. If protection rackets represent organized crime at 
its smoothest, then politics and state-making were protection rackets with the advantage of legit-
imacy – the ‘largest examples of organized crime’. In this argument terrorism, banditry, piracy, 
gangland rivalry and state-making all belong on the same continuum, selling protection. It was 
only axiomatic that Maoist commanders, already plugged into protection networks, would capi-
talize on these connections during and after their retirement.   
In this system violent entrepreneurs are, in fact, respectable businessmen and politicians, 
professionals and police, who, much like in the post-Soviet context, effectively underwrite the 
fragile contracts of emerging capitalism through the threat of physical harm (Varese 2005; 
Volkov 2002). In an environment marked by rapidly expanding opportunity in mining, industri-
alization as well as large welfare projects, long-term relationships between mutually constituted 
forms of authority of rebels, crime, violence, politics, corruption, and state authority constitute an 
‘enforcement partnership’ (Volkov 2000).  
The Jharkhandi ‘mafia’, although depicted in Indian films as caricature of Sicilian mafia, 
‘men of honor’ bound by feudal honor and ties of vendetta, is actually as much rooted in a tena-
cious economic logic and political legitimacy as in kinship. The popular politician, elected with a 
huge margin, is also a goonda, as the strong-arm is locally known. The goonda can also be a col-
lector of debts for large multinational banks, with college degrees and ‘normal’ families living in 
middle class neighborhoods. The mafia in democracy-insurgency interface is made up of a wide 
variety of individuals and institutions of various caste, class, ethnic and work backgrounds, some 
of whom were obviously criminal, some of whom were probably legitimate but most of whom 
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were both as and when necessary. The mafia is often indistinguishable from law enforcement, 
civil administration and political elites. In this environment, breaking law does not automatically 
relegate anyone as a social outcaste. Criminals are trusted lieutenants of elected politicians, who 
convene party meetings, distribute party pamphlets, organize microphones and chairs for his mo-
hallah (neighborhood) meetings, standing right next to the elected representative with a social 
respectability that is not questioned, at least openly. (Munda and Mullick 2003) 
I argue that in this all-encompassing corruption, the former Maoists are the most dreaded 
of goondas. They quit insurgency with a plan to pursue the profitable business and political op-
portunities that they often protected or extorted during their insurgent career. Former Maoists in 
Palamau described how they worked closely with district police administration to root out dowry 
and child marriage. A well-known police officer, who later contested elections, was identified as 
‘popular’ because he attended village fairs organized by local Maoist groups for entertainment of 
the poor. Democracy, insurgency and the grey area in between constituted each other by com-
plementary use of political influence, monetary power, and violence. Maoists, when they desire 
to quit, reach out to this network. They do not want to reintegrate and return to pre-rebel life.  
This violent-corrupt power network does not go down to the grassroots. Thus there are no 
reintegration stewards in this setting. Movement entrepreneurs, in the sense of the overarching 
network of geographically mobile, opinion makers, are also either non-existent or hostile to for-
mer Maoists who, in Jharkhand, are former commanders with dreaded history of violence and 
terror, sometimes akin to a local Robin Hood. They took the upper caste domination by its horns, 
and either overpowered or co-opted it by counter-mobilizing their own corrupt mafia-police-
politician network. They are lucrative assets to politician-police-mafia network that protects and 
encourages them to serve their interests by winning elections within democracy. Thus the infor-
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mal exit network that emerges in the North exacerbates the fear and insecurity of returning Mao-
ists, severely restricting rebel retirement and assisting safe passage of only those who commit to 
oil the vast, creaky machine of  corrupt politics. 
5.7 Conclusion 
	  
In this chapter I set out to explain the emergence of discordant exit network in Jharkhand. I build 
a historicized understanding of a popular insurgency in the North that takes into account how 
insurgent organizations are embedded into local social bases. I argue that the northern Maoists, 
embroiled in daily encounters with caste militias, were unable to forge dense horizontal networks 
encompassing diverse social groups across both rural and urban areas. Instead incessant struggle 
by the insurgents to establish military superiority over feudal caste armies irreversibly and in-
tensely militarized the struggle. I show how villages in the North became polarized into two 
camps with the Dalit landless/Maoists facing the wrath of upper as well as backward caste land-
owning peasants.  
 
As daily encounters with the state-backed upper caste militias caused unprecedented blood 
bath in the North, the Maoists recruited thugs, gangs, mafia and criminals to kill and die for 
them. The ordinary people, already frightened by Maoist viciousness, became further repelled by 
their participation in the ‘protection markets’. The Maoists were no longer the Robin Hoods, the 
beloved lawless revolutionary agents of righteous resistance.  They were, instead, another clog in 
the giant wheel of corruption and exploitation.  
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  This irreparably damaged the ability of insurgent organization to forge horizontal networks 
with broader civil society courted by competing social justice and identity movements within 
democracy. Popular indigenous upheaval, identity-based socialist movements further undercut 
Maoist mobilization and recruitment capacity in the North. As the insurgent organization lost 
popular ground, they undermined and attacked grassroots organizations in the insurgency-
democracy interface viciously, including those that were sympathetic but not completely subju-
gated to their revolutionary program. Thus retiring rebels in the North, unlike their southern 
comrades, did not encounter any robust, supportive network of movement entrepreneurs and re-
integration stewards who would alleviate their fear and insecurities and ease their reintegration. 
Instead they had to fall back upon the Maoist-mafia-police-politician-bureaucrat network that 
comprised the protection racket that they were already plugged into. Returning Maoists latch on 
to pervasive political criminality that was part of their pre-rebel and rebel careers and dominate 
their post-rebel life as well. The emergent discordant exit network is top heavy with many politi-
cians and bureaucrats, but the connections do not grow into local villages or expand onto urban 
areas. Thus the retired rebels in the North mostly join various political parties to contest elections 
at national, state or local levels. Some also reinvent themselves as political operatives who lever-
age their control over certain rural pockets to deliver votes for their chosen parties. They stay 
close to the capital city, and are unable to reintegrate into their pre-war professions in their re-
spective villages. The discordant exit network, given that it is embedded in the market of protec-
tion and corruption, discourages the return of foot soldiers who do not have the leverage, politi-
cal capital or area domination to become a cog in this well-oiled machinery of market and the 
state in the North.  
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Chapter	  6:	  Understanding	  the	  Process	  of	  Rebel	  Retirement	  
6.1	  Introduction:	  Revisiting	  the	  Argument	  
	  
This dissertation examines how insurgents give up arms and return to the mainstream. Through 
out history ordinary men and women have taken up arms hoping to radically improve their so-
cial, political and economic circumstances. Equally often, rebels have given up arms to return to 
the mainstream. But while a lot has been written on why men rebel (Gurr 1970), we know very 
little about how rebels quit. Over the last decade, policy makers worldwide have devoted ex-
traordinary resources and attention to devise incentives to wean the youth away from extremist 
groups. Violent political groups have emerged as greatest threat not only to the dream of world 
peace, but also to more mundane yet proximate woes like child/maternal nutrition and adult liter-
acy. The policy literature is, however, focused on impact evaluation of concrete economic incen-
tives designed to facilitate disarmament and reintegration. It is also fixated on countering extrem-
ism of Islamic and right-wing variety, which obfuscates the fact that only in the last century ex-
tremism was mostly communist. Left radical groups recruited youth for armed uprisings against 
the state. But eventually they decided to disarm and return into the fold of electoral competition. 
Ideology aside, surely there are some insights to be drawn from disarming of left radical and the 
evolution of leftwing extremism into social democratic struggles within the system.  
 In this dissertation, I focus on how armed rebels quit a successful and ongoing 
communist armed struggle in a functioning democracy like India. I show that rebels retire 
through informal exit networks that grow in the grey areas of democracy in the insurgency-
democracy interface. Based on extensive conversations with former Maoists and other stake-
holders in conflict locations in North and South India, I argue that the primary fear of retiring 
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rebels is that they would be killed as soon as they disarmed. There is no institutional guarantee 
within democracy that the state will protect returning rebels even after the fanfare of rebel sur-
render, bringing high reputational career rewards for law enforcement officers and politicians, is 
over. This creates a problem of credible commitment, which unless resolved, is an impediment to 
rebel retirement and reintegration.  
 I show how informal exit networks can resolve this problem of credible commit-
ment locally. These networks grow in the shadow of various voluntary organizations of civic 
participation that flourish in the grey zones of democracy-insurgency interface. In fact, a popular 
armed insurgency, depending on its social base and organizational ties, can energize the grass-
roots politics and encourage emergence of various voluntary organizations within democracy. 
These organizations encourage civic participation within democracy but adopt rhetoric and is-
sues from anti-democratic rebel politics. Some of these voluntary organizations might have orig-
inated within rebel politics before migrating into democracy. They operate one-foot in democra-
cy and one-foot-in rebel politics. Thus they open up grey zones in insurgency-democracy inter-
face where informal exit networks facilitating rebel retirement and reintegration eventually 
evolve.  In other cases, due to the nature of pre-existing social forces and their interaction with 
insurgent mobilization, rebel linkages and ties with democratic politics can be less virtuous, ex-
acerbating the thuggish political criminality and sectarianism in democratic politics which even-
tually spills over into the grey zones. Under such circumstances rebel retirement and reintegra-
tion is stunted. I explain the origin of two different exit networks and two distinct trajectories and 
outcomes of rebel retirement in two conflict locations of India in terms of three factors that are 
systemically different in the two cases: (a) pre-war social bases of insurgency, (b) the nature of 
insurgent organizational ties and (c) insurgency-democracy interaction in the grey areas between 
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them.146 Informal exit networks, depending on the evolving dynamics in the grey zone of insur-
gent-democratic interface can be harmonic or discordant.  
 Harmonic exit networks, as in the Telangana case analyzed in this dissertation, re-
veal the critical importance of movement entrepreneurs (MEs) and reintegration stewards (RSs), 
who work together to safeguard life and livelihood of retiring rebels. MEs are tied to rebel 
groups via longstanding horizontal ties that are forged through their shared commitment to goals 
of greater democratic accountability, participation, representativeness that they approach through 
different means. As one former Maoist put it, many MEs in rights and cultural organizations 
strive for the same goals of inclusive democracy for the impoverished and marginalized popula-
tion. MEs do it within the limits of law and constitution and the Maoists take up arms with an 
aim to precipitate a crisis intense enough to lead to dissolution of the state. RSs grow in the 
grassroots caste, women’s’ or professional organizations in insurgency-democracy interface. Un-
like MEs, their impact and networks are geographically static. Like MEs, they also have/had 
close family/friends in rebel groups or were themselves part of rebel politics at some point in 
their lives. They are connected to MEs through shared political activities in various democratic 
platforms of civic participation and via a common stake in local peacebuilding.  As MEs build an 
overarching consensus within in favor of Maoist political goals, RSs turn the nuts and bolts lo-
cally, often under the radar, to ensure that former enemies do not jeopardize the life and liveli-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  The	  usual	  recommendation	  of	  case	  selection	  on	  independent	  variables	  was	  not	  an	  option.	  But	  in	  exploratory	  
research,	  where	  the	  thin	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  does	  not	  really	  arm	  me	  with	  any	  solid	  intuition	  (except	  the	  prelimi-­‐
nary	  evidence	  from	  my	  statistical	  analysis)	  about	  what	  factors	  explain	  the	  outcome	  (rebel	  retirement),	  examining	  
the	  case	  with	  the	  highest	  and	  lowest	  values	  on	  dependent	  variable	  was	  a	  conscious	  attempt	  to	  maximize	  variance	  
on	  the	  dimension	  of	  interest.	  With	  the	  same	  purpose	  of	  increasing	  variation,	  for	  state-­‐level	  comparison	  I	  chose	  
West	  Bengal	  and	  Jharkhand	  with	  lowest	  values	  on	  surrender	  as	  my	  other	  area	  of	  field	  research.	  This	  approach	  re-­‐
duces	  the	  number	  of	  case,	  but	  its	  combination	  of	  careful	  comparisons	  within	  a	  shared	  political	  setting	  and	  militant	  
group,	  attention	  to	  sequencing,	  and	  empirical	  details	  make	  my	  inferences	  more	  credible	  than	  those	  that	  I	  might	  
draw	  from	  a	  more	  heterogeneous	  and	  less	  detailed	  set	  of	  cases.	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hood of returning rebels. The diagram below depicts the process of emergence of harmonic exit 
network in Telangana.  
 
Figure	  28	  
Rebel Retirement through Harmonic Exit Network 
 In the other process of rebel retirement portrayed in this dissertation, a discordant 
exit network exacerbates the fear and insecurities of retiring rebels, impeding further retirement 
and reintegration. This network offers retiring rebels the protection and benefaction of the dis-
cordant exit network only in return of their willingness to either contest elections or manipulate 
elections at gunpoint. When a rebel movement is intensely militarized, their recruitment becomes 
increasingly restricted to the politically unprincipled, to criminal elements looking for guns and 
action. Militarization of Jharkhand Maoists did not happen in a socio-political vacuum. Intense 
sectarian divides in a deeply feudal rural society of North India posed greater challenge to Mao-
ist project of class mobilization than did rural Telangana, which had the benefit of prior com-
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munist and ant-Brahmin movements. The Maoists in rural South Bihar/Jharkhand found the 
Backward Castes divided in their loyalty: while most backward castes were poor and sympa-
thized with Maoist redistribution goals, they had strong kinship ties with their rich caste brethren 
and often took up arms against Maoist comrades to avoid caste excommunication. Further back-
ward castes scrambled their way up in democratic platforms through Yadav, Kurmi regional po-
litical parties, which further distanced them from Maoists. These backward castes are keen to 
maintain their caste superiority, social distance and inbuilt scorn for Dalits (formerly ‘untoucha-
ble’), who stuck to the Maoists.  
 This fractured support base in Jharkhand weakened Maoists, injected caste mis-
trust/rivalry into Maoist organization and divided Maoists into warring caste factions.  In addi-
tion, the divided Maoists had to cope with highly militant feudal landlords, whose stranglehold 
extended to elected offices and administrations via kinship networks. State institutions, from po-
lice to courts, operated via kinship ties deeply biased against Dalits. The local Maoist leadership, 
not free of these caste dynamics, increasingly adopted an extortionary, rent-seeking behavior as 
well as sectarian politics to sustain their area of control and local domination. This damaged their 
horizontal linkages, alienated principled rights activists in democratic grassroots organizations. 
The same political-criminal networks that infiltrated Maoist organization also dominated the 
Grey Zone in insurgency-democracy interface. Only those former rebels who could potentially 
win elections or manipulate election outcomes for other candidates and political parties were of-
fered benefaction of the discordant exit network. Grassroots level cadres, mostly Dalit and tribal, 
do not receive its assurance that their lives and livelihood would be equally protected. The fol-
lowing diagram depicts the process of rebel retirement through discordant exit network in Jhar-
khand.  
 	  
	  
216	  
 
Figure	  29	  
Rebel Retirement through Discordant Exit Network 
 
 I conclude that it was not a coincidence that Telangana Maoists forged broad coali-
tion of progressive forces around them and Jharkhand Maoists did not. These divergent tracks 
built on interplay of local social bases of insurgency, specifically on composition and militancy 
of antagonistic groups, and on ideological history of Maoist groups dominating the region. I 
show that ideology has a mediated effect on retirement through influencing mobilization and re-
cruitment strategies of extremist groups. In the rest of this concluding chapter I summarize the 
theoretical implications of the process of rebel retirement analyzed in this dissertation. I show 
how pre-war social bases of insurgency and network and ties forged by insurgent organization 
are expected to interact to influence rebel retirement in the real world. Instead of sacrificing de-
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tails for parsimony and generalizability, I have focused on increasing the internal validity of the 
findings. In the next section I summarize how the insights of this study can be applied elsewhere.  
6.2	  Theoretical	  Implications	  
	  
While this dissertation has been a comparative study of two cases of rebel retirement in one 
country, its central argument that rebels quit through informal exit networks that grow in the in-
surgency-state interface can resonate in many other parts of the world. The primary apprehension 
of retiring rebels that the state does not offer any assurance that retiring rebels will not be killed 
as soon as they disarmed and the resulting problem of credible commitment in DDR (Disarma-
ment, Demobilization and Reintegration) will also likely resonate in other contexts of insurgent 
democratic transition. For example, Sinhalese armed forces have killed surrendered Tamil rebels 
en masse deterring further reconciliation. 147 Sometimes rebel groups would execute their former 
comrades if they suspected that they would surrender.148 There are massive organized protests in 
Kashmir against the Indian government’s rehabilitation policy of 2010 that lured former rebels 
back with false promises and later had them killed.149 The Burundi police and National Defense 
Force killed least 47 surrendered rebels in one month (January 2015). Surrendered rebels were 
beaten to death, shot at point blank range or thrown off cliffs. 150 After the Syrian President Ba-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/14/srilanka-­‐tamil-­‐leaders-­‐surrender-­‐shot	  there	  are	  reports	  of	  
Sri	  Lankan	  state	  colluding	  to	  kill	  Tamil	  guerrilla	  throughout	  the	  civil	  war.	  See	  some	  details	  at	  http://white-­‐flags.org/	  	  
148	  http://kashmirdispatch.com/2016/01/06/anti-­‐india-­‐rebel-­‐killed-­‐by-­‐own-­‐men-­‐who-­‐suspected-­‐him-­‐of-­‐
surrendering/4180/	  	  
149	  http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/06/kashmir-­‐former-­‐fighters-­‐regret-­‐homecoming-­‐
201462214440675226.html	  	  
150	  https://news.vice.com/article/at-­‐least-­‐47-­‐surrendered-­‐rebels-­‐executed-­‐as-­‐burundi-­‐makes-­‐a-­‐bloody-­‐start-­‐to-­‐
2015	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shar Assad offered a general amnesty to militants who surrender to the government authorities, 
surrendered rebels attending reconciliation camps were butchered. 151  
I argue that the informal exit networks that evolve in some conflict locations are harmon-
ic and they locally resolve the problem of credible commitment. The discordant exit networks in 
other locations, however, are not robust enough to offer their protection to all retiring rebels. In-
stead, they exacerbate rebel insecurities and restrict their reintegration to a few professions in 
limited locations. In the rest of this chapter I summarize my arguments on how emergence of two 
different kinds of exit networks depend on interaction of two factors: (a) Pre-war Social Bases of 
Insurgency (b) Vertical and Horizontal Ties of Insurgent Organization 
6.2.1 Pre-­‐War	  Social	  Bases	  of	  Rebel	  Group 
	  
It is fairly intuitive to claim that pre-existing community structure—or the lack thereof—
impacts the insurgent organization, its military capabilities, staying power, effectiveness, and 
group cohesion. (Staniland 2012; Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013; Giustozzi 2008; Kilcullen 2009; 
Dixon 2009) Insurgent organizations also alter local communities, drawing new battle lines, rein-
forcing some old ties and fracturing others, breaking trust and forging new alliances. 
I argue that pre-war social bases impact group cohesion of insurgent organization through 
two concomitant processes: (a) degree of polarization of support base (b) militarization of local 
authority. Social bases of insurgent organizations are made up of supporters and adversaries. By 
supporters, I mean those who provide information and supplies to insurgents and refuse to coop-
erate with government forces, beyond what is necessary to survive in conflict areas. (Wood 
2003) The adversaries are the local authority or ruling class, who consider rebel politics detri-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/video-­‐daraa-­‐rebels-­‐disturb-­‐reconciliation-­‐kill-­‐surrendered-­‐fighters/	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mental to their socioeconomic prospects and hence take up arms and/or provide information and 
support to government counterinsurgency efforts. Generally, the socially dominant groups who 
benefit from the status quo are adversaries who oppose insurgency. The oppressed groups who 
seek change in status quo constitute support base of the insurgency. 152  
Polarization of support base of insurgency  
Polarization of the support base of an insurgency can be high or low. High polarization 
implies that rebels recruit exclusively from one, fairly homogenous group and mobilize against 
other(s). In Telangana the Maoist supporters are Dalit and Backward castes with little or no land. 
The opponents are forward caste landed peasants.153 The opponents share no overlapping social 
ties or economic interests with Maoist supporters. Therefore, there is a thick line of dividing 
identities and interests of these two conflicting groups. Low polarization implies that in a loca-
tion both pro-rebel and anti-rebel elements belong to the same caste groups and share strong kin-
ship ties despite conflicting class interests. For example, in Jharkhand, Yadav and Kurmis were 
both supporters and opponents of Maoists. Some land-poor backward caste Yadavs joined the 
Maoists struggle for socioeconomic justice, while others sided with the affluent caste brethren 
despite conflicting class interests. Poor Yadav peasants would sometimes switch their allegiance 
from Maoists to their own caste groups, prioritising caste identities over class interests. (Kunnath 
2006) Often they did so to avoid caste excommunication, which would, among other things, 
make it impossible for a family to marry their daughters within their caste. This bred simmering 
caste mistrust within the Maoist organizations, where Dalits doubted the loyalty of their back-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  In	  the	  messy	  reality,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  neat,	  dichotomous	  categorization.	  The	  oppressed	  group	  often	  supplies	  inform-­‐
ants	  who	  betray	  insurgents	  and	  assist	  counterinsurgency	  operations.	  But	  the	  broad	  generalization	  that	  the	  op-­‐
pressed	  groups	  support	  insurgents	  and	  the	  dominant	  groups	  oppose	  it	  is	  fairly	  acceptable.	  	  
153	  This	  sharp	  polarization	  of	  Maoist	  supporters	  and	  opponents	  applies	  to	  the	  rural	  support	  base.	  The	  leadership	  of	  
the	  movement	  is	  largely	  upper	  caste,	  urban,	  college	  educated	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ward caste comrades. Thus I argue that high polarization of Maoist support base produces fairly 
homogenous membership of rebels groups and creates high rebel group cohesion. Low polariza-
tion of support base leads to low rebel group cohesion.  
Group cohesion refers to interpersonal emotional bonds among rebel soldiers that allow 
them to trust each other, care for each other and, in the end, fight together (Griffith 2007).154 In-
surgent organizations, in adverse geographies and away from families, meets organic needs of 
comrades by offering each other affection, esteem, a sense of power and direction, which regu-
lates their relations with leaders, reduces self-concern and distinct individual identity and allows 
them to commit to insurgent shared tasks and missions. In the face of imminent danger to their 
lives, rebels from mutually hostile social groups are unable to blend and rally around the flag. 
Local leaders forced to mediate in conflict among various cliques in the organization are forced 
to eventually take sides in underlying caste conflicts or are perceived to do so.155 The central 
leadership of insurgent organization either plays hands off or become drawn into local conflicts 
as well. 156Research on conventional militaries has already recognized the potentially positive or 
damaging effects of strong pre-existing social divides on military cohesion and outcome (Mac-
Coun, Kier, and Belkin 2006; Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, and Ben-Ari 2005; Griffith 2007). Insurgent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  Low	  group	  cohesion	  leads	  to	  low	  task	  cohesion.	  Task	  cohesion	  refers	  to	  the	  shared	  commitment	  among	  mem-­‐
bers	  to	  achieving	  organizational	  goal	  that	  requires	  the	  collective	  efforts	  of	  the	  group.	  High	  group	  cohesion	  howev-­‐
er,	  does	  not	  necessarily	  produce	  high	  task	  cohesion.	  	  
155	  In	  India,	  caste	  of	  an	  individual	  is	  the	  most	  potent,	  enduring,	  divisive	  identification	  characteristic	  laden	  with	  cen-­‐
turies	  of	  power	  relations,	  social	  hierarchies,	  and	  economic	  endowments.	  I	  argue	  that	  Maoist	  insurgent	  organiza-­‐
tion	  is	  more	  cohesive	  in	  areas	  where	  they	  polarize	  society	  into	  Dalits	  v	  upper	  castes	  and	  their	  recruitment	  of	  cadres	  
is	  primarily	  from	  the	  Dalits,	  the	  formerly	  untouchable	  castes.	  The	  Maoist	  organization	  is	  less	  cohesive	  in	  areas	  
where	  it	  fails	  to	  polarize	  society	  into	  Dalits	  versus	  others.	  In	  such	  situations,	  it	  recruits	  cadres	  both	  from	  Dalit	  and	  
other	  middle	  castes.	  Caste	  animosity	  travels,	  and	  insurgent	  organization	  is	  not	  immune	  to	  its	  disruptive	  effect.	  As	  
they	  try	  to	  deepen	  the	  landless	  versus	  landowning	  cleavage,	  middle	  castes	  are	  caught	  in	  a	  limbo.	  Thus	  the	  organi-­‐
zation	  cohesion	  is	  weakened	  by	  (a)	  Dalit	  v	  middle	  caste	  animosities	  (b)	  middle-­‐caste	  family	  ties	  between	  support-­‐
ers	  and	  opponents	  of	  Maoists.	  	  
156	  Depending	  on	  how	  the	  central	  leadership	  reacts,	  there	  are	  different	  outcomes	  affecting	  rebel	  exit	  networks	  as	  
well.	  That	  discussion	  is	  taken	  up	  later.	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military organizations should be no different. In fact, the effect of social division on insurgent 
group cohesion is likely to be more pronounced, because they tend to both recruit and operate 
locally.  
Degree of militancy of local authorities  
The degree of militancy of local authorities also determines the evolving nature of grey 
areas in the state-insurgency interface. Local authorities are highly militant if they fight rebels by 
raising their own militias, who fight side-by-side state forces with total impunity. Local authori-
ties are relatively less militant if they offer information support, shelter, ration and supplies to the 
state counterinsurgency forces, but do not have their own private militia. They do resist rebels in 
isolated clashes but prefer to flee to urban areas rather than risk frequent bloodbath. Adversary 
militancy depends on factors predating and exogenous to the insurgency, like martial traditions 
of the ruling class, feudal political economy and prevalent thug capitalism (goonda raj).(Sidel 
1998) The more feudal local elites stay tied to the land; they raise militia and fight rebels in 
frequent bloody wars. The more capitalist rural elites abandon rural agriculture or outsource to 
seek alternative urban income. The following table sums up how pre-war social bases impact in-
surgent organization by the interactive effect of polarization of support base and militarization of 
local adversary, which, in turn, impacts the emergence of specific exit network through mecha-
nisms described below.  
Militancy of 
local author-
ities 
Polarization of Support Base 
High Low 
High A. High group cohe-
sion; frequent clashes; 
 
No Grey Area 
C. Low group cohe-
sion; 
Frequent clashes; 
 
Vicious Grey Area 
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Low B. High group cohe-
sion; sporadic vio-
lence; 
 
Virtuous Grey Area 
 
D. Low group cohe-
sion; sporadic vio-
lence; 
 
 
No Grey Area 
Figure	  30	  
Rebel Retirement and Pre-War Social Bases of Insurgency  
Quadrant A: When a highly cohesive rebel group faces a highly militant local authority 
there will be frequent clashes resulting in high militarization of the rebel movement. Everyone is 
forced to take sides. ( Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Kalyvas 2007) This is generally the stage of 
intense conflict when actors who try to straddle across the state-rebel divide are ruthlessly elimi-
nated. Conditions are likely to be unfavourable to emergence of exit networks under such cir-
cumstances.  
Quadrant B: But when a cohesive rebel group faces weakly militant local authority, re-
bels establish local domination. Riding on military superiority they are able pursue and imple-
ment their progressive agenda at the grassroots, which will engender selective sympathy among 
broad progressive crowd within democracy. This cracks open a gray area of virtuous collabora-
tion between democratic activists and the rebels. In this setting harmonic exit network is likely to 
be grow.  
Quadrant C: When a weakly cohesive rebel organization confronts a highly militant local 
adversary in frequent clashes, local commanders anxiously navigate internal divisions in the in-
surgent organization and try to up the ante against adversary in a manner that allows them to 
maintain leadership. Rebel leaders perpetuate influence through money laundering, extortion, 
kidnapping, arms trafficking, mining, mafia, smuggling through intricate extensions of filial 
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networks. A grey area is cracked open, but it is deeply embedded in a nexus of mafia-politicians-
police-bureaucrat-rebel leaders. The exit network here is likely to be discordant.   
6.2.2	  Horizontal	  and	  Vertical	  Ties	  of	  Insurgent	  Organization	  
	  
Insurgent organizations proactively forge vertical and horizontal ties. The relative strength of 
these ties interacts variously with their pre-war social bases to produce different organizational 
outcomes. The type of rebel exit network is also contingent on the dynamics of this interaction.  
In this study, horizontal ties link rebel leaders, organizers and intellectual support bases across 
space, embedded in formal organizations, informal relationships, or often in an overlap of two. 
Below this ideational firmament of horizontal ties are the local communities, neighborhood, and 
villages where recruitment and retirement of rebels actually happens. The vertical ties refer to 
linkages that the insurgent organization forges with the local communities – villages and 
neighborhood. Unlike the horizontal ties that travel across space, the vertical ties are geograph-
ically concentrated. The following diagram shows the different outcomes for insurgent organiza-
tion depending on different combinations of strong and weak vertical and horizontal ties forged 
by an insurgent organization.   
Vertical 
Ties 
Horizontal Ties 
Strong Weak 
Strong A. Autonomous Or-
ganization 
B. Entrenched Or-
ganization 
 
Weak C. Centralized Or-
ganization 
 
 
D. Fledgling Organi-
zation 
 
Figure	  31	  
Rebel Retirement and Insurgent Organizational Ties  
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Quadrant A: When both vertical and horizontal ties are strong, insurgent organizations 
enjoy political centralization and organizational decentralization. In other words, though vertical 
ties give organizations enough mass base, ideological directives from central leadership and dia-
logue with democratic forces sympathetic to rebel cause keeps the organizations autonomous 
from local sectarian divisions. Harmonic exit networks are likely to emerge in areas where insur-
gent organization forges strong horizontal and vertical ties.  
Quadrant B: However, when vertical ties are strong and horizontal ties weak, local de-
mands gain the upper hand over central plans and goals. The central leadership is forced to make 
ideational compromises in order to accommodate local requirements. Insurgent organizations are 
cut off from broader democratic actors who do not identify with sectarian politics of insurgent 
leaders. This produces a locally entrenched organization. Discordant exit networks are likely to 
emerge in these areas.  
Quadrant C: When horizontal ties are strong and vertical ties weak, the insurgent organi-
zation has a weak mass base. A highly centralized organization with weak local presence cannot 
foster local networks of trust. But since leaders have strong horizontal ties, they will likely be 
absorbed into mainstream in professions and roles commensurate with their ambitions and quali-
fications.  
Quadrant D: When both ties are weak, the fledgling organization is either nascent or de-
caying. There is no exit network in this configuration.  
6.2.3	  Insurgency-­‐Democracy	  Interaction	  
	  
Despite sharp juxtaposition of the legal state and illegal rebel movement both in state and 
in rebel communications and documents, millions of men and women in conflict zones every-
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where live their everyday lives in a gray zone between the two. Alongside exchange of fire be-
tween the two sides in an ongoing conflict, popular political life and governance grow across the 
state-rebel divide. These pockets of partial belonging and disorder in conflict zones create gray 
areas. In everyday experiences, state institutions and rebel politics in these gray areas penetrate 
each other in the constant intersection between the formal and the informal, the legal and the il-
legal.  
Although state law and regulations are flouted at every turn, the presence and power of 
the state can still be felt. Although rebels are outlaws, they often regulate day-to-day lives and 
livelihoods. People sympathetic to the movement seek justice for rebels in state courts. State of-
ficials take cues from rebel mobilization to identify policy areas in need of urgent remedial 
measures. The size and energy of the gray area and the rebel-state interaction in it depends on 
polarization and militarization of pre-war social bases of insurgency and on horizontal and verti-
cal ties forged by the insurgent organization.  
For example, civil liberties activists in Telangana formed Amara Veerula Bandhumitrula 
Sangham (Committee for Martyrs’ Friends and Relatives) devoted to the task of claiming dead 
bodies of rebels killed in an exchange of fire with police. This is a pro-rebel organization that is 
legal and works openly in democracy. There were many other such organizations in Telangana 
that work within democracy to compel that state to follow its own laws. The state secretary of 
CMAS described how she negotiates with police, both perpetrator of atrocities and harbinger of 
hope. She is herself an employee of a public sector bank. Public sector employees with deep 
sympathy for rebel political causes are hardly uncommon.  Police personnel have rebel connec-
tions. Bureaucrats personally know and admire rebel leaders. Journalists are former guerrillas. 
Guerrillas have family members in the government ministry. Opening a local business needs 
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blessings of both state and rebels. Businesses collaborate with rebels in securing government 
contracts. Government collaborates with same businesses to weaken rebel control. Perpetrators 
are victims, and victims are perpetrators. In some conflict locations the grey zone is virtuous, 
with active, open collaboration among democratic and rebel forces. In other conflict locations, 
the grey zone can be mired in fear and mistrust dominated by anti-social actors running smug-
gling, extortion, trafficking with support of both rebels and the state. However, it is unlikely that 
any protracted conflict grew without creating an ambiguous interface between itself and the mar-
gins of the state.  
There is also a rich literature in Anthropology on the ‘margins of a sovereign state’, 
which questions the Weberian ideal of rational, legal state with centralized control over determi-
nate territory and proposes that we explore the state’s “margins”—that is, the places where state 
law and order is continually renegotiated. (Das and Poole 2004; Das 2004) In other words, the 
margins of the state are porous. In everyday lives of ordinary people the extra-legal and the legal 
overlap. The following diagram sums up how (a) pre-war social bases of insurgent groups and 
(b) horizontal and vertical ties forged by insurgents define the grey zone in insurgent-democracy 
interface. 
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Figure	  32	  
Informal Exit Network in the Grey Zone 
When an insurgent support base is sharply polarized into two sides, and local authority 
weakly militant, a highly cohesive organization grows strong vertical and horizontal ties. They 
build strong mass movements around broad movement political goals. This energizes the grass-
roots politics in democracy and instigates high civic participation in cross cutting voluntary or-
ganizations. Thus Reintegration Stewards emerge at grassroots level with one foot in democratic 
mass organizations and other foot in rebel movement. Movement Entrepreneurs, tied to rebels 
through horizontal network, steer collective discourse around resistance and build broad consen-
sus and social goodwill around rebels. The grey area is marked by the multilevel exchanges be-
tween the state and insurgency, ranging from everyday interactions to high-level dialogues, both 
through the formal institution and informal channels. When rebels retire, the MEs and RSs work 
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together to produce a harmonic exit network that safeguards rebel life and livelihood. This builds 
peace locally and encourages a high rebel retirement and broad reintegration in a wide variety of 
roles. Thus the lure of democracy works bottom up, through thriving grassroots associational 
life.  
On the other hand, when insurgent support base is diffused (not sharply polarized into 
friends and enemies of rebel mobilization) and local authority is very militarized, an insurgent 
organization with low group cohesiveness becomes caught in frequent violent clashes. This mili-
tarizes state- rebel interaction intensely and rebel mass organizations wither. With the mass or-
ganizations, horizontal ties of rebel groups are broken. The rebel movement is divorced from the 
civic participations within democracy. Movement Entrepreneurs do not emerge. The vertical ties 
of an insurgent organization fighting bloody sectarian wars are strong. But these ties are strong-
est with corrupt, violent, thuggish elements who aid local leadership sustain internecine wars. 
Insurgents groups become mired in local divisions that permeate insurgent organization and dis-
rupt organizational cohesiveness. These anti-social elements eventually dominate the grey area in 
the interface of state and insurgency. They are the only conduits ensuring safe passage of retiring 
rebels. Exit networks are discordant, allowing former rebels protection only if they agreed to 
perpetuate the dominant unholy nexus.  
In another likely scenario, when the insurgent local support base is diffused and local au-
thority is not very militarized an insurgent organization with low group cohesiveness but strong 
horizontal ties (and well-known leaders) sees its insurgent counter-elites seek political rehabilita-
tion in the mainstream. To compensate for weak vertical ties and thin mass base, the leaders give 
up arms, form new political parties, join existing electoral parties or seek other professional ca-
reers. Exit networks do not emerge here due to weak grassroots presence. Grey Zone is restricted 
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to urban areas, in elite campuses or literary circles. Insurgent elites transition back into diverse 
roles. Foot soldiers either die or side with local power overnight, in a turncoat exit to escape exe-
cution.   
6.3 Conclusion	  
	  
The type of exit network that emerges in a location is conditional on pre-war social bases of in-
surgency and vertical and horizontal ties forged by insurgents.  These factors locally determine 
the dynamics of interaction between legitimate/state and illegitimate/rebel politics in the gray 
zones that separate the two. The lure of democracy is contingent on this interaction. Paradoxical-
ly, a strong rebel movement with an extensive mass base is likely to increase the lure of democ-
racy. Such a rebel movement energizes the grassroots and encourages proliferation of multiple 
civic associations, which operate with considerable sympathy to rebel causes but within the 
democratic platform. This allows emergence of MEs and RSs who facilitate rebel retirement and 
reintegration.   
In explaining rebel retirement I depart from existing writings on rebel retirement in psy-
chology, sociology, and criminology that identify ‘push’ factors  (such as disillusionment with 
personnel, strategy and ideology, fatigue/burnout) and ‘pull’ factors (such as lucrative surrender 
packages, amnesty, desires to establish a family) influencing rebel retirement. The counterinsur-
gency literature on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is also focused too 
narrowly on confiscation of arms and livelihood concerns of ex-combatants. In between push-
pull factors that affect insurgents’ desire to exit, and post-exit DDR programs, is the protracted 
process of disengagement whereby rebels establish contact with the outside and plan post-
retirement safety and livelihood strategies. I focus on this in-between protracted process that 
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plays out in the interface between democracy and insurgency, where macro (environmental), 
meso (organizational) and micro (individual) factors co-evolve to produce outcomes. Retiring 
rebels are motivated by the institutional lack of credible commitment to depend on informal exit 
networks that either ameliorate or exacerbate their fear and insecurities over disarming, particu-
larly the fear of getting killed by former enemies. I highlight how insurgent organizational ties 
and pre-war social bases interact to determine the grassroots associational life within democracy 
as well as the type of exit networks that evolve in the shadow of these associations in a particular 
conflict location.  
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Fig	  1:	  Distribution of Dependent Variable: Effect of Outliers 
	  
	  
	  
Fig	  2:	  Correlation	  between	  Rebel	  Retirement	  (DVa)	  and	  Investment	  in	  Electrical	  Industry	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Fig	  3:	  Correlation	  between	  Rebel	  Retirement	  (DVa)	  and	  Investment	  in	  Construction	  Industry	  
	  
Fig	  4:	  Correlation	  between	  Rebel	  Retirement	  (DVa)	  and	  Public	  Sector	  Investment	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Fig	  5:	  Correlation	  between	  Rebel	  Retirement	  (DVa)	  and	  Foreign	  Investment	  	  
	  
	  
Fig	  6:	  Correlation	  between	  Rebel	  Retirement	  (DVa)	  and	  Investment	  in	  Mining	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Fig	  7:	  Correlation	  between	  Rebel	  Retirement	  (DVa)	  and	  Mining	  of	  Coal/Lignite.	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Fig 8: Construction of Orgdens (Organizational Density) 
	  
	  
	  
Variable  Survey Question 
ME1 Does anybody in the household belong to a Mahila 
mandal (womens’ organization)? 
ME2 Does anybody in the household belong to a youth 
club, sports group, or reading room?  
ME3 Does anybody in the household belong to a trade un-
ion, business or professional group?   
ME4 Does anybody in the household belong to a self help 
group? 
ME5 Does anybody in the household belong to a credit or 
savings groups?  
ME6 Does anybody in the household belong to a religious 
or social group or festival society? 
ME7 Does anybody in the household belong to a caste as-
sociation?   
ME8 Does anybody in the household belong to a devel-
opment group or NGO?   
ME9 Does anybody in the household belong to an agricul-
tural, milk, or other co-operative  
ME10 In the most recent national elections, did you vote?   
ME11 Have you or anyone in the household attended a pub-
lic meeting called by the village panchayat/ nagarpal-
ika/ ward committee in the last year?  
ME12 Is anyone in the household an official of the village 
panchayat/nagarpalika/ward committee. Is there 
someone close to the household, who is a member?   
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Variable Survey Question 
CI1 Confidence in politicians to fulfill promises.   
CI2 Confidence in the military to defend the country.   
CI3 Confidence in the police to enforce the law.  
CI4 Confidence in the state government to look after the people  
CI5 Confidence in newspapers to print the truth   
CI6 Confidence in village panchayats/nagarpalika to implement public 
projects  
CI7 Confidence in schools to provide good education  
CI8 Confidence in hospitals and doctors to provide good treatment.  
CI9 Confidence in courts to meet out justice   
CI10 Confidence in banks to keep money safe.  
	  
Fig	  9	  ;Construction	  of	  Confidence	  in	  Institutions	  (CI)	  variables	  
	  
State 
# of Dis-
tricts in 
State 
# of Dis-
tricts 
Affected 
Districts Affected 
Andhra Pra-
desh 
13 8 
Guntur, Prakasam, Anantapur, Kurnool, Vizianagaram, East Godavari, 
Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam 
Bihar 38 11 
Aurangabad, Gaya, Rohtas, Bhojpur, Kaimur, East Champaran, West 
Champaran, Sitamarhi, Munger, Nawada, Jamui 
Jharkhand 24 18 
Hazaribagh, Lohardaga, Palamu, Chatra, Garhwa, Ranchi, Gumla, Sim-
dega, Latehar, Giridih, Koderma, Bokaro, Dhanbad, East Singhbhum, 
West Singhbhum, Saraikela Kharsawan, Khunti, Ramgarh 
Chhattisgarh 27 9 
Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Rajnandgaon, Sarguja, Jashpur, 
Koriya, Narayanpur, Sukma 
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Maharashtra 35 3 Gadchiroli, Chandrapur, Gondia 
Odisha 30 9 
Malkangiri, Ganjam, Koraput, Gajapati, Rayagada, Mayurbhanj, 
Sundargarh, Deogarh, Kandhamal 
Telangana 10 8 
Warangal, Karimnagar, Adilabad, Khammam, Medak, Nalgonda, 
Mahbubnagar, Nizamabad 
Uttar Pradesh 75 3 Sonbhadra, Mirzapur, Chandauli 
West Bengal 19 3 Bankura, West Midnapore, Purulia 
Madhya Pra-
desh 
50 1 Balaghat 
Total 318 77 
 
Fig	  10:	  	  Red	  Corridor:	  The	  Maoist	  Affected	  States	  and	  Districts	  
	  
	  
Variable	   N	   Mean	   SD	   Min	   Max	  
InvestmentsElectric	  (INV_ELECTRIC)	   237	   0.2353	   0.257	   0.0004735	   1	  
Investments	   Construction	  
(INV_CONSTRUCTION)	  
219	   0.1624	   0.2669	   0	   1	  
InvestmentsForeign	  (INV_FOREIGN)	   154	   0.08216	   0.2436	   0	   1	  
InvestmentsDomestic	  (INV_DOMESTIC)	   310	   0.1174	   0.1849	   0	   1	  
InvestmentsPublic	  (INV_PUBLIC)	   197	   0.1071	   0.2172	   0	   1	  
InvestmentsMining	  (INV_MINING)	   228	   0.07216	   0.2007	   0	   1	  
MiningCrudePetrol	  (Crude_Petrol)	   310	   0.4	   1.163	   0	   6	  
MiningCoalLignite	  (Coal_Lignite)	   310	   2.8	   4.715	   0	   17	  
MiningMetalOres	  (Metal_Ores)	   310	   2.033	   4.098	   0	   16	  
MiningNonFerrousMetal	   Ores	  
(Non_Ferrous_Metal_Ores)	  
310	   0.1333	   0.5713	   0	   3	  
Difference	   Household	   Assets	  
(DIFFHHASSETS)	  
318	   3.496	   2.169	   -­‐1.417	   11.43	  
Health	  Access	  (HEALTH_ACCESS)	   318	   2.447	   0.928	   0	   3	  
Literacy	  (Literacy)	   318	   0.5957	   0.9007	   0	   3	  
Percentage	   of	   Argricultural	   Labor	  
(r_pct_maglb)	  
310	   0.2297	   0.09891	   0.0803	   0.4649	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Confidence	  in	  Institutions	  (CONFINST)	   318	   2.021	   0.9205	   1	   3	  
Crime	  (CRIME)	   318	   1	   0	   1	   1	  
Natural	  Logarithm	  of	  Area	  (ln_area)	   318	   8.778	   0.9361	   5.22	   9.859	  
Natural	   Logarithm	   of	   Population	  
(ln_population)	  
318	   14.51	   0.6125	   13.13	   15.58	  
Area	  Covered	  with	  Forest	  (forest_cover)	   315	   26.56	   17.85	   0	   67.2	  
Percentage	  of	  SC	  Population	  	  	  (r_pct_sc)	   318	   0.1609	   0.0726	   0.02499	   0.3248	  
Percentage	  of	  ST	  Population	  (r_pct_st)	   318	   0.2481	   0.2341	   0.000751	   0.7021	  
Fig	  11:Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  Independent	  and	  Control	  Variables	  
	  
	  
	  	   RTRMT	   ln_area	   ln_pop	   forest_cover	   r_pct_sc	   r_pct_st	  
RTRMT	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
ln_area	   0.19	   	   	   	   	   	  
ln_pop	   0.11	   0.12	   	   	   	   	  
forest_cover	   0.21	   0.28	   -­‐0.59	   	   	   	  
r_pct_sc	   -­‐0.26	   -­‐0.11	   0.24	   -­‐0.48	   	   	  
r_pct_st	   0.15	   0.06	   -­‐0.57	   0.75	   -­‐0.65	   	  
	  
Fig	  12:	  Correlation	  Among	  control	  variables,	  and	  between	  dependent	  and	  control	  variables	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REGRESSION	  MODELS	  
	  
Notes: Negative binomial regressions. Dependent variables are number of Maoist surrender events.  Standard errors 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Fig 13: Organizational	  Density	  and	  Rebel	  Retirement 
	  
	  
	  	   RETRMT	  	  
	  
(IHDS	  1)	  
RETRMT	  	  
w/	  Controls	  	  
(IHDS	  1)	  
	   RETRMT	  
	  
(IHDS	  2)	  
RETRMT	  
	  w/	  Controls	  	  
(IHDS	  2)	  
(Intercept)	   2.875***	  
(0.269)	  
1.001	  
(3.180)	  
	   2.880***	  
(0.374)	  
1.956	  
(3.407)	  
ORGDENS:	  2/1	   -­‐0.148	  
(0.548)	  
-­‐0.015	  
(0.574)	  
	   1.445*	  
(0.594)	  
0.945	  
(0.635)	  
ORGDENS:	  3/1	   1.138**	  
(0.398)	  
0.652*	  
(0.413)	  
	   0.686*	  
(0.473)	  
0.096*	  
(0.584)	  
r_pct_sc	   	  
	  
-­‐5.843*	  
(2.733)	  
	   	  
	  
-­‐6.932*	  
(2.860)	  
ln_area	   	  
	  
0.331	  
(0.351)	  
	   	  
	  
0.250	  
(0.385)	  
AIC	   407.177	   376.118	   	   409.802	   371.400	  
N	   318	   316	   	   318	   317	  
	  	   RETRMT	  
(1)	  
RETRMT	  
(2)	  
RETRMT	  
(3)	  
RETRMT	  
(4)	  
RETRMT	  
(5)	  
RETRMT	  
(6)	  
(Intercept)	   1.464	  
(3.781)	  
0.401	  
(3.973)	  
-­‐17.570**	  
(5.983)	  
1.121	  
(3.349)	  
1.896	  
(3.636)	  
-­‐1.524	  
(4.157)	  
ORGDENS:	  2/1	   0.065	  
(0.658)	  
0.185	  
(0.668)	  
-­‐0.524	  
(1.324)	  
-­‐0.195	  
(0.649)	  
-­‐0.050	  
(0.633)	  
-­‐1.390	  
(0.805)	  
ORGDENS:	  3/1	   0.677*	  
(0.492)	  
0.001*	  
(0.499)	  
0.418	  
(0.720)	  
0.505*	  
(0.437)	  
0.835*	  
(0.469)	  
1.250*	  
(0.555)	  
r_pct_sc	   -­‐8.100*	  
(3.449)	  
-­‐11.042***	  
(3.208)	  
-­‐2.618	  
(4.523)	  
-­‐6.152*	  
(2.991)	  
-­‐6.873*	  
(3.011)	  
-­‐0.569	  
(3.663)	  
ln_area	   0.358	  
(0.406)	  
0.531	  
(0.457)	  
2.438***	  
(0.692)	  
0.363	  
(0.372)	  
0.262	  
(0.399)	  
0.534	  
(0.465)	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Notes: Negative binomial regressions. Dependent variables are number of Maoist surrender events.  Standard errors 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Fig	  14:	  Impact	  of	  Investment	  in	  Industrialization 
	  
	  	   RETRMT	  
(1)	  
RETRMT	  
(2)	  
RETRMT	  
(3)	  
RETRMT	  
(4)	  
(Intercept)	   -­‐0.151	  
(4.221)	  
-­‐3.984	  
(4.112)	  
-­‐1.444	  
(4.083)	  
-­‐1.314	  
(4.044)	  
ORGDENS:	  2/1	   -­‐1.302	  
(0.788)	  
-­‐1.657*	  
(0.775)	  
-­‐1.452	  
(0.780)	  
-­‐1.493	  
(0.772)	  
ORGDENS:	  3/1	   1.313*	  
(0.556)	  
1.304*	  
(0.543)	  
1.327*	  
(0.557)	  
1.284*	  
(0.548)	  
r_pct_sc	   -­‐1.563	  
(3.705)	  
0.502	  
(3.542)	  
1.443	  
(3.703)	  
1.232	  
(3.674)	  
ln_area	   0.385	  
(0.472)	  
0.808	  
(0.464)	  
0.466	  
(0.458)	  
0.462	  
(0.455)	  
Crude_Petrol	   0.117	  
(0.191)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Coal_Lignite	   	  
	  
-­‐0.087	  
(0.049)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Metal_Ores	   	  
	  
	  
	  
0.066	  
(0.054)	  
	  
	  
INV_ELECTRIC	   -­‐1.640	  
(0.873)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
INV_CONSTRUCTION	   	  
	  
-­‐0.282	  
(0.977)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
INV_FOREIGN	   	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.869	  
(1.095)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
INV_DOMESTIC	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐2.492*	  
(1.136)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
INV_PUBLIC	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.305	  
(0.966)	  
	  
	  
INV_MINING	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.481	  
(1.239)	  
AIC	   278.041	   244.017	   126.771	   353.668	   315.125	   255.815	  
N	   231	   218	   150	   306	   190	   228	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Non_Ferrous_Metal_Ores	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
0.579	  
(0.374)	  
AIC	   255.434	   253.540	   254.846	   254.020	  
N	   301	   301	   301	   301	  
Notes: Negative binomial regressions. Dependent variables are number of Maoist surrender events.  Standard errors 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Fig 15: Impact	  of	  Mining	  on	  Retirement	  
 
	  
	  	   RETRMT	  
(1)	  
RETRMT	  
(2)	  
RETRMT	  
(3)	  
RETRMT	  
(4)	  
RETRMT	  
(5)	  
(Intercept)	   0.536	  
(3.172)	  
-­‐2.311	  
(2.950)	  
1.117	  
(3.556)	  
2.553	  
(3.230)	  
3.769	  
(3.538)	  
ORGDENS:	  2/1	   0.112	  
(0.590)	  
0.238	  
(0.524)	  
-­‐0.369	  
(0.581)	  
-­‐0.321	  
(0.587)	  
-­‐0.663	  
(0.590)	  
ORGDENS:	  3/1	   0.909*	  
(0.409)	  
0.495*	  
(0.395)	  
0.280**	  
(0.444)	  
0.526*	  
(0.422)	  
0.218*	  
(0.431)	  
r_pct_sc	   -­‐6.379*	  
(2.802)	  
-­‐7.132**	  
(2.509)	  
-­‐4.535	  
(2.931)	  
-­‐7.086*	  
(2.869)	  
-­‐6.767*	  
(2.953)	  
ln_area	   0.431	  
(0.347)	  
0.535	  
(0.326)	  
0.319	  
(0.388)	  
0.138	  
(0.365)	  
0.121	  
(0.369)	  
DIFFHHASSETS	   -­‐0.138	  
(0.087)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
HEALTH_ACCESS:	  1/0	   	  
	  
0.088	  
(1.060)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
HEALTH_ACCESS:	  2/0	   	  
	  
2.449***	  
(0.724)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
HEALTH_ACCESS:	  3/0	   	  
	  
1.583*	  
(0.641)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
LITERACY:	  1/0	   	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.030	  
(0.449)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
LITERACY:	  2/0	   	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐1.108	  
(1.350)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
LITERACY:	  3/0	   	  
	  
	  
	  
0.249	  
(0.811)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
REPRESSION	   	   	   	   1.946	   	  
 	  
	  
256	  
	   	   	   (2.188)	   	  
CONFINST:	  2/1	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.841	  
(0.597)	  
CONFINST:	  3/1	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.831	  
(0.477)	  
AIC	   369.969	   370.620	   382.741	   377.123	   377.279	  
N	   312	   301	   310	   310	   310	  
Notes: Negative binomial regressions. Dependent variables are number of Maoist surrender events.  Standard errors 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Fig	  16:	  	  ACCESS	  TO	  ASSETS	  AND	  PUBLIC	  SERVICE	  AND	  RETIREMENT	  
	  
	  
	  	   RETRMT	  
(1)	  
RETRMT	  
(2)	  
RETRMT	  
(3)	  
RETRMT	  
(4)	  
(Intercept)	   2.573	  
(3.445)	  
-­‐4.041	  
(3.408)	  
2.772	  
(3.283)	  
0.583	  
(3.699)	  
ORGDENS:	  1/0	   -­‐0.176	  
(0.573)	  
-­‐0.633	  
(0.491)	  
0.027	  
(0.545)	  
-­‐1.402**	  
(0.524)	  
ORGDENS:	  2/0	   1.174	  
(0.626)	  
0.449	  
(0.622)	  
1.320*	  
(0.609)	  
0.729	  
(0.571)	  
ORGDENS:	  3/0	   0.401*	  
(0.601)	  
-­‐1.320*	  
(0.573)	  
0.401*	  
(0.617)	  
-­‐0.547*	  
(0.533)	  
r_pct_sc	   -­‐7.700**	  
(2.899)	  
2.064	  
(2.714)	  
-­‐6.214*	  
(2.752)	  
-­‐5.147	  
(2.770)	  
ln_area	   0.226	  
(0.382)	  
0.580	  
(0.346)	  
0.162	  
(0.371)	  
0.400	  
(0.393)	  
DIFFHHASSETS	   -­‐0.123	  
(0.093)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
HEALTH_ACCESS:	  1/0	   	  
	  
5.808***	  
(1.396)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
HEALTH_ACCESS:	  2/0	   	  
	  
2.533*	  
(1.014)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
HEALTH_ACCESS:	  3/0	   	  
	  
1.963*	  
(0.854)	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
LITERACY:	  1/0	   	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐1.258*	  
(0.505)	  
	  
	  
 	  
	  
257	  
LITERACY:	  2/0	   	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.730	  
(0.536)	  
	  
	  
LITERACY:	  3/0	   	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐1.195	  
(0.633)	  
	  
	  
CONFINST:	  2/1	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
1.473**	  
(0.536)	  
CONFINST:	  3/1	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.374	  
(0.455)	  
AIC	   371.826	   356.366	   369.592	   363.254	  
N	   312	   310	   312	   312	  
Notes: Negative binomial regressions. Dependent variables are number of Maoist surrender events.  Standard errors 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Fig	  17:	  Robustness	  Tests	  (IHDS	  II)	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
